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The Bowen Affect: 
The Short Fiction of Elizabeth Bowen and the Case for Re-Reading Emotion 
 
 
Summary 
 
This thesis argues that the short fiction of Elizabeth Bowen is acutely preoccupied with 
reading emotion. Despite the growth of Bowen criticism, her stories remain 
understudied and this project proposes that their marginal status corresponds to this 
preoccupation. Through a close engagement with the literary representations of emotion 
at work in selected Bowen's stories, read alongside Bowen criticism, short story theory, 
and work on emotion, however, I show how her stories not only anticipate, but radically 
disrupt, current emotion theory. Recent theorisations of, and research on, emotion and 
affect across the disciplines tend to rely on the readability of emotion, emphasising the 
interpretation of specific emotions and reviving practices of affective criticism. Yet 
Bowen‟s short fiction foregrounds emotion‟s textuality: rather than allow us to read 
emotion „in‟ literature, I argue that her stories theorise the literariness of emotion. The 
project begins by suggesting a correspondence between her stories‟ engagement with 
emotion and their status, both within her literary oeuvre and in Bowen scholarship, to 
suggest that the complexity of her short fiction is often under-represented by occluding 
the deconstructions emotion mobilises. This enables us to map critical debates amongst 
Bowen scholars about the radicality of Bowen‟s fiction onto wider narratives about 
emotion and critical resistances to its textuality. I go on to undertake close readings of 
selected stories to show how Bowen‟s short fiction destabilises, rather than reinforces, 
the geographies of subjectivity, reality, time, and materiality to which emotion is 
presumed to belong. This project extends Bowen criticism that observes the ways her 
work anticipates psychoanalytical and Derridean readings, but through its focus on the 
short story it offers the second focused study of Bowen‟s short fiction, and the first 
study of her short fiction to be informed by critical emotion theory. Not only does this 
thesis carve out a new territory within Bowen scholarship, but it offers a timely 
contribution to problems in thinking emotion and affect in literary criticism and theory. 
More broadly, it is my hope that my reading of Bowen demonstrates the necessity of 
attending to the textuality of emotion in the reading and theorisation of emotion across 
the disciplines. 
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Introduction 
Bowen’s ‘Shrewish’ Short Stories 
 
In February of 1941, Elizabeth Bowen replied to an invitation from Virginia Woolf to 
visit.  Bowen‟s letter is brief: she asks about buses from Lewes to Rodmell, mentions an 
upcoming christening, and explains that she will begin her journey after lunch, as she 
has friends coming to „eat a turkey…brought from Ireland‟. 1   Personal, funny, perhaps 
even intimate, there is nothing obviously radical about Bowen‟s letter. But towards the 
end of the final page, she runs out of space. Before signing off, there is a cramped 
paragraph which, reaching the end of the line, is completed, scrawling upwards, in the 
left-hand margin:  „Here are the short stories‟, she writes, „ – most of them, as I said, 
except Summer Night, were written three, four, or five years ago.  They now seem to 
me to be rather shrewish.  Please read the last one first. Much love, from Elizabeth‟.2  
Spread between the letter proper and its margins, Bowen‟s remarks are doubly 
located. Concluding by introducing the stories makes these an important part of the 
letter; their presence is major. But Bowen‟s remarks also have the quality of an 
afterthought, a minor observation.  Significant, and at the same time marginal, Bowen‟s 
remark on her stories figures what has come to be, until recently, Bowen‟s own status in 
twentieth century literature and criticism, what Susan Osborn describes as that quality 
of being „not quite in but never quite out either‟.3 Yet Bowen‟s comments also invoke, 
                                                     
1
 Letter from Elizabeth Bowen to Virginia Woolf, February 3
rd, 1941. Bowen‟s letter is held in the Monks 
House Papers in the Virginia Woolf Archives at the University of Sussex Library Special Collections.  
2
 Ibid. 
3
 Susan Osborn, „Introduction: Elizabeth Bowen: New Directions for Critical Thinking‟ in Modern 
Fiction Studies, Vol. 53: Number 2 (John Hopkins University Press: Summer 2007), pp. 225-237, p. 227.  
Osborn‟s introduction and the critical essays from the special edition of Modern Fiction Studies were 
2 
 
within that critical scholarship, the marginal status of her short stories. As Phyllis 
Lassner remarks, Bowen‟s critical readers „never fail to refer to her stories, but the latter 
are usually read as glosses on the longer works‟.4 The growth of Bowen studies has 
begun to provide the stories with a critical life of their own and retrieve them from 
marginality. Yet this project begins by suggesting that Bowen‟s remark registers a more 
specific, and marginalised aspect of Bowen‟s short fiction: their preoccupation with 
emotion.  
This project is not the first to suggest a relationship between Bowen‟s short 
fiction and emotion – Bowen herself insisted that the short story without passion 
„desiccates into little more than a document‟.5 Phyllis Lassner remarks that critics of 
Bowen‟s stories have taken their „cue from readings of her novels‟, characterising her 
work as that of a „social critic, a psychological realist, and a dramatist of moral truth‟.6 
Far from overlooked, emotion has been the critical tool that underpins these readings, 
by locating their „feeling of depth, of sympathy, experience realized‟, and „antithesis 
between external fact and internal reality, between the objective condition and the 
projection of an internal world where feeling alone reigns‟.7 Observing the tendency to 
universalise both Bowen‟s stories, and the psychological realities they have been argued 
to portray, Lassner argues instead that it is their distinctive engagement with emotion 
that sets the stories apart from the novels: 
                                                                                                                                                           
recently published as an edited collection of essays in Susan Osborn (Ed.), Elizabeth Bowen: New Critical 
Perspectives (Cork: Cork University Press, 2009). Where needed this study distinguishes between 
Osborn‟s introduction to MFS and her introduction to New Critical Perspectives by date. 
4
 Phyllis Lassner, Elizabeth Bowen: A Study of the Short Fiction (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1991), 
p. xi. 
5
 „Stories by Elizabeth Bowen‟ in The Mulberry Tree, ed. by Hermione Lee (London: Harcourt Brace 
Jovanovich, 1986), pp. 126 – 130, ps. 130,128. 
6
 Lassner, p.157. 
7
 Lassner quotes John Bayley‟s discussion of „Mysterious Kôr‟ (p. 159) and Edward Mitchell‟s 
categorisation of Bowen‟s „themes‟ (p. 163). See John Bayley, The Short Story: Henry James to Elizabeth 
Bowen (New York: St Martin‟s Press, 1988), pp. 175-175 and Edward Mitchell, „Themes in Elizabeth 
Bowen‟s Short Stories‟ in Critique Vol. 8 (Spring-Summer 1966), pp. 41-54, p. 50. 
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Overturning a primary feature of the novel, she develops the idea of 
a story‟s action as a drama taking precedence over character 
development. Instead of character, emotion shapes events, and even 
contemporary political issues are transformed into “dislocated and 
stabbing” feeling (CI, 46). Even setting or atmosphere, as she writes 
in the preface to Encounters, is given its frame by emotion.
8
  
 Overturning what she describes as the critical tradition of „acknowledging the 
significance of Bowen‟s background‟ before interpreting Bowen‟s stories as 
„psychological studies that universalize the terror of modern alienation‟9, Lassner‟s 
study departs from previous criticism of the short fiction by arguing that the 
psychological forces of Bowen‟s work are those of „personal and cultural history shaped 
by social, economic, and political forces internalized as the individual‟s sense of self‟.10 
For Lassner, Bowen‟s interest in the psychological complexifies the „literary, social, 
ideological, and epistemological questions‟11 with which her stories are occupied. 
Positioning Bowen‟s short fiction as „a response to her dual heritage and to the turbulent 
and unresolved history of Ireland‟, Lassner traces the importance of emotion in 
Bowen‟s stories to an „immediacy of…subjectivity‟ by which the stories „dramatize the 
way in which consciousness shapes history‟.12 Since its publication in 1991, Lassner‟s 
remains the only study to focus exclusively on Bowen‟s short fiction, offering a 
valuable contribution to the future of Bowen studies. The comprehensiveness of her 
                                                     
8
 Lassner, pp.119-120. Lassner quotes from Bowen‟s review of The Faber Book of Modern Short Stories 
in Collected Impressions (New York: Knopf, 1950). 
9
 Lassner, p.3. Amongst those studies that Lassner argues make up this tradition are Howard Moss‟s 1979 
discussion of children in Bowen‟s short fiction for the New Yorker („Interior Children‟ in New Yorker 
(February 5, 1979), pp. 121-128), William Heath‟s 1961 study Elizabeth Bowen (Madison: University of 
Wisconsin Press), Edwin Kenney‟s 1974 study Elizabeth Bowen for the Irish writer‟s series (Lewisburg, 
Pa.: Bucknell University Press), and Harriet Chessman‟s argument that women in Bowen‟s fiction are 
„outsiders to discourse‟ as examples of this tradition („Women and Language in the Fiction of Elizabeth 
Bowen‟ in Twentieth Century Literature, Vol. 29 (Spring, 1983), pp. 69-85, p. 70).  
10Lassner, p. 3. This tradition is perhaps exemplified by Allan Austin‟s remarks that Bowen „sees the 
essential being residing in the state of feelings; moreover, the quality of an individual‟s life is directly 
related to the depth and honesty of his felt life. Perhaps in an age in which the human mind has shown its 
limitations in the face of perpetual flux and overwhelming data, the possibilities for survival…truly reside 
in the emotional being‟ (Allan Austin, Elizabeth Bowen  (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1971), p.20). 
11
 Lassner, p. xii. 
12
 Ibid., pp. 8,4. 
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study, which considers all seventy-nine stories then widely available to the public in 
The Collected Stories, is still timely in its  caution against reducing Bowen‟s stories to 
„glosses‟ on the novels.13 Allan Hepburn‟s recent publication of „The Bazaar‟ and Other 
Stories will no doubt add to the possibilities Bowen‟s stories offer by sharing with 
Bowen‟s readers an additional 17 published but previously uncollected stories, and 11 
fragments of stories previously available only in archives.
14
 
 
The growth of Bowen studies has begun to provide the stories with a critical life 
of their own. While focused on Bowen‟s novels, Andrew Bennett and Nicholas Royle‟s 
1995 study Still Lives: Elizabeth Bowen and the Dissolution of the Novel observes the 
destabilising effects of touch at work in „Hand in Glove‟ and the hallucinatory effects of 
Bowen‟s war-time stories.15 In Maud Ellmann‟s Elizabeth Bowen: The Shadow Across 
the Page, „Look at All Those Roses‟ initiates the „nothings‟ that the study traces 
throughout Bowen‟s writing. Ellmann develops the uncanny geometries of love at work 
in The Hotel and Friends and Relations through readings of „The Secession‟ and „The 
Shadowy Third‟, and draws out the explosive collisions of past and present in „The 
Happy Autumn Fields‟.16 Neil Corcoran‟s Elizabeth Bowen: The Enforced Return 
intimates a poetics at work in Bowen‟s short fiction that lends to „The Back Drawing-
Room‟ a „decorously baleful momentum‟ that is haunting in its silences about the „end 
of her class‟.17 Corcoran also locates in Bowen‟s The Demon Lover and Other Stories a 
                                                     
13
 Lassner discusses those stories collected in The Collected Stories of Elizabeth Bowen (New York: 
Knopf, 1981).   
14
 See Elizabeth Bowen, The Bazaar and Other Stories, Ed. Allan Hepburn (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 2008). 
15
 See Andrew Bennett and Nicholas Royle, Still Lives: Elizabeth Bowen and the Dissolution of the Novel 
(London: St. Martins Press, 1995), pp.90; 168-169.   
16
 Maud Ellmann, Elizabeth Bowen: The Shadow Across the Page (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University 
Press, 2003). 
17
 Neil Corcoran, Elizabeth Bowen: The Enforced Return (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004), p. 34. 
5 
 
retrieval of feeling from the past to restore and preserve the „uncertain “I” ‟.18 For Renée 
Hoogland, whose study discusses Bowen‟s preface to The Demon Lover and Other 
Stories, these war-time stories reaffirm „the social basis of subjective experience‟.19 
Confronted with the tearing down of social barriers and places, Hoogland argues, the 
stories not only signal how the war „threatened the total extinction of the self‟ but that 
literature, for Bowen, „puts up a defense against the threat of total disintegration‟.20  
Despite the growth of interest in Bowen‟s stories, however, critical work on her 
short fiction is still dominated by attention to those included in the Demon Lover 
collection, and, more particularly, to „The Happy Autumn Fields‟, „The Demon Lover‟, 
and „Mysterious Kôr‟. Discussions of these tend to hinge on the effects of the war on 
Bowen‟s literary formations of subjectivity; crucial to these arguments is an attention to 
the emotional effects of Bowen‟s writing, and to the way these help us interpret the 
stories‟ contexts as well as trace the trajectory of her literary development. In particular, 
while critics disagree about the extent to which the war stories, in Hoogland‟s words, 
defend against disintegration, there is little consideration of the ways this kind of 
„disintegration‟ may have been at work in her earlier stories and, instead, critics tend to 
locate this aspect of Bowen‟s innovation and strangeness as a direct response to the war. 
Just as Lassner argues that Bowen‟s stories have been read as „glosses on the novel‟, 
however, I would argue that scholarship of the short fiction tends to treat these as 
emotional glosses on the psychological, historical and socio-cultural contexts and 
derivations of her work, her characters, and Bowen herself. While this is something 
Bowen‟s prefaces themselves might be argued to invoke, the stories are far less 
                                                     
18
 See Corcoran‟s chapter „Words in the Dark: The Demon Lover and Other Stories (1945)‟ (pp.147-167). 
Corcoran‟s argument draws the „uncertain „I‟‟ from Bowen‟s preface to The Demon Lover and Other 
Stories (MT, pp. 94-99). 
19
 Renée Hoogland, Elizabeth Bowen: A Reputation in Writing (New York: New York University Press, 
1994), pp.110, 113. 
20
 Ibid., 110. 
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transparent about emotion.
21
 As the only sustained study of Bowen‟s short fiction, 
Lassner‟s is also perhaps the most problematic in this regard: organising Bowen‟s 
stories into the  „literary, social, ideological, and epistemological questions‟22 she argues 
they pose, Lassner‟s thematisations also depend on reading the emotions of Bowen‟s 
characters to organise the stories into a coherent oeuvre. In this way, despite its value to 
scholarship on the short fiction, Lassner‟s study at times under-represents the 
complexity of emotion more generally, and, specifically, the ways Bowen‟s short fiction 
engages with ideas about emotion. It is precisely this complexity that I believe 
preoccupies Bowen‟s short fiction. Bennett and Royle observe that Bowen‟s novels 
„appear to accommodate…highly traditional notions of literary criticism (a focus on 
„life‟, close reading, the affective power of literary texts)‟ and also represent „powerful, 
theoretically-informed sites of cultural and ideological disruption‟.23 This thesis extends 
Bennett and Royle‟s observation to Bowen‟s short fiction: but in doing so, I argue that 
the affective power of Bowen‟s stories is what mobilises their radical disruptions.  
Bowen‟s stories anticipate theorisations of emotion that have emerged in the 
more recent critical turn to emotion, affect, and feeling across the disciplines, but they 
also challenge, in important ways, the readings of emotion these theorisations give rise 
                                                     
21
 For example, the reader of Encounters, Bowen tells us, must „allow for the intellectual fashion, and for 
the psychological climate of a decade. The now famous ‟twenties, asceptic and disabused, had already set 
in, though without a name‟[sic] (APaW, p. 86). To the reader of The Demon Lover and Other Stories, 
Bowen draws out the stories‟ commonalities: „one finds a woman projected from flying-bombed 
London…into the key emotional crisis of a Victorian girlhood…a man…peers through the rusted 
fortifications and down the dusty empty perspectives of a seaside town at the Edwardian episode that has 
crippled his faculty for love…[and] a girl is led to find the key to her neurosis inside a timepiece‟ (MT, p. 
97-98). And in her preface to Stories by Elizabeth Bowen, Bowen writes that the short story „allows for 
what is crazy about humanity: obstinacies, inordinate heroisms, immortal longings‟ (APaW, p. 80). 
Explaining why she chose these stories, amongst her thirty-six years of story writing, to represent what 
„kind of stories‟ she wrote, Bowen notes: „Each of these arose out of an intensified, all but spellbound 
beholding, on my part, of the scene in question…Each time I felt: „Yes, this affects me – but it would 
affect “X” more.‟ Under what circumstances; for what reason? And who is „X‟? In each case, the „X‟ I 
pondered upon became the key character in the resultant story‟ (APaW, p. 79). 
22
 Lassner, p. xii. 
23
 Bennett and Royle, p. xiv. 
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to. Bowen‟s critics have observed the acuity her writing has to its own status as writing, 
how it both entreats, and retreats from, interpretation. Charged with an „eventfulness‟ of 
reading and writing that exceeds the analytic pressures they invite, Bowen‟s fiction 
actuates her observation that „writing is eventful; one might say it is in itself 
eventfulness…Reading is eventful also‟.24 Bennett and Royle‟s study registers the force 
of this eventfulness as what mobilises „dissolutions at the level of personal identity, 
patriarchy, social conventions and language itself – up to and including the language of 
fiction and criticism‟.25 Maud Ellmann‟s study shows us how Bowen „thinks in fiction‟, 
her writing contracted such that her „ideas are inseparable from her objects, settings, 
plots, and characters, and from the oddities of her unnerving syntax‟.26  Scholarship of 
the short fiction, however, dominated as it is by the Demon Lover stories, perhaps 
occludes the eventfulness of her short fiction by privileging her own critical 
interpretation of her stories in her prefaces. Yet as Bowen‟s foreword to Afterthought 
suggests, her critical writing gives form to, rather than defines, her fiction: it is, she 
notes, „[e]asy to be wise after the event‟.27 While Bowen insisted on the emotional 
shape and register of her short fiction, this project aims to attend to the eventfulness of 
this engagement with emotion. Not only do Bowen‟s fictions „think‟, then, but I argue 
her short stories feel: remarkably preoccupied with the problems of how to read 
emotion, Bowen‟s short fiction feels for feeling.  
In this sense, this project responds to observations circulating through Ellmann‟s 
study, and Bennett and Royle‟s, both of which initiate an attention to how Bowen‟s 
fiction destabilises our ideas about emotion. Ellmann draws out the plagiarising effects 
of love and its geometries in Bowen‟s fiction, where people often work as place-holders 
                                                     
24
 Elizabeth Bowen, „Foreword‟ in Afterthought: Pieces about Writing (Longmans: London, 1962), p. 9. 
25
 Bennett and Royle, p. xix. 
26
 Ellmann, p. 7.  
27
 APaW, p. 9. 
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and intimacy always requires a third presence
28, while Bennett and Royle‟s study of the 
dissolutions Bowen‟s novels effect is punctuated by observations that suggest 
Ellmann‟s observations of love might be extended to a re-reading of emotion itself. My 
project picks up on these propositions; but it also demonstrates my own critical 
preoccupation with the place of emotion – or difficulty of placing emotion –  not only 
within literary theory and criticism, but across the disciplines. Literary scholarship, is, 
this project argues, irreducibly tied up with discourses of and about emotion. While 
criticism is often grounded in specific claims about emotion, or specific emotions, 
mobilising these for critical ends, emotion itself has until recently, as in other 
disciplines, worked like an open secret whose remarkable circulation guarantees the 
economy of criticism, and yet whose presence itself is often considered unremarkable, 
or unremarked upon. Vital to theorisation, emotion itself is often un-theorised. Both 
everywhere and nowhere, the critical position of emotion oscillates between its 
centrality, and its marginalisation, both within disciplines, and across them. 
Keith Opdahl remarks that the „twentieth century may someday be known for its 
quiet rediscovery of emotion‟.29 Certainly, since about the late 1970s, interest in 
emotion has accelerated across the disciplines to the extent that it would not only, as 
Sara Ahmed observes in The Cultural Politics of Emotion, be „impossible‟30 to offer a 
comprehensive survey of emotion theory, but such a survey would also suggest that 
work on emotion has a cohesiveness as a body of scholarship that it simply does not. 
Introducing his recent study of emotion theory, James Kagan writes that what he 
intended to be a discussion of what emotion is was able only to summarise what we 
                                                     
28
 See Maud Ellmann‟s discussion of the geometries of love in „Shadowing Elizabeth Bowen‟ (pp. 1-39) 
and „Impasse: The Hotel, Friends and Relations, and „The Shadowy Third‟‟ (pp. 69-95). 
29
 Keith Opdahl, Emotion as Meaning: The Literary Case for How We Imagine (Lewisburg: Bucknell 
University Press, 2002), p. 79. 
30
 Sara Ahmed, The Cultural Politics of Emotion (New York: Routledge, 2004), p.4. 
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think we know and why. The growth in emotion research meant that completing each 
chapter „resembled the removal of fallen leaves from a vast lawn on a windy day in 
October. By the time one has cleared the last patch of earth, new leaves have fallen on 
the area one raked hours earlier‟.31 Far from decided, the current status of emotion 
continues to be divided by debates about the extent to which there are basic and 
universal emotions; the nature of the interactions between the body‟s neural, 
musculoskeletal, and nervous systems; the usefulness of distinctions between orders of 
emotion; and the extent to which emotion upholds or disrupts the boundaries of the 
subject. Evolutionary psychology, for example, continues to develop Darwin‟s thinking 
about facial expression, and the idea that the body‟s physical expressions of emotions 
can be reliably read or decoded has been widely popularised by Paul Ekman‟s work on 
both expression and emotion more generally, and tends to pivot around the idea of 
„revealing‟ or decoding emotion.32  Neuroscience remains significantly divided about 
the extent to which the brain interacts not only with the other constitutive components 
of the body but also with society. Antonio Damasio has offered an unexpected 
„material‟ ally for those interested in the performativity and  cultural aspects of emotion 
and has had a significant impact on the popularisation of the neuroscience of emotion. 
                                                     
31
 James Kagan, What is Emotion? History, Measures and Meanings (New Haven: Yale University Press: 
New Haven, 2009), p. xi. 
32
 See Ekman‟s Unmasking the Face: A Guide to Recognizing Emotions from Facial Expressions 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Malor Books, 2003); What the Face Reveals: Basic and Applied Studies of 
Spontaneous Expression Using the Facial Action Coding System (FACS) (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2005); The Nature of Emotion: Fundamental Questions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994); 
Emotions Inside Out: 130 Years After Darwin‟s Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals (New 
York: New York Academy of the Sciences, 2003); and Emotions Revealed: Recognizing Faces and 
Feelings to Improve Communication and Emotional Life, 2nd ed. (New York: Holt Books, 2007). There 
are too many critical engagements with the „legibility‟ of emotion to adequately catalogue them here, and 
I am limited over the course of this discussion to those most relevant to the intersection of arguments I 
undertake here. Some fruitful engagements with the textuality of facial expression, however, are Lynda 
Nead‟s consideration of the „making‟ of facial expression in relation to the history of emotion in 
„Response: The Art of Making Faces‟ in Textual Practice 22: 1 (2008), pp. 133-143;  Walter Koch‟s 
argument for and discussion of a readability of emotion in For a Semiotics of Emotion (Bochum: N. 
Brockmeyer, 1989), and Angela Rosenthal‟s discussion of the legibility of the blush and the politics of 
race in „Visceral Culture: Blushing and the Legibility of Whiteness in Eighteenth Century British 
Portraiture‟ (in Art History Vol. 27, No. 4 (Sept 2004), pp. 563-592). 
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His work also offers a productive attention to the relationships between neuroscience, 
philosophy and psychoanalysis, while Elizabeth Wilson‟s research offers an exceptional 
consideration of the intersections between the body, brain and psychoanalysis to suggest 
that conversion hysteria might importantly contribute to feminist theorisations of the 
body.
33
 Alongside Damasio, Joseph Le Doux‟s neuroscience of emotion is equally 
popular, although his approach is rather different. LeDoux‟s initial work argued for a 
significant distinction between the cultural aspects of emotion and the brain states that 
are its „facts‟, however his more recent work examines the synaptic activity emotion 
involves and this has led him to redefine his earlier distinctions between „nature and 
nurture‟ as „the nurturing of nature‟.34  Most disciplines continue to deploy either 
explicit or implicit differentiations between different „orders‟ of emotion, for instance 
by distinguishing between „reactive‟ or „basic‟ emotions and „intellectual‟ or „cognitive‟ 
ones, and this becomes evident when reading the literature review of any of the studies 
that I have noted in this project. This tendency, for example, shapes the methodology of 
the recent study The Self-Conscious Emotions: Theory and Research, which focuses on 
guilt, empathy, altruism and care-giving because these are perceived to involve more 
complex social relations and orientations than the „basic‟ emotions.35 The study 
emphasises that those emotions termed „self-conscious‟ are those that do not adhere to 
biological definitions of emotion. We can also see the distinction between orders of 
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emotion at work in an emphasis on the rationality of emotion, such as Martha 
Nussbaum‟s Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions.36 
Although the „turn‟ towards thinking about emotion, affect, and feeling is often 
diagrammed by its scholars as a long overdue response to a history of critical 
disinterest, Sara Ahmed and Rei Terada remind us that these „turns‟ should always be 
situated as returns that emerge from longer histories of ideologies of emotion.  As Sarah 
Ahmed remarks,  
…even if emotions have been subordinated to other faculties, they 
have still remained at the centre of intellectual history. As a reader of 
this history, I have been overwhelmed by how much „emotions‟ have 
been a „sticking point‟ for philosophers, cultural theorists, 
psychologists, sociologists, as well as scholars from a range of other 
disciplines. This is not surprising: what is relegated to the margins is 
often, as we know from deconstruction, right at the centre of thought 
itself.
37
 
 
It is this „sticking point‟ that interests me – one of the most remarkable aspects of the 
„rediscovery‟ of emotion is that we do not, actually, know what emotion is. Even more 
remarkably, we proceed as if we do.  
Recently, Peter de Bolla argued that the problem with emotion, or „the problem 
with understanding its strangeness, its awkward status or function in respect to 
knowledge, say, or experience is not the languages we use or negotiate in our speaking 
of it but the concept of subjectivity it upholds and perhaps even protects and 
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promulgates‟.38  This is because, for De Bolla, what „links all our current accounts of 
emotion is a concept of the subject or individual which provides us with the location for 
emotion. Emotions happen in people‟.39 De Bolla goes on to argue that it does not 
matter when the concept of subjectivity that emotion „upholds‟ emerged, only that this 
is the „conceptual envelope‟ in which we live, the „ “vrai” that we are “dans” ‟.40  But, 
while I agree that attending to emotion does demand an attention to the subjectivity it is 
believed to uphold, it is important to remember that it is not „emotion‟ that upholds this 
idea of subjectivity (as De Bolla‟s own proposition that we „begin the task of building a 
different concept of the subject‟41 would seem to acknowledge), but precisely the ways 
we „speak about‟, „express‟ or „represent‟ emotion; what upholds this is the work we 
make emotion do, so to speak.  
I want to suggest that De Bolla‟s remarks repeat a familiar narrative about 
emotion. „Emotionology‟ may not be a well-known term for many of today‟s emotion 
researchers, but it was introduced in 1985 by Stearns and Stearns to help overcome what 
they argued was a vital methodological problem confronting the „new‟ field of emotion 
study: the need to distinguish between the „reality‟ of emotion – our actual experiences 
of it, and its „ideation‟ – the values, orientations, and beliefs a culture, individual or 
institution or social group holds about emotion.
42
 What precipitated Stearns‟ and 
Stearns‟ concern was that the then burgeoning interest in the history of emotions offered 
„provocative histories about aspects of emotionology but…said far less about emotion 
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41
 Ibid. 
42
 Peter N. Stearns and Carol Z. Stearns, „Emotionology: Clarifying the History of Emotions and 
Emotional Standards‟ in The American Historical Review, Vol. 90, No. 4 (Oct., 1985), pp. 813-836. 
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than they claimed‟.43 Concerned that an emerging emphasis on emotion as a social and 
cultural phenomena was confusing the distinctions between emotional experience and 
emotional expression, and implicitly confusing the boundaries between the material 
individual and their experience in the world, Stearns and Stearns offered 
„emotionology‟ as a taxonomical aid for siphoning one aspect of emotion from the other 
to assist in „grasping a phenomenon demonstrably difficult to grasp and adequately 
described by no single theory of human behaviour‟.44 Stearns and Stearns‟ introduction 
of emotionology registers a kind of scholarly dread of the effects (and, one might 
suggest, the „affects‟) of post-structural theory and what would come to be dubbed the 
linguistic turn. Rather than distinguish between emotion and emotionology as Stearns 
and Stearns hoped, however, work on emotion came to scrutinize the distinctions 
„emotionology‟ was meant to preserve. Rom Harré, for example, is one of the few 
emotion scholars to continue to use Stearns and Stearns‟ term, yet he now deploys 
„emotionology‟ to indicate the difficulty, rather than necessity, of distinguishing 
between the „actual‟ experience of emotion and its discourses.45 In this sense one of the 
important realizations of 1990s emotion research inflected by the „linguistic turn‟ was 
that emotion cannot be studied apart from the discourses that produce it. As Rei Terada 
remarks: 
It is not possible to talk about what emotion is, however, apart from 
arguments about how it can be conceived. It is only possible to 
construct a theory of emotion – or of anything – by asking how to 
represent it. The difficulty of representing emotion, in other words, is 
the difficulty of knowing what it is, not just for poststructuralist 
theory but for any theory.
46
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Yet the implications that impel Terada‟s work produced for many other thinkers of 
emotion a rather markedly different effect. Rei Terada observes that it is precisely this 
kind of observation that precipitated the turn for many emotion scholars away from 
post-structural theory and particularly deconstruction. Terada introduces her work by 
recalling a symposium at which emotion and feeling were posited amongst the things 
that „linguistic theories cannot do‟ or explain because it contradicts the very 
„elimination of the category of subject‟ these theories were understood to promulgate.47 
At the heart of this contention, Terada argues, was the accusation that not only did so-
called „deconstructionist‟ thinking fail to account for the persistence of emotion in a 
world that was supposed to be subject-less, but this persistence was being mobilized by 
the very accounts that were meant to counter the subject they thereby upheld: „[s]ome 
believe that poststructuralist theory describes a blank, mechanistic world; others point 
out with irritation that, nevertheless, certain theorists seem all too willing to claim and 
represent strong emotion‟.48   
Terada‟s observation is not restricted to the pragmatic philosophers she 
encountered. In the case of William Reddy‟s highly influential model for the historical 
study of emotions, for example, he adapts the performativity of emotion into a theory of 
„emotives‟ that are described as the „real world anchor of signs‟: this categorization of 
emotional experience, he argues, can intervene usefully in the „relativisms‟ of post-
structuralist theory.
49
 Taking as its central concern the implications of the „plasticity of 
the individual‟50 for political agency and questions of liberty, he argues that „emotives‟ 
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offer a meeting point between the „universality‟ of human emotion detailed by cognitive 
psychology and the cultural mutability and performativity of expression: emotion and 
expression, he argues, „interact in a dynamic way‟.51 At stake in this concession to 
universalism, he argues, is the capacity to establish  
a core concept of emotions, universally applicable, that allows one 
to say what suffering is, and why we all deserve to live in freedom.  
With reference to this concept of emotions, historical change again  
becomes meaningful; history becomes a record of human efforts to 
conceptualize our emotional makeup, and to realize social and political  
orders attuned to its nature‟.52  
 
Like Reddy, literary critic Keith Opdahl (whose arguments underpin and advocate an 
affective criticism) also develops a theory of emotion that attempts to preserve emotion, 
and subjectivity, from deconstruction. Opdahl extends cognitive work on emotion to 
suggest that emotion is meaning: while poststructuralism has some potential for 
understanding emotion, it at least „prepares for a study of emotion‟ by „breaking the 
positivistic mold… expos[ing] the hidden levers of social and linguistic control…‟.53 
Yet the work of „deconstructionist critics‟ is for Opdahl more than a little disturbing: 
The claim by deconstructionist critics that texts deny their own 
meaning, privileging distance, devalues empathy with the text and 
values the analytical breakdown of its meaning – a source of great 
fun and power, even if it does erode our appreciation of the 
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masterpieces that define our culture. In this sea change, critics 
moved from the old humanism, which had a place for emotion and 
subjectivity, to the relentless world of semiotics…in which all is 
convention and the only path to knowledge is self-conscious 
analysis.
54
  
 
For Opdahl, the loss of certainty about identifying emotion that poststructuralist 
accounts discerned could at least be recuperated into an account of the relationship 
between power and emotion. The disregard for human experience that he attributes to 
„deconstructionist critics‟ renders their thinking irrelevant to, or disinterested in, the 
study of emotion.
55
 The consequence of such a „turn‟ is manifest in Opdahl‟s argument 
that that there is a special relationship between „prose fiction‟ and emotion:  „…emotion 
is there on the page, embedded in language.  We can walk around it, studying it from all 
sides.  We can come up close to feel its texture and stand back to view it in context.  In 
prose narrative emotion is stable and public and so uniquely accessible‟.56 I want to 
point out that this model simply exemplifies the assumption that there is such a „thing‟ 
as emotion that can be defined, identified by particular signs, located, and stabilised so 
as to study it. In short, it assumes that emotion is readable in that it accedes to and is 
disclosed by reading, whether in the form of formal analysis, or everyday experience. 
This is what Sarah Ahmed calls the „property‟ model of emotion. Observing that we can 
describe the sense that emotion is „contagious‟, Ahmed notes that work on archives of 
feeling, contagion and transmission of emotion, feeling and affect is useful when it 
draws attention to the ways emotion can move across boundaries; in this way, these 
models can help to destabilize the notion that emotion belongs „in‟ bodies. The problem, 
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however, is when these transform emotion into a property, as „something one has, and 
can then pass on, as if what passes on is the same thing‟.57  
While Opdahl‟s theory might belie the problems of what Terry Eagleton 
appointed the „dentistry school‟ of interpretation, where meaning is waiting to „be 
extracted, like a tooth‟58, it matters to thinking about both literary practice and the study 
of emotion because it helps us to trace and trouble wider narratives about emotion that 
register the „horizon of assumptions‟59 Terada observes at work in critical responses to 
deconstruction. But it also importantly indexes the investment these narratives have in 
the recuperative possibilities of emotion, affect, and feeling as the grounds of a reality 
and subjectivity that can be preserved against textuality.  Opdahl‟s narrative about our 
ability to read the relationship between emotion and its representation demonstrates a 
shift in critical narratives about emotion and our capacity to identify, define and theorise 
it that charts a turn from discourses of uncertainty about emotion to discourses of 
critical clarity about the location of emotion in the geographies of relations between 
bodies, subjects, and objects and, more importantly, between reality and signification, 
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materiality and ideation. The return in the humanities to emotion, affect, and feeling is 
increasingly enamoured by the promises of recuperation these subjects seem to offer.   
Perhaps one of the best examples of the persistence of these narratives about 
emotion is evinced by the critical status of distinctions between „emotion‟, „affect‟, and 
„feeling‟. In our everyday discourses of emotion, these overlapping terms don‟t refer to 
distinct phenomena but instead suggest the speaker‟s orientation to those phenomena – 
it is this everyday sense that I preserve in this project. Writing in 2001, Terada observes 
that the ways these terms overlap poses difficulties for a critical discussion of emotion, 
and so she offers these distinctions in order to facilitate her project: 
By emotion we usually mean a psychological and at least minimally 
interpretive experience whose physiological aspect is affect. Feeling is 
a capacious term that connotes both physiological sensations (affects) 
and psychological states (emotions). Although philosophers reserve 
“feeling” for bodily conditions, I use it when it seems fruitful to 
emphasize the common ground of the physiological and the 
psychological. Passion highlights an interesting phenomenon, the 
difficulty of classifying emotion as passive or active. Emotions are 
often portrayed as expressions of a subject imposed upon by the 
subject, as when someone is seized by remorse or surprised by 
joy…some [philosophers] address the ambiguity by dividing emotions 
into passive and active groups.
60
  
 
Terada acknowledges that these distinctions depend on the critical project that mobilizes 
them. In Ugly Feelings, Sianne Ngai argues that the contemporary „affect/emotion‟ split 
originated in psychoanalysis for the practical purpose of distinguishing third-person 
from first-person representations of feeling, with “affect” designating feeling described 
from an observer‟s (analysts‟) perspective, and “emotion” designating feeling that 
“belongs” to the speaker or analysand‟s “I” ‟. 61 Ngai‟s observation importantly draws 
out that these distinctions are intimately connected with the kind of work undertaken 
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within a particular framework of analysis, and are mobilized to deal with resistances to 
interpretation that the study of emotion encounters. For this reason, she argues that she 
chooses to maintain this distinction precisely because it registers a continual attention to 
the work these positionalities do when discussing emotion.
62
  
That our work on emotions should maintain this kind of attention to the slippage 
in the terminologies we use to talk about it is precisely what Amélie Rorty observed in 
1980, in Explaining Emotions:   
Emotions do not form a natural class. A set of distinctions that has 
generally haunted the philosophy of mind stands in the way of 
giving good descriptions of the phenomena. We have inherited 
distinctions between being active and being passive; between 
psychological states that are primarily explained by physical 
processes and psychological states not reducible to nor adequately 
explained by physical processes; distinctions between states that 
are primarily nonrational and those that are either rational or 
irrational; between voluntary and nonvoluntary states. Once these 
distinctions were drawn, types of psychological activities were then 
parcelled out en bloc to one or another side of the dichotomies. 
That having been done, the next step was to argue reclassification: 
to claim that perception is not passive but active, or that 
imagination has objective as well as subjective rules of association. 
Historically, the list of emotions has expanded as a result of these 
controversies.
63
 
 
Yet the essays in Patricia Clough‟s 2007 The Affective Turn: Theorizing the Social not 
only naturalise a distinction between affect and emotion, but also define emotion 
without attention to this uncertain status. Affect is defined by Clough as the „non linear 
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complexity out of which the narration of conscious states such as emotion are 
subtracted‟.64 Subtracted from affect, emotion is also subtracted from the discussions 
that form the collection, except for two moments that are suggestive for the distinctions 
they make between affect and emotion. Elizabeth Wissinger contends that because 
„affect‟ has been deployed in different disciplines to refer to „demeanour, the external 
expression of emotion, or emotions more generally‟65, it is necessary to distinguish 
emotion from the affect that „Silvan Tomkins…understood [as] specific physiological 
responses that then give rise to various effects which may or may not translate into 
emotions‟.66 What distinguishes affect and emotion here is that emotion, which is 
already conceived of as a representation, is also understood to be open to reading; 
affect, however, is not yet organized and therefore not represented. This distinction 
seems to institute a variation on the logos of depth in the form of temporality. The other 
discussion of emotion in the collection, however, reintroduces this distinction by 
advocating that Antonio Damasio‟s definition of emotion, in which „the actual physical 
response of the organism as [stimulus] is mapped and modified by the brain‟67, be 
understood as a definition of affect, because Damasio‟s construction of emotion more 
closely resembles Spinoza‟s definition of affect as the „power to act‟.68 The very 
critique Damasio‟s conceptualization of emotion might pose to an „affect/emotion‟ split 
is then recuperated by allocating „capacity‟ purely to affect rather than emotion. I am 
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curious about these moments because they work by siphoning emotion from affect, or 
replace emotion with affect, precisely because of the contradictions emotion appears to 
present. My point here is not to question the calibre of thinking about affect, but to 
problematise how this thinking advances by distinguishing affect from emotion, 
doubling the „affective turn‟ with a turning away from the conceptual difficulties 
attached to emotion. I want to suggest that the risk of assuming emotion has been 
defined is two-fold: it not only under-represents the complexity of the intersections of 
thought that underpins our ideas about emotion, but also under-represents the extent to 
which our thinking about emotion is produced by the very disciplinary discourses and 
critical genealogies that study it. Anthropologist Catherine Lutz, whose work I discuss 
in Chapter One, once remarked that emotion is one of the most powerful devices by 
which domination proceeds.
69
 While my thinking about emotion has come to be 
differently inflected than it was when I first read Lutz in 1999, her observation is still at 
the heart of the ways I think about emotion. Underpinning my engagement with the 
increasing interest in emotion, affect and feeling across the disciplines, then, are the 
questions prompted by Rei Terada‟s observation that discussions of emotion are always 
ideological.
70
 
Asked in an interview with the Oxford Literary Review in 2006 about the 
„affective turn‟, Imogen Taylor replied:   
I could dwell for sometime on what I find problematic about the recent 
turn to feeling, emotion and affect within the humanities…I find the 
turn to affect particularly problematic in the work of thinkers such as 
Brian Massumi (2002), for whom a focus on the „affective‟ is explicitly 
understood as a „turn away‟ from the perceived limitations of 
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ideological and representational critique and „back to‟ some pure, 
mythic, vital, materiality.
71
  
 
Massumi‟s Parables for the Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation is the text cited by 
Clough as a significant influence on the thinkers in her collection. Massumi offers this 
distinction between emotion and affect:  
…emotion is subjective content, the sociolinguistic fixing of the quality 
of an experience which is from that point onward defined as personal. 
Emotion is qualified intensity [affect], the conventional, consensual 
point of insertion of intensity into semantically and semiotically formed 
progressions, into narrativizable action-reaction circuits, into function 
and meaning. It is intensity owned and recognized. It is critical to 
theorize the difference between affect and emotion. If some have the 
impression that affect has waned, it is because affect is unqualified. As 
such, it is not ownable or recognizable and is thus resistant to critique.
 72
 
 
Massumi argues that it is critical to distinguish emotion from affect: but to delineate 
how emotion is sociolinguistically fixed he refers to specific emotions.  Yet, as Zoltán 
Kövecses points out in a critique of neuroscientist Joseph LeDoux‟s hardening of the 
distinction between the materiality and ideation of emotion, if we only locate emotion in 
the content that categorises or designates emotion, and more particularly the content we 
may recognize as designating emotion, then we are already encountering it at a point of 
objectification. As Kövecses points out, the idea that emotion inheres in particular 
content is an 'unsatisfactory kind of linguistics, in which emotion language consists only 
in literal emotion words, such as fear, anxiety, terror, apprehension, that classify and 
refer to a pre-existing emotional reality (the brain states and bodily responses)…[that] 
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can only lead to an over-simplification of the many subtle ways in which emotion and 
language interact…‟.73  
I do not wish to conflate Le Doux and Massumi‟s distinctions but remain 
curious about why Massumi‟s differentiation between potentiality and actualisation 
needs to iterate a distinction between affect and emotion. Fixing emotion braces the 
fluidity of affect that moves Massumi‟s arguments, yet interrupts the motions of 
emotion – from „e-movere‟, „to move out‟ – in order to make it do work. While 
Massumi‟s observation that thinking about discursivity has limited spheres of 
applicability is perhaps correct, I am unsure how the distinction between affect and 
emotion does not also imply discursivity with affect.
74
 Even if what we speak of is 
presumed to be prior to representation, it is unclear as to how a conceptualization of 
affect that is determined against emotion can exclude what this relationality makes 
possible from the problems of relationality. If, as Massumi argues, it is an emotion‟s 
escape from affect that allows the „autonomy of affect‟75 to retain that autonomy (its 
openness as a „system‟), then it suggests this differentiation between what is outside the 
sphere of applicability of discourse and what is within this sphere, is given its very 
spatiality and capacity to be thus distinguished, by emotion. The exclusion of emotion 
from the more recent discourse about affect itself indicates the importance of attending 
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to the conceptual work that is done by our ideas of emotion. This project cannot be a 
direct engagement with Massumi, nor can it resolve the questions Massumi‟s definition 
of emotion raises, but his emphasis on there being a hardened distinction between the 
„order and logics‟76 of emotion and affect continues to preoccupy my thinking. It seems 
especially important that the definition of emotion that is being offered by the „affective 
turn‟ be retained as a problem, rather than a conclusion, because this distinction 
announces a designation of emotion that implies a recuperation, as Michael Hardt‟s 
foreword to Clough‟s edition puts it, of „what affects are good for‟ that gains its escape 
from „critique‟ by turning away from the interpretive problems emotion involves by 
making it, paradoxically, accede to interpretation.
77
 Rei Terada‟s critique of the affect-
emotion split is suggestive in this regard. She argues that theorizing non-subjectivity out 
of affect tends to work by reinforcing associations between emotion and centred 
subjectivity. For this reason, Terada contends that „championing affect is not the best 
way to debunk the supposed connection between emotion and subjectivity…because 
proponents of the subject are willing to compromise on affect‟.78   
Whilst De Bolla argues that it does not matter how we talk about emotion, 
feeling and affect, or what constitutes the „envelope of conceptuality‟79 in which we 
live, I want to suggest that Massumi‟s reinsertion of emotion into a spatial and temporal 
geography of „narrativizable action-reaction circuits, into function and meaning‟ is not 
necessarily a capture of emotion but captures with absolute intensity the importance of 
thinking about how we are writing about emotion. While Massumi and Opdahl 
undertake what might look like radically different projects, these overlap in their 
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diagramming of emotion. In both cases, it is presumed that emotion is captured and 
narrativised – or stilled – and thus it accedes, albeit in different conceptual frameworks, 
to epistemic pressure, reinforcing geographies of relations between ideality and 
substance, fiction and reality, bodies and texts, discourse and materiality. For Opdahl, 
that emotion inheres „in‟ texts makes emotion a representation within which meaning 
can be discovered, whilst for Massumi emotion‟s intensification of and thus escape 
from affect and „reinsertion‟ into function and meaning provides proof of the 
autonomous affect that is „resistant to critique‟.80   In this sense „emotion‟ is, in both 
cases, being activated to materialize or evidence what cannot otherwise be accessed; 
emotion becomes a kind of interface that coheres what is otherwise incoherent. 
Importantly, the conduit thus provided by emotion (whether as Opdahl‟s meaning or 
Massumi‟s „qualified affect‟) stabilizes or offers to its „reader‟ or „interpreter‟ the 
specific densities, relationalities, and intensities of its contracture, as if, from this point, 
the reader of emotion may „proceed‟. It is precisely the persistence of these interlocking 
ideas – that emotion can be stabilised and read; that it can be read in a text or in a 
subject; and that it accedes to this reading – that I am arguing Bowen‟s writing disrupts. 
In this study I share Imogen Taylor‟s concern, but I also agree with Terada‟s 
observation that „historically, the idea of emotion has been activated to reinforce notions 
of subjectivity that could use the help‟.81 For these reasons, maintaining an attention to 
the ways emotion is deployed should be at the heart of „forging new directions through 
a prevailing climate of methodological and political fatigue in the humanities‟.82  
The interest in emotion, then, has not developed or established a critical security 
about what emotion is but has instead involved the accumulation of distinctions to get at 
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the emotion we have not been able to access. Mobilising a flood of terminologies, 
discourses, and practices of reading or analysis that contract around the insistence that 
we are either getting closer to emotion or that we have not only identified it but, in some 
cases, moved on from it, the series of turns executed in work on emotion often repeats 
the epistemological defensiveness that Rei Terada observes is characteristic of thinking 
about emotion.
83
 It is particularly telling of the difficulties emotion presents to its 
scholars that much of the work since the late 1990s prefers to concentrate on specific 
emotions, such as fear, love, disgust, and, most recently, shame.
84
 Affording valuable 
attention not only to the histories of particular emotions, but also to the ways these 
circulate in what Sarah Ahmed describes as an affective economy, these also, however, 
attend to those emotions whose taxonomies have already determined our thinking about 
what emotion is, and those that are perceived to offer the potential for a reparative or 
recuperative politics. In this sense, critical study itself involves economies of affect.  
Importantly, the study of emotion also relies on the readability of the emotion studied so 
that it can be distinguished as a reality apart from the analyst that studies it. My ideas in 
this thesis have instead been shaped by thinking about the ways an analysis of emotion, 
to borrow Stearns and Stearns‟ phrase, leads to its emotionology – emotion exceeds the 
critical framework or taxonomies deployed to define it. Thinking about emotion is 
dominated by variations of cognitive theories, which posit that emotion is a judgment, 
an orientation, an interpretation, a belief, or an appraisal; histories of particular 
emotions, then, offer histories of specific judgments, beliefs, interpretations, appraisals, 
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and orientations.
85
 What interests me, however, is the textuality of these interpretations: 
rather than designate emotion as an interpretation, this thesis is underpinned by those 
theorists of emotion who mobilize it as an interpretive event, rather than an outcome of 
interpretation. While in 1995, Brian Parkinson suggested that the difficulty of defining 
emotion should make us ask whether emotion „actually exists‟86, much of the 
scholarship since the mid 1990s has, as Daniel Gross remarks, moved away from the 
problem of emotion itself, because it „obscures particular histories of shame, guilt, 
melancholy, and so on‟.87 Rei Terada, however, observing the ideologies smuggled into 
discussions of emotions, and in particular in the more recent „affect/emotion‟ split, 
argues that it is time to consider that the problem of defining emotion is at the heart of 
what it is.  
It is in this sense that Jacques Derrida‟s writing has inflected my thinking 
throughout this project. Two essays have been particularly critical for my thinking about 
the possibility of reading emotion: „Passions: An Oblique Offering‟ implies an intimacy 
between emotion and secrecy and teases out how this intimacy mobilizes critical 
discourses, while „ “Che cos‟è la poesia?” ‟, which touches on the invention of the heart, 
has textured my feeling, throughout this project, for emotion.
88
 Throughout my research 
I have been struck by how discussions about Bowen‟s fiction map larger debates about 
the possibility of „preserving‟ emotion from deconstruction, and my thinking throughout 
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this project has been inspired by and engages with the work of Rei Terada, Sara Ahmed, 
and Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, whose theorisations of emotion engage, albeit in different 
ways, with the deconstructions emotion mobilises.  Rei Terada‟s offers an important 
attention to the ways the „expressive hypothesis‟89 diagrams a history of thinking that 
extrapolates a subject from emotion by creating a circular logic where subjects are 
presumed to „have‟ emotion that they then express outward; the expressions that are 
visible to others thus offer proof of the subject that is expressed. For Terada, the 
continual need for classical philosophers to „hook‟ emotion to the subject, however, 
suggests that emotion is, instead, non-subjective. This in turn suggests emotion cannot 
be thought apart from deconstruction. Sara Ahmed‟s work importantly destabilises the 
assumption that emotions belong in particular bodies or texts. Instead, she argues that 
emotions involve circulations that make and unmake bodies, sticking these together in 
particular relations or allowing them to be held apart. Not only does her work attend to 
how emotion deconstructs the geographies it is presumed to reinforce, but it also helps 
us to observe the importance of thinking about emotion as an event, rather than an 
object or thing. With a tact for the impressions emotion involves, Ahmed shows how 
emotion initiates sensuous contiguities that trouble simple assumptions about dividing 
emotion between '„feelings‟ and „conscious states‟ that are „in‟ or „outside‟ bodies. An 
attention to the feeling of emotion is elucidated by Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, whose 
sensitivity to the textures of emotion materialises the interpretive potential of emotion at 
                                                     
89
 Terada observes that „expression is the dominant trope of thought about emotion‟ – the expressive 
hypothesis is the ideological and conceptual work done by the trope of expression in discussions of 
emotion: „The ideology of emotion diagrams emotion as something lifted from a depth to a surface…The 
purpose of expression tropes is to extrapolate a human subject circularly from the phenomenon of 
emotion. The claim that emotion requires a subject – thus we can see we‟re subjects since we have 
emotions – creates the illusion of subjectivity rather than showing evidence of it‟ (p. 11). What Terada 
terms the expressive hypothesis is one way of articulating what is meant by the presumption that emotion 
is readable, a notion that I explicitly challenge through my argument in chapter two that rather than show 
us how to read literary emotion, Bowen‟s short fiction demands that we acknowledge the literariness of 
emotion.  
29 
 
the level of discernment, initiating a dimensionality that undercuts the logos of depth 
and temporality involved in framing emotions as reactions in the subject or cognitions 
about an object. All three maintain an attention to the critical histories attached to 
particular emotions and thinking about emotion, offering an understanding of the ways 
critical writing feels, and, importantly, how critical this feeling is. 
This thesis argues that the short fiction of Elizabeth Bowen is remarkably 
preoccupied with the problem of reading emotion: anticipating contemporary theories of 
emotion, Bowen‟s short fiction also disrupts these. Given the breadth of Bowen‟s short 
story oeuvre, as well as the scholarship on emotion, this project can, at best, only be 
suggestive. Rather than contextualise Bowen‟s stories within a genealogy of criticism, I 
aim to show how attending to the ways Bowen‟s stories engage with ideas about 
emotion re-contextualises, and disrupts, our critical narratives about those genealogies. 
In doing so, I hope to show how these stories problematise wider narratives about 
emotion. In a culture of criticism that has had to contend with giving up what Frank 
Kermode called the „satisfactions of closure‟90, the study of emotion, affect, and feeling 
is being increasingly deployed to recuperate the dissatisfactions of textuality. It is 
precisely this turn that I suggest Bowen‟s short fiction interrupts. 
In Chapter One, „Sheer Gush‟: Bowen‟s Critical Feelings‟, I draw a 
correspondence between the critical histories of emotion, and Bowen scholarship. I 
suggest that critical debates about the radicality of Eva Trout contracts around readings 
of emotion, and explore how Bowen criticism maps debates about emotion more 
generally.  
In Chapter Two, „Frederick‟s Tears and the Literariness of Emotion‟, I explore 
the ways Bowen‟s stories deploy emotion as a kind of secret, whose reading 
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deconstructs relations between ideality and substance, fiction and reality, bodies and 
texts, discourse and materiality. Both appealing to interpretation, and resisting it, 
emotion helps us think about how Bowen‟s stories move our textual practice from 
reading literary emotion, to engaging with the literariness of emotion; this is how they 
move. 
In Chapter Three, „ “Nobody illustrates now, I wonder whether they could”: 
Motion, Pictures and Fictional Feeling in the Short Fiction of Elizabeth Bowen‟, I 
develop this sense of movement to argue that the cinematic in Bowen‟s short fiction 
disrupts critical traditions about modernist aesthetics. Interrupting the association 
between emotion and subjectivity that underpins the emergence of the post-modern non-
subject, Bowen‟s stories challenge the recent revival of the assumption that emotion 
belongs in the subject.  
Throughout, the project suggests the timeliness of reading Bowen given both the 
affective turn, and the acceleration of interest in the feeling of Bowen‟s war-time 
stories. In „Bowen‟s Feeling for Feeling‟ I respond to critical readings that time the 
feeling of Bowen‟s writing to her literary and personal contexts. Exploring the ways 
Bowen‟s stories knit time and emotion together into a textual fabric that enfolds the 
possibility of reading emotion into its very historicity, I suggest her short fiction returns 
the most recent turn from emotion to affect back into the temporal geography of 
emotion itself. 
Returning to emotion, Bowen‟s stories suggest their own movements of what, in 
her 1951 essay, she called the „Bend Back‟.91 Having „gone back‟ to emotion, I 
conclude in „ “that touch of the farouche”: The Queer Heart of Bowen‟s Short Fiction‟ 
by pointing forward to ways a feeling for emotion might develop our tact for Bowen‟s 
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short fiction. Bowen‟s insistence on „implied emotion‟92 has, at times, irritated critics 
and theorists of the short story. Unable to theorise the short story on emotion alone, its 
criticism is textured with a language of frustrated apprehension; this „tradition of 
ineffability‟93 is what „vexes those critics who grapple with the short story as a separate 
literary genre‟.94 From „grappelle‟, to „hook‟, criticism is unable to secure the short 
story, to take it in hand; yet its critics seem hooked by this retreat, as if it – or they – 
refuses to detach. Suggesting something like the poetics of Derrida‟s hérisson, „rolled 
up in a ball, prickly with spines, vulnerable and dangerous‟95, the short story feels more 
offensive. It advances, moving as if on its own. This, Bowen‟s stories suggest, is its 
emotion. 
* 
„They now seem to me to be rather shrewish.  Please read the last one first‟: as 
Bowen hands the stories over to Woolf, her remark animates them – they become little 
beasts, wicked, ill-natured, ill-tempered.
96
 They have bite. Underlined, the shrewish 
stories are flagged up, making Bowen‟s injunction to Woolf to „read the last one first‟ 
carry the sense of warning or caution: the stories must be handled with care, as if 
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reading them in a particular manner will keep them at arm‟s length, tame them, perhaps 
even diminish their capacity to affect. That which is shrewish is sharp: its apparently 
diminutive stature – whether the shrew or the shrewish woman – belies its 
dangerousness, its potential to radically alter or take over whatever it comes into contact 
with. The danger of the „shrewish‟ is that, although apparently innocuous, it will get 
under one‟s skin. The shrew‟s work is tongue-lashing: derived from the shrew‟s 
surprisingly painful bite, from Old English „screawa‟, the shrew „shreds‟. Yet its 
sharpness isn‟t from a bite that cuts, but from what the shrew leaves behind. Rarely 
puncturing the skin, the shrew‟s saliva produces inflammation and reddening of the 
skin.
97
 What makes the shrew sharp, then, what gives it bite, is not its ability to cut, but 
that it affects the body of another without rupturing it. The other root of „shrew‟ is 
„strew‟:  to scatter, to cover, to spread.  The shrew spreads itself, leaves its secretion 
behind – it sticks to what it threatens. Felt long after its bite, it gets hold of you just 
when you think you‟ve shaken its grip.  The shrewish short stories are thus doubly 
dangerous – they cut through reading alone, spreading their affect no matter how 
carefully they are handled.  Pointing out, in advance, this „sharp or cross-grained‟ 
nature, the letter anticipates the stories‟ reading effects: how they may rub the wrong 
way, or irritate their reader. Perhaps the remark offers a touch of cover for a softer side; 
or perhaps, marginalising them, it allows the stories to work under cover by 
undermining their capacity to affect, their reading effects – writing them off as merely 
shrewish, the stories are, after all, only words. Undecidable, Bowen‟s remark is, 
perhaps, also very shrewd.  
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A copy of Bowen‟s letter is held at the University of Sussex. The archives do 
not record which stories had been sent with her letter; aside from „Summer Night‟, we 
cannot be sure which ones she called „shrewish‟.  We can, however, get a taste of 
sharpness amongst those that might have been included.
98
 In „The Good Girl‟, Dagmar 
discusses a suitor with her cousin: „Italians are fearfully passionate,‟ she remarks: „I 
know a girl who got bitten by an Italian. But, as I said, that is just their way. Does he 
make love in English?‟ (CS: 358).  In „The Cat Jumps‟, a house‟s  murderous past 
animates a group of weekenders: Muriel Barker observes of one of the weekenders  „a 
kind of insane glitter‟ (CS: 364). In „A Love Story‟, Mrs Massey cries: her „eyes for the 
first time filled with tears. The access of some new feeling, a feeling with no context, 
resculptured her face‟ (CS: 510). In „No. 16‟, Jane, having visited a writer she admired, 
„still felt herself closely bound to him – he had done no more than hold her wrists, but 
she was a girl who had never been touched‟ (CS: 554). And in „Tears, Idle Tears‟, a 
mother‟s admonition not to cry in the middle of Regents Park causes her young 
Frederick to „burst into tears‟; later, an onlooker asks of his tear-swollen face: „My 
goodness, what‟s been biting you?‟ (CS: 485).  
These are, of course, all only speculations. But I want to suggest that in 
„Summer Night‟99, the one story named in Bowen‟s letter, we encounter a rather 
unexpected sharpness in the innocuous sweetness of Queenie. Most of „Summer Night‟ 
is preoccupied with an affair between Robinson, a „married man living apart from his 
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wife‟ (588), and Emma, a married woman en route to Robinson‟s to consummate their 
affair.  While Robinson waits for Emma‟s arrival, he hosts Justin and his sister Queenie. 
Their visit, as if entertainment to Robinson, forms a brief episode in the narrative; 
Queenie, characterised by her deafness, is even more peripheral. While Justin and 
Robinson talk, Queenie is in the background, but her deafness is sharpened into focus. 
Perceived by those around her to have heightened feeling Queenie is rendered with an 
attention to emotion  – she is, we are told several times, „happy‟, „inside her sphere of 
silence that not a word clouded‟; she even drops „hairpins into a heart-shaped tray‟ 
(607).  
As if belonging to the past, in her „poult-de-soie parasol‟ and „artless dresses‟ 
(587), Queenie tantalises with the taste of redemption. Augmented by her very 
peripherality, Queenie suggests sweetness, a security of feeling that offers an alternative 
to Emma and Robinson‟s adultery and the dissonances of war and modernity that 
occupy her brother (605). For Justin, Queenie seems untouched by the present: he 
doesn‟t know „if she shared his feeling of dissonance, or if she recoiled from shock, or 
if she were shocked at all‟ (605). While Justin and Robinson discuss the need for a „new 
form for thinking and feeling‟ (589), Queenie has never been out of touch with feeling: 
when Robinson laughs at Justin‟s question about love, „Queenie felt the vibration and 
turned round‟ (591). Queenie‟s departure from Robinsons‟s heralds Emma‟s arrival, and 
a return to the affair that drives the story. Yet it is as if something of Queenie‟s 
innocence lingers after her departure, tainting the atmosphere. Emma realises her 
adulterous „adventure‟ is Robinson‟s regular „quiet practice‟, and Robinson‟s 
„experienced delicacy on the subject of love‟, soon smothers „the last of her little wishes 
for consolation‟ (604-605). Realising Robinson has broken her „fairytale‟ of romance, 
Emma‟s „adventure…died at its root‟ (604).  
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The story returns, in its final moments, to Queenie, as if suggesting a 
compensatory gesture that offers the reader the consolations that Robinson has failed to 
tender Emma. Until now only peripheral in Emma‟s broken fairytale, Queenie seems to 
offer the closure that Emma‟s summer night refuses. Alone in her bed, Queenie dreams 
a lovers‟ walk in which Robinson takes the place of „her one and only love‟ (607) from 
twenty years past; it is Robinson who, in her dream, is „guided by Queenie down leaf 
tunnels, took the place on the stone seat by the lake‟ (608 ).  We close on Queenie 
dreaming, „her face turned sideways, smiling, one hand lightly against her cheek‟ (608).  
While Justin accuses Robinson of not knowing „any more about love‟ (607), it is as if 
Queenie‟s dream redeems him. For Phyllis Lassner, Queenie‟s is „a romantic vision‟ 
that „creates genuine connections between past and present, passion and tenderness… 
Queenie‟s imagination is a saving grace‟.100  Queenie‟s dream thus summons a love 
untouched by the dissonant present, offering a vision of the restorative powers of 
emotion, of genuine connection. Yet it is with Queenie‟s feeling and her very appeal to 
a taste for consolation that I suggest the figure of the shrew resurfaces. 
Queenie is pointedly sharp from the beginning. She is middle-aged and single: 
though „very pretty‟, she has „a pointed face‟; she „threatens [her brother] with a 
pressure he could not bear‟ (587). Queenie‟s deafness has a kind of violence: muting her 
brother, it „broke down his only defence, talk‟ (587). Queenie is invasive: whilst her 
brother is nervous about entering Robinson‟s house, Queenie „showed herself happy to 
penetrate‟ (589).  Queenie makes Justin vulnerable: „[e]xposed to the odd, immune, 
plumbing looks she was forever passing over his face‟ (587), her brother cannot deflect 
her look, nor her speech, instead: „the things she said out of nowhere, things with no 
surface context, were never quite off the mark‟(587).  And Queenie‟s attention to Justin 
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is „not all solicitude, she loved to be teasing him‟ (587).  She irritates, vexes, gets at and 
under her brother‟s skin. 
Queenie‟s shrewishness lends her dreaming conclusion to „Summer Night‟ 
toxicity; it sharpens into view how the story pulls out, just at the end, from the inside of 
her dream, to give us Queenie‟s touch on her own cheek, her feeling of her own affect.  
If there is a tenderness in how Queenie lies, „in her bed facing the window, with her 
face turned sideways, smiling‟ (608), I want to suggest it is not the tenderness of 
healing, but the sore-spot of emotion. We read Queenie‟s dream freshly bitten by the 
revelation, at last, of Queenie‟s secret: that she had a lover for one night, but he fled 
from her, from „that delicate deaf girl that he could not speak to and was afraid to touch‟ 
(607). Queenie‟s dream does not cull love from the past, but offers a keener perception 
– that it only stays „living under a film of time‟ (607). Yet if Queenie keeps „in her 
senses each frond and breath of that night‟ (608), she offers us no meaning, no 
redemption, no access to solace. Queenie is turned toward the window, away from us: 
we are left only with her solitary touch, her own face turned sideways, „one hand lightly 
against her cheek‟ (608). Rather than restore the broken present by offering love, she 
preserves this from us, her emotion returning only our taste for consolation. It is our 
exclusion from Queenie‟s touch, from the affect she tenders herself, that gives the story 
bite. 
  
Chapter One 
‘Sheer Gush’: Bowen’s Critical Feelings 
 
 
In a letter dated July 1
st
, 1940, Elizabeth Bowen wrote to thank Virginia Woolf for 
having her to visit:   
It doesn‟t seem to me that I‟ve ever been so perfectly happy – This 
seems to me to be all “I…I…I…”, but how impossible, quite 
wrongly, it is to write about any feeling without identifying oneself, 
with it.  I don‟t think I‟d ever imagined a place and people in which 
and with whom one felt so perfectly happy that one felt suspended 
the whole time, and at the same wanting to smile, and smiling, 
continuously, like a dog…At the end of which I can only say, thank 
you both very much.  I loved everything that we did.
 1
 
 
For a writer whose work has been described as presenting „controlled analyses of 
motives and emotions‟2, Bowen‟s effusiveness initiates a letter that is, as she writes, 
„already very wandering‟.3  Sugar, berries and domestic servants share the page with 
air-raid sirens, Cyril Connolly‟s recently launched Horizon and Bowen‟s impending 
trip to „do work‟ in Ireland.  Figuring a network of intersections between the domestic, 
manners, sensibility, war, literature, friendship, Anglo-Irishness, loyalty, class, 
technology, feminism, and (with the letter addressed to Virginia Woolf) literary 
genealogies and modernism,  it is as if the letter writes to the future of Bowen criticism. 
Not only does the letter anticipate how Bowen will be read, but it also registers the 
difficulty of reading her work: crossed out words, syntactical ambiguity and a 
disjunctive use of commas demand an attention to how the letter reaches us, already 
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 Letter from Elizabeth Bowen to Virginia Woolf, dated July 1
st
, 1940 (Monks House Papers, University 
of Sussex Archives), p. 1. Subsequent references to Bowen‟s letter will be provided using in-text 
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read, gathering interpretation into a texture of critical acuity, that, as Hermione Lee 
observes of Bowen‟s oeuvre, „resist[s] interpretation by over-interpreting‟.4 It is 
through attention to such resistances that Bowen‟s writing has, as Bennett and Royle 
remark, been more recently engaged by „current academic criticism and by radical 
theorists alike‟, emerging as „a significant figure within several key areas of 
contemporary study and interest:  twentieth-century women‟s writing, Anglo-Irish and 
minority literature, writers of the thirties and forties, postcolonialism and 
postmodernism‟.5  If such readings are gathered together in the texture of Bowen‟s 
letter, however, the form this interpretive gathering takes is effusion; at the heart of 
this, what initiates and resists interpretation, is emotion.   
 Bowen‟s letter begins by remarking on how the Woolf‟s home at Rodmell has 
touched her. Self-consciousness takes hold, however, and the letter turns to analysis. 
We move from how Rodmell makes her „feel‟, lingering on its place in her imagination, 
to a remark upon the nature of feeling itself:  the letter‟s „I…I…I…‟ become „one‟.6  
But rather than staunch the effusion, this move towards an impersonal analysis 
actuates
7
 it:  sentences gush over several lines; clauses – piled up and connected 
through the use of commas, ellipses, dashes, and connectives – spill into the next. It 
becomes, at times, uncomfortably close, exceedingly intimate. The letter‟s sensitivity to 
this increases as it goes on, gathering into its force a collection of disparate subjects and 
remarks, until, after three pages, Bowen makes a remarkable statement:  „If I began to 
                                                     
4
 Lee, p. 64.  
5
 Bennett and Royle, p. xiii. 
6
 Letter July 1
st
, 1940, p. 1. 
7„Actuate‟ is a word that recurs across Bowen‟s writing. In „Tears, Idle Tears‟, for example, Mrs 
Dickinson is described as a „gallant-looking, correct woman‟ (CS: 481) who possesses an „unfailing sense 
of what not to say, and say it:  despair, perversity or stubborn virtue must actuate them‟ (482-3). 
According to the Oxford English Dictionary Online, „Actuate‟ means to „make act‟ or „make work‟, 
indexing similar questions about the relationship activity and passivity as „passion‟, as I will go on to 
explore.  
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write about affection for you, Virginia, I should degenerate into sheer gush‟.8  And with 
this, the effusion dissipates: the tumbling, wandering, transgressive gathering of 
subjects makes way for Bowen to sign her love:   
Meanwhile my love to you both, and all the thoughts of the most continuous 
kind, that one can only stodgily call good wishes.  Good wishes to you both, at 
all times and thank you for those lovely two days.      
   Love  
          from  
      Elizabeth. 
 
How does writing about emotion „identify oneself, with it‟?  What is „sheer gush‟? And 
why should one „degenerate into‟ it?  Bowen‟s letter registers a remarkable strangeness 
about the relationship between her own writing and emotion that I propose moves 
critical debates about her writing. Not only does this figure a correspondence between 
Bowen‟s writing, and emotion, as critical subjects, but it helps us to consider how, at 
the heart of these debates, we might read a critical anxiety about the geographies of 
subjectivity, textuality, and bodily relations associated with emotion. These are the very 
geographies that Bowen‟s writing threatens. This thesis suggests that Bowen‟s short 
stories, like her letter, „gush‟; in this chapter I want to begin by considering how Bowen 
criticism intersects with the study of emotion.  
Hermione Lee observes that Bowen‟s fiction has been read as the work of „a 
social realist, a Jamesian stylist, a comic satirist of manners, a historian of the Anglo-
Irish, a lesbian sensibility, an anti-romantic but passionate analyst of fatal love, a 
civilian war correspondent, or an elegist for lost innocence‟.9 Bowen‟s writing (and 
indeed its criticism), like her letter, „wanders‟. On the one hand, she has been described 
as a „lesser social or domestic realist‟, at best overlooked and at worst dismissed for, as 
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 Hermione Lee, „Psychic Furniture: Ellmann‟s Elizabeth Bowen‟ in Body Parts:  Essays on Life-Writing 
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Bennett and Royle observe of such criticism, representing „a tradition of the realist 
novel untouched by the vagaries of modernist or postmodernist experimentalism‟.10  On 
the other hand, Bowen‟s writing and personal life present challenges to neat 
identifications or categorization; for every reading of Bowen, there is a counter-reading 
to be located in her work, her life, and often by Bowen herself. Susan Osborn remarks 
that Bowen‟s critics, „[t]roubled by the unsystematic ways that her peculiar and in ways 
often transgressive and non-identical body of work resists historical, generic, and ethnic 
incorporation…have historically struggled to place or locate her vast oeuvre in one 
tradition or another‟.11  As a result, notes Susan Osborn, Bowen‟s work has occupied 
what Neil Corcoran describes as a kind of „critical “limbo” ‟:  „Never has her work 
been quite in, but never has it ever been quite out either‟.12   
Renewed critical interest, however, has sought to respond to some of the 
difficulties Bowen‟s „wandering‟ presents.  Thus, a writer „whose work has been taken 
(however tacitly) to embody the very bulwark of the conventional and “proper” of 
traditional realism and conservative “society” ‟13 has been more recently re-read as a 
„minor‟ and „modernist‟ writer. To Lee‟s inventory of the categorisations Bowen‟s 
work has both invited, and resisted, Osborn adds a further catalogue of critical 
interventions: Douglass Hewitt‟s acceptance of Bowen as a „minor‟ novelist (albeit one 
who  „ “turned [her] back . . . on technical innovation” and wrote “delicate small-scale 
post-Jamesian studies, mostly of children and adolescent girls” ‟), Glendinning‟s „link‟ 
connecting Virginia Woolf with Iris Murdoch and Muriel Spark; Blodgett‟s 
„psychological realist using symbolic methods‟ to „produce heightenings of reality‟; 
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 Osborn, 2007, p. 226-7.  
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Lee‟s „modern writer‟ interested in „dislocation, unease, and betrayal‟, Hoogland‟s 
„critically practicing feminist‟, Humble‟s „novelist whose “writerly qualities and 
philosophical concerns” locate her somewhat obscurely “at the highbrow end of the [as 
yet ill-defined] middlebrow” ‟, and McCormack‟s reading of her work as adaptions of 
„Le Fanu‟s narrative techniques to represent “altered experiences of reality under the 
blitz” ‟.14 The recent release of Susan Osborn‟s Elizabeth Bowen: New Critical 
Perspectives generates a sense of some of the directions Bowen scholarship is moving: 
these include analyses of Bowen‟s „Beckettian affinities‟, her sensationalist 
intertextualities, her writing of trauma, and the potential and disruptions her work poses 
to a thinking of agency and ethics. Marcia Farrell, who provided a bibliography to 
record developments in Bowen scholarship for the 2007 Modern Fiction Studies, now 
keeps a comprehensive online bibliography that is updated regularly to reflect the 
growth in critical interest in Bowen‟s work.15     
Each of these readings has opened up new ways of encountering Bowen‟s work, 
but, as Osborn reminds us, Bowen criticism demonstrates a significant disagreement 
about how to read her, and is marked by an emphasis on thematisation and biography.  
This reading might approach the letter‟s effusion, quoted at the beginning of this 
chapter, at having found a „place‟ as a reminder of the dislocation that pervades 
Bowen‟s fiction to locate this in a childhood marked by her father‟s hospitalisation 
mental illness, her mother‟s early death, and an ensuing rootlessness as she moved 
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between various boarding schools and aunts‟ houses. Hermione Lee argues that Bowen 
„believes in the childhood sources of all writing‟16 and Bowen criticism has 
demonstrated a preoccupation with Bowen‟s personal life as a way of unpicking her 
assertion that writing is „transposed autobiography‟.17  One of the underlying 
preoccupations in this thesis is the way these readings themselves often insist on a 
transmission of emotion from the author‟s experience, to the reader‟s. My observations 
here then are not to suggest that such readings lack merit, but rather to agree with 
Bennett and Royle‟s observation that „to present the meaning and power of novels in 
terms of the “experience” and “sensibility” of their author is to strangle such novels, so 
to speak, at birth. The “life” of the novel is blotted out by the focus on the “life” of the 
author‟.18 My interest is in how attending to the ways Bowen‟s stories „think‟ feeling 
corroborates this observation.  
Alternatively, one might interpret the „Bowenesque‟ as an effect of literary 
tradition, for example as Anglo-Irish writing, modernist experimentalism, or, indeed, as 
Osborn remarks upon Lee‟s reading, both – a „fusion of two traditions, “that of Anglo-
Irish literature and history, and that of European modernism” ‟.19  Yet these categories 
do not erase, but accentuate the problem with locating her work. When Bennett and 
Royle observe Bowen‟s uneasy situation in the realist tradition, they argue that the 
process of placing Bowen within a particular tradition or genealogy of writing (they 
cite Austen, Eliot, James, Woolf, Forster, Lehmann, Compton-Burnett, Spark and 
Murdoch), has also involved reading her into „certain (inappropriate) criteria‟ by which 
her work is assessed: 
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….found to be of secondary significance..[a] certain tautology 
ensues:  if you read Elizabeth Bowen as a minor Virginia Woolf, 
then that is precisely what you will find – a minor Virginia 
Woolf…Critics‟ commonly expressed reservations about Bowen‟s 
inability or refusal to distinguish the real from the fictional, together 
with the opposite claim that her writing is not realistic enough, 
means that her work is marginalized within the realist tradition.
20
  
 
Susan Osborn, writing more than ten years after Bennett and Royle, observes 
the ongoing difficulty in framing Bowen. Citing the decision reached by the editors of 
the North Cork Anthology on whether, and how, to include Bowen as an „Irish‟ or 
„Cork‟ writer, Osborn observes how Bowen‟s biography, as well as her miscarriage of 
generic expectations, colludes in the difficulty critics have had with placing her. For the 
editors, Bowen was not identifiable as „a North Cork writer, either in the sense of being 
a product of North Cork society, or of being interested in it and writing about it‟.21 Her 
place compromised by her wandering nationality (as Bowen‟s biographers observe, she 
had lived, since childhood, between Ireland and England), this was further complicated 
for the editors by her eventual sale of Bowen‟s Court, the sometimes biting treatment of 
Ireland in her work, and her offer to do „secret work‟ during the Second World War 
when she was employed by the English Ministry of Defence to report on the 
atmosphere of politically neutral Ireland.
 
For the editors of the anthology, these 
„disturbing irregularities‟ not only „complicated their desire to identify her with one 
national identity or another‟ but „increased [their] difficulty when trying to describe 
them‟.22 Not only did Bowen „not fit‟, but this un-containability rendered unstable the 
very definition of „Irishness‟ within which they were working.23  As Osborn relates, the 
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 Brendan Clifford and Jack Lane, (Eds.), A North Cork Anthology (Millstreet: Aubane Historical 
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anthology made a rather remarkable decision:  „Bowen‟s entry, complete and longer 
than that of many of the other entrants, is struck out by a line drawn through her name. 
In this way, the anthology „include[s] her…in deleted form, in order to explain why she 
does not belong‟‟.24 By choosing to represent her, excised, the anthology‟s entry 
highlights „the various pressures and threats that Bowen's personal history presents to 
conventional notions of identity and political and philosophical coherence‟.25  
Yet this ambivalence is itself already figured in Bowen‟s 1940 letter to Woolf.  
Remarking upon her impending return for the summer to Bowen‟s Court, she writes: 
„[n]ow it has come to the point I have rather a feeling of dismay and of not wanting to 
leave this country…I hope I shall be some good: I do feel it‟s important…I suppose I 
shall also finish my book.  But Ireland can be dementing, if one‟s Irish and may well be 
so now‟.26  The structure of the last line, rather than resolve or offer closure about 
national identity or affiliation, instead suggests and syntactically mediates her 
undecidability. The lack of comma after „Irish‟ causes what might have been only an 
interjection to spill into the final clause, rendering both Ireland‟s being „dementing‟ and 
her Irishness uncertain.  Thus the letter itself leaves open the question of whether or not 
she „is‟ Irish, whilst allowing her to comment on her relation to her Irishness.  Earlier, 
the letter uncannily anticipates the North Cork Anthology editor‟s „strike-out‟ solution, 
articulating these problems of dis-placement, dis-location and un-belonging. The letter 
begins, „Dearest Virginia, Ever since I got back home I have been thinking about 
Rodmell – this sounds nonsense, but you must know how some part of one‟s thoughts 
                                                                                                                                                           
little dejected like an umbrella that an absent-minded caller has brought into the drawing-room‟, unsettles 
those gathered by his failure to fit in. His unfitting appearance in the story follows directly from a 
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24
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or one‟s imagination can go on contemplating a place almost continuously…‟.27 The 
letter is typed, but the word „home‟ has been struck out by hand and replaced with a 
written correction:  „here‟. If „here‟ is emotionally „wrong‟ – neutral, unaffected, 
detached – so too is „home‟, implying an intimate attachment to a place not hers, a 
wrongly located affection. The letter preserves both, „home‟ persisting, underwriting, in 
its deletion, the „here‟ that is now readable only against „home‟.  
The copy of Bowen‟s letter used for this project is archived at the University of 
Sussex Library in the Monks House Papers as part of the collected correspondence of 
Virginia Woolf.  Originally handwritten, it was transcribed when Leonard Woolf 
removed the letter from the collection. It was his practice, however, to review 
transcriptions, and correct them:   
The handwriting for the amendments belongs to Leonard Woolf. 
Leonard removed selected letters from various writers, either for sale 
purposes or to give to others. Being the meticulous person he was, 
he always ensured that the letters were first transcribed so that a 
copy would always be part of the original collection. The corrections 
that you see must be from when he checked the transcript against the 
original before the latter left the collection.
28
  
 
Whether the transcriptionist‟s gaffe is as a result of his or her own misreading, or 
prompted by an indecipherable hand, it brings out how Bowen‟s use of „here‟ jarred her 
reader, producing in the transcription a re-writing, and re-narrativisation, of Bowen‟s 
„home‟-lessness; „here‟ is hidden, secreted behind the more expected, or conventional, 
„home‟. Woolf‟s correction, rather than rectify this, accentuates it, putting the hidden 
„here‟ out in the open and crossing out what was meant to be read over it. The gaffe 
                                                     
27
 Letter July 1
st
 , 1940, p. 1. 
28
I am grateful to Fiona Courage, Special Collections Manager at the University of Sussex Library for not 
only explaining these corrections to me but also for allowing me to quote her e-mail dated July 21
st
, 2008. 
In the letters collected in The Mulberry Tree, Hermione Lee has preserved some of the „strikeouts‟ and 
editing characters that evidence the corrections Bowen‟s letters underwent (see pp. 193; 194; 195), but in 
her edition of this letter (214) it has been published to read „here‟. It is unclear from The Mulberry Tree 
whether Lee was using the letter from the University of Sussex archive or another version of the letter. 
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distinguishes the two senses, but at the same time hooks each to the other, 
deconstructing the difference between „home‟ and „here‟ which still stand, destabilised 
and unresolvable.  Later, Bowen comments, „I still feel very homesick‟29: so, after 
reading the letter, are we. These moments – the  missing comma and the correction – 
anticipate Bowen‟s resistances to critical reading; multiple readings are brought 
forward, and maintained, rendering reading both visible, and impossible.
30
  
These moments help us to consider how Bowen‟s work already possesses a 
critical acuity to itself, a sense of its own otherness; as such it troubles not only the 
project of reading Bowen, but as Bennett and Royle argue, the project of reading itself.  
Both inviting and resisting interpretation, these moments read back to the critic the 
analyses they seek to discover.  And, whilst these are remarkable moments of 
singularity, they are neither (as moments of ambiguity, undecidability, or 
uncontainability) singular, nor exclusive, to her letter; her work is traced through by 
such strange and bizarre twists of syntax, grammar, diction, and structure.  Susan 
Osborn notes that, though previously „dismissed or derided as defects of temperament 
or talent, unaccountable gaffes, obscuring distractions that were not worthy of sustained 
critical attention‟31, these have, more recently, drawn the attention of Bowen‟s readers 
who, through attention to these disjunctive features, have begun to consider how her 
„conspicuous and dislocating irregularities – the intriguing and often unfamiliar 
instabilities of form, language, and composition…lend to her work its uncommon 
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elusiveness and its uncommon adaptability to a variety of interpretive ploys‟.32 As 
Hermione Lee remarks in her 1999 edition of her study of Bowen‟s work, she „needed 
to show [Bowen‟s] manners were not just mannerisms, and to read “style” as an 
essential part of what she has to say‟.33 Bowen herself, responding to criticisms that her 
work at times „jars, jingles‟ the reader, insisted that these „express something; I want 
the rhythm to jerk or jar, to an extent even, which may displease the reader‟.34 
If Bowen sought to jar her readers, however, it is Bennett and Royle‟s reading 
of Bowen‟s novels, in Still Lives: Elizabeth Bowen and the Dissolution of the Novel, 
that seems most likely, in recent Bowen scholarship, to displease her critical readers. In 
what Susan Osborn calls „undoubtedly the most audacious recent reading of Bowen‟s 
work‟35, Bennett and Royle register across Bowen‟s work „dissolutions at the level of 
personal identity, patriarchy, social conventions and language itself – up to and 
including the language of fiction and criticism‟.36  Rather than see Bowen‟s work then 
as „at odds‟ with the concerns of radical theory or contemporary criticism, Bennett and 
Royle suggest that Bowen‟s novels, „precisely because of their apparent 
conventionality and stability‟ read the „dissolution of the twentieth-century novel‟.37 
Bowen‟s novels undo „the very grounds of “character”, what it is to “be” a person, to 
“have” an identity, to be real or fictional‟.38 „Living‟, they argue, „in the work of 
Bowen is dissolving‟.39   
Such dissolutions are perhaps most powerfully at work in the ways „reading 
people‟ renders uncertain everything associated with living – personality, identity, 
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being, subjectivity, reality, and emotion. In „Convulsions‟ for example, Still Lives 
considers the „convulsions of body and mind‟ that jerk their way through Bowen‟s 
oeuvre, fissuring moments „when the body is caught up in and by its own 
otherness…when the body is haunted by its own body as other‟.40  Locating the 
convulsions of Eva Trout, Bowen‟s last completed novel, specifically (but not 
exclusively) in the face and its expressiveness, they undo the emotions of the face as an 
expression of interiority, and instead remark upon the tension between describing the 
face and its „involuntariness‟ to itself:  „to describe the living face is to fix it, to still it.  
But the face is constantly set in motion by a smile, a spoken word, a sneeze a yawn, a 
twitch, a blink of the eyes.  Even at rest or in sleep the face cannot be still, caressed as 
it is by the mobilities of breathing and the reflexes of dreams‟.41  Facial expression, the 
very means by which our inner lives are supposed to be readable are, instead, caught 
into convulsions. The text and body, caught up in and haunted by its own otherness, 
index the dissolution of subjectivity, how in Bowen people are „traversed by uncertain 
motions, emotions and mobilities‟ that „furnish the basis for a theory of novel-reading 
as convulsion-work‟.42  
Bowen‟s acuity to the „overlapping and haunting of life by fiction‟43 convulses 
our very notions of what it means to be human; but in observing these convulsions, 
even acting on them, Still Lives has, at times, convulsed its critics. Shortly after the 
study‟s publication, the authors presented a paper about Bowen‟s „torn-off senses‟ – the 
„blasting‟ „bombing‟ „explosive‟ effects of her „singularly strange and violent texts‟.44 
Drawing their title, and dialogue from Bowen‟s novel The Heat of the Day and from 
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her stories, their reading, they suggest, seemed to set off or detonate the kinds of textual 
affects that preoccupied them: „It should perhaps be said that „Torn-Off Senses,‟ when 
presented…had a strange and violent effect on at least some of the audience: three 
people stood up and walked out within the opening minute or so‟.45 If the reception of 
this paper hints that Bowen‟s critics feel strongly about her work, John Coates‟ 
engagement with Still Lives‟ reading of Eva Trout makes this feeling critical.46 
Eva Trout is not only Bowen‟s last novel, published in 1969, but, of all her 
novels, perhaps the one that gains least consensus from its critics. While my interest 
here is in the critical dialogue Coates takes up with Bennett and Royle, it is important 
to note first that what tends to divide responses to Eva Trout between affirming its 
radical displacements or confirming its aesthetic failures has been the question of 
whether the novel represents a culmination of Bowen‟s literary preoccupations, or a 
disturbing departure from her oeuvre.
47
 As Susan Osborn and Neil Corcoran‟s 
discussions of responses to Eva Trout suggest, at stake in anxieties about the 
relationship between Eva Trout and the rest of Bowen‟s novels is the ability to discern 
the boundaries of Bowen‟s experiments with realism, and, in so doing, secure the 
temporalities of her writing in the geneaologies of modernism and postmodernism.
48
 
Yet, as Coates‟ introduction to his discussion makes clear, these divisions are also 
acutely felt, though not necessarily articulated or recognised, by Eva Trout‟s critics, as 
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a matter of feeling. This is, perhaps, best demonstrated by Coates‟ reading of Hermione 
Lee‟s declaration that Eva Trout was a „bizarre conclusion to [Bowen‟s] opus‟: 
For Hermione Lee, Bowen‟s last novel's „unhappy struggle with its 
own language and structure‟ records an „almost unbearable present‟ 
with which the „traditional novel of order and feeling‟ – the kind of 
writing Elizabeth Bowen excelled in - could no longer deal. Eva 
Trout's „haphazard‟ plot and its patchy characterisation are put down 
to a belief that present conditions „can no longer be mastered or even 
registered by our language‟.49 
 
What is of interest to me here is that what Coates picks out from Lee‟s response to the 
novel is the sense that Eva Trout‟s transgressions are, in part, a transgression against an 
idea and order of feeling. According to Coates, the mistake critics make when reading 
Eva Trout is the insistence on reading Eva‟s wedding as a „mock‟ one, which, in turn, 
mistakes real emotion, for fictional. Yet, whilst „all‟ the critics he points to „resolutely 
ignore the crucial and determining point‟ of the novel – that Eva‟s „love for Henry 
Dancey is returned‟50 – it quickly becomes clear that in preserving the authenticity of 
love, Coates is staging an intervention not only in Bennett and Royle‟s 
„deconstructionist account‟ of Eva Trout, but in the effects, and affects, of 
deconstruction itself.
51
 
 „Deconstructionists‟, Coates writes, „have found that Eva Trout's supposed 
oddities of plot and characterisation may serve their desire to dissolve such tyrannical 
categories as theme, plot, recognisable personality and closure‟.52 In order to read in 
Eva Trout these „kaleidoscopic “convulsions” ‟, such criticism allows an „antipathy to 
considering the structure of the text or even a refusal to accept the notion of structure at 
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all‟53 to override the „explicit‟ moral resolution offered by Eva‟s recognition that she 
not only loves but is loved in return. Coates is also, no doubt, responding to Bennett 
and Royle‟s argument that, „despite the attempts of conventional criticism to read 
consolation into Bowen plots, these novels diverge from everything in or after 
modernism that might be identified with a “culture of redemption” ‟.54 Whilst Coates 
does not cite this passage, his arguments about the origins, and implications, of Bennett 
and Royle‟s reading renders the consequences of such a reading in the strongest terms. 
Stemming from a „deliberate refusal‟ to encounter the novel‟s „individual moral terms‟, 
„such determined mis-readings‟ offer evidence of the critics‟ „heavy intellectual, or 
emotional, investment in notions of incoherence and disorder‟.55 These readings 
demonstrate, he argues, „an instance of what Freadman and Miller have singled out as 
one of recent theorists‟ “most disturbing and regrettable achievements” namely the 
elimination of “central ethical concerns and discourses” from the examination of 
literature‟.56 These, he argues, are the very moral impulses that lie, albeit without 
transparency, behind the „generalised anti-authoritarianism of critics opposed to “truth 
claims” or hierarchies of value as much as to characters or to plots‟.57 In the end, he 
suggests, this will suffer under its own ministrations, yet Eva Trout, he implies, will 
recuperate itself: in a conclusion that addresses those critics that agree with him, and 
seems to admonish those who do not, Coates argues that „Elizabeth Bowen's stylistic 
elaboration, demanding a similar “attention of perusal”, bears the pressure of the 
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shifting complexities of a disturbing moral problem, that of the injuries done by the 
injured, and the complicity of the “innocent” in their own destruction‟.58  
Coates unfolds a reading of Eva Trout that traces her character‟s psychological 
development to its fruition in her learning to love. Though plagued by doubts about 
identity, personality, and reality itself, Eva is, although she dies, first brought to life by 
love:  „When she learns that her love…is reciprocated, Eva for the first time sheds tears 
of joy. Eva dies having at last discovered she can arouse love where she herself loves. It 
is hard to see how the text could be more explicit‟.59 Eva‟s tears, however, although 
explicit, are far from explicated by the text:   
Something took place, a bewildering, brilliant, blurring, filling 
up, swimming and brimming over; then, not a torrent from the eyes 
but one, two, three, four tears, each hesitating, surprised to be 
where it was, then wandering down. The speediest splashed on to 
the diamond brooch. „Look what is happening to me!‟ exulted Eva. 
She had no handkerchief, not having expected to require one – she 
blotted about on her face with a crunched-up glove. „What a 
coronation day…‟ 
„Are you happy?‟ asked Henry, awed. 
„A coronation being living, today.‟60 
Eva‟s tears are a brimming over whose „coronation‟, from the Latin „coruna‟, „to 
crown‟, marks a becoming that irreducibly overflows distinctions between birth or 
death, real or fictional, that all the acts of crowning caught up in this coronation might 
suggest. If Eva‟s tears „crown‟ a person, identity, self or interiority, it is as a 
commemoration, an emblem.
61
 Eva herself does not designate this „coronation‟ into a 
lexicon or taxonomy of emotion or its signs (it is the narrator who calls them „tears‟), 
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but offers, when asked if she is happy, an oblique, almost unreadable statement that 
registers what she had hitherto believed impossible:  „A coronation being living, today‟.  
Seeing her own tears, Eva‟s coronation does not redeem by investing her with an 
authentic self that feels, but registers that she, unreal, lives; this „something happening‟ 
does not release her from dissolution – it is a dissolution that is her coronation.  Eva‟s 
tears tear at the very ontological certainties with which they might console us.   
Here we might consider Rei Terada‟s remarks upon another tear that overspills 
the boundaries between reality and virtuality that emotion is supposed to confirm:  
replicant Sean Young‟s remarkable human „tear‟ in Bladerunner (1982).62  In an 
„explicitly sentimental moment‟, Terada remarks, Sean discovers she is a replicant, one 
„whose memories are not her own‟. Sean‟s tears, Terada argues, do not shatter her non-
subjectivity; she is still a replicant, a virtual human, but one who feels and whom „we 
assume…has had feelings before‟. Terada contends that „the detective protagonist 
Deckert…realizes that subjectivity must go and emotion must stay‟. Sean‟s tears, most 
importantly, work by imploring us to read the very otherness they are supposed to 
undermine:  seen by Sean, by Deckert, and, most importantly, by the film‟s audience, 
„reserving the sight of her tears for this occasion dramatizes the fact that destroying the 
illusion of subjectivity does not destroy emotion, that on the contrary, emotion is the 
sign of the absence of that illusion‟. Like Eva‟s, Sean‟s tears trace a „coronation being 
living, today‟, intervening in the very geography of relations between subjectivity and 
emotion, reality and virtuality, that they invite.
63
  
Coates‟ essay is no less performative and theatrical then the texts it critiques; 
not only does it detonate an emotionality from which it also sets itself apart, but, 
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through its discussion of emotion, actuates the dissolutions it critiques. By advocating 
the redemptive qualities of love, Coates‟ essay, on the one hand, renders deconstruction 
„insensitive‟ to emotion, or, more particularly, to the particularities of „love‟. At the 
same time, he subordinates emotion to analysis, aligning „over-emotionality‟ with poor 
criticism. Those readings he critiques are marred by their „heavy intellectual, or 
emotional, investment‟ in a „notion‟ that is not „in‟ the text but merely a product of this 
investment. What he calls „deconstructionist readings‟ are incompatible with, and 
disproved by, love‟s redemption; this emotion is secure from the theatrical tendencies 
that „drastically rewrite‟64 their objects of study.  Invoking a dual language of, on the 
one hand, reification and, on the other, imbalance and critical impropriety, love is both 
objectified, and, in this contained form, elevated. This elevation makes it inaccessible 
to or outside deconstruction which, according to this argument, makes use of an abased 
form of love (perhaps the very narcissism Coates suggests Eva grows out of) to avoid 
engaging with the sticky issues raised by Coates‟ conception of emotion‟s apparently 
explicit reality. In this rather remarkable move, Coates does not locate emotion‟s 
redemptive stability, but enacts its discursivity.  
Emotion scholars agree that feminist work has been largely responsible for not 
only developing the study of emotion into its multi-disciplinary renaissance but, more 
importantly, for legitimating it as an area of inquiry by attending to discourses of 
emotion
65
 or, as Catherine Lutz‟s seminal work in the anthropology and sociology of 
emotion observes, the production of emotion through its rhetoric.
66
 Lutz compares 
                                                     
64
 Coates, p. 61. 
65
 This point is made by Terada, p. 8; Ahmed, p. 3; Opdahl, p. 193; Sedgwick, pp. 5-7, amongst others.  
66
 „Engendered Emotion:  Gender, Power & The Rhetoric of Emotional Control in American Discourse‟ 
in Rom Harré and W. Gerrod Parrott (Eds.), The Emotions:  Social, Cultural and Biological Dimensions 
(London: Sage, 1996), pp 151 – 170. See also Catherine Lutz, Theodore Schwartz and Geoffrey White 
(Eds.), New Directions in Psychological Anthropology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993); 
55 
 
emotion, through Foucault, with sexuality, observing that both are dominated by bio-
medical models, are commonly considered „universal, natural impulses‟, accompanied 
by languages of management, such as distinctions between what is „healthy‟ or 
„unhealthy‟, and both are under „quasi-medical professions‟.67 Furthermore, clinical 
interventions in emotion deploy a rhetoric of control which not only „diverts attention 
from the socially constructed nature of the idea of emotion‟ but simultaneously 
„reproduces emotion as irrational and other and elevates the status of the person who 
claims ability or need to control‟; but the rhetoric of emotion „opposes the view of this 
other as dangerous when the rhetoric is reversed‟.68 Lutz cites this at work in, for 
example, twentieth-century child-rearing manuals, which, on the one hand, make 
„proper‟ emotion the aim of the ideal mother, one who acts on her naturally healthy 
feminine feeling, whilst improper emotion – either an absence or excess of intimacy – 
threatens to stick to the child, contaminating them with their mother‟s abnormality.69 
Bringing Lutz‟s observations to bear on reading Bowen not only emphasises the extent 
to which Bowen‟s fiction engages with these problems, but also points to the 
impossibility of distinguishing a discourse about emotion from discourses of emotion. 
As Coates‟ essay helps us to observe, criticism is not only not exempt from emotion, 
but depends on it for its critical, and categorical, distinctions. 
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While I will go on in this thesis to argue that the intensity of Bowen‟s fictional 
acuities to ideas about emotion complicates a discursive or contextual account of her 
textual affects, I want to observe here that Lutz‟s work resonates with Bonnie Kime 
Scott‟s observations that „gender‟ intersects „modernism‟ through, in part, emotion.70 
Until more recently, Kime Scott observes, categorising modernist literatures has been 
dominated by an emphasis on „experimental writing‟, which „reinforces the need of the 
academy to be its interpreter and dismiss[es] traditions associated with women, activist 
agendas or mass culture‟.71 It is precisely the gendering of „mass culture as feminine‟ 
that makes the study of modernity always also gender study, argues Kime Scott: an 
important aspect of this is what Suzanne Clark elaborates as modernist „anxieties over 
sentimental writing‟.72 Clark cites Wyndham Lewis‟ use of „sentimental‟ as the 
„defining quality of all that the Vortex must reject…[the] domestic, romantic, Latin, 
abasement of intellectual as opposed to fashionable / cosmopolitan‟73 and observes that 
the „manifestoes of the twentieth-century avant-garde made clear that the “sentimental” 
would be a target‟.74  In this way, Clark argues that „sentimental‟, as used by modernist 
critics, „repudiated and effectively silence[d] a whole generation of women writers by 
linking emotionalism to women – as if revolutionary poetry could only be intellectual, 
or by suggesting that women‟s continuity with nineteenth century conventions of 
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narrative made them less than intellectually respectable‟.75  For Clark, the „problem of 
the sentimental is a narrative of matricide‟ and she contends that the „dismissive and 
uncritical use of the word “sentimental” continues to this day‟.76 Like Lutz‟s „quasi-
medical professions‟ Clark‟s observations link modernist aesthetics and literary 
criticism to a wider cultural preoccupation with and deployment of clinical discourses 
about emotion. This is at work in Floyd Dell‟s exhortation that feminism was at risk of 
being infected by „sentimentalism‟:  
Of all the corruptions to which the woman‟s movement is now 
open,…the most poisonous and permeating is that which flows from 
sentimentalism, and it is in the W.S.P.U. [Women‟s Social and 
Political Union] that sentimentalism is now rampant...It is this 
sentimentalism that is abhorrent to us. We fight it as we would fight 
prostitution, or any other social disease.
77
  
 
The language of contagion at work here is important, because it helps us to observe 
how the „sentimental‟ does not so much locate a particular kind of emotion, but locates 
an anxiety about the effects (and consequences) of being identified with emotion that is 
associated with the feminine. Drawing on Clark‟s observations, then, the categorisation 
of the sentimental does not identify an inherent quality of feeling, but instead works to 
categorise emotion by producing certain emotions as sentimental, as if to contain 
emotion‟s threat. Designating the „sentimental‟ then does not name a discourse, but 
instead enables the modernist writer and critic to establish a distance from that being 
designated as sentimental. This distance works by differentiating between the „wrong‟ 
kind of emotion, which should be distinguished and set apart from the „right‟ emotion 
to be celebrated or identified with. It also draws out that „modernisms‟78 developed 
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their aesthetic arguments, engagements, and dialogues, in part, by discerning between 
those emotions to be eliminated, like waste, and those to be valued, and preserved.
79
 
What I want to emphasise here is how these discussions help us to consider some of the 
critical moves that intersect to do so: particular emotions, or categories of emotions, are 
distinguished; the manner of distinguishing positions these emotions in relation to the 
constituents of that discourse; these emotions are allocated differing levels of intensity 
and complexity which, in turn, corroborates not only the level of interest they have for 
that discourse, but their accessibility to that discourse‟s capacity to either read or 
represent them. Ideologies of emotion, as Terada observes, tend to under-represent its 
complexity
80
, so that even the most elevated emotion, that which is most difficult to 
understand and least accessible to a range of interpretive methods, will in the end be 
explicable. Such an emotion‟s very resistance to other discourses or modes becomes 
evidence of the expertise that reads and represents it. 
While Coates‟ essay demonstrates what we might, through Terada, observe as 
the „ideological convenience of casting emotion as a basis for naturalized social or 
moral consensus‟81, I want to suggest then that it also extends this to the kinds of 
consensus involved in periodisation and aesthetic categorisation. Coates is certainly not 
the first critic to describe Bowen‟s writing in terms of its emotion, and, certainly, 
ideologies of emotion are enfolded into the traditions of realism and manners associated 
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with those criticisms that find in Bowen the conventional. For Hermione Lee, Bowen‟s 
openness to such criticisms comes in the form of her „emotional plots‟, a literary 
preoccupation with school-girl crushes and sensational storylines.
82
 In her defence of 
Bowen, Lee urges us to see that these „are about more than the deaths of individual 
hearts or private worlds of love‟: they make a „modern critique‟ and their „intense, 
witty, evocative treatment of personal behaviour and feeling is also an analysis of a 
“disinherited” society in a period of loss and diminishment‟.83 Bowen‟s „emotional 
plots‟ registers in Lee‟s discussion precisely the kinds of work I have suggested 
„emotion‟ performs in critical discourses. Lee‟s rationale for her study begins to point 
to the extent to which these are at work in the critical history of Bowen‟s writing; but it 
also speaks to the severity of critical anxiety that can accompany advocating for a 
writer interested in the wrong kinds of emotion: 
I wanted, in this book, to make clear what a significant, dramatic, 
interesting historical narrative her fictions make. I was anxious to 
rescue her from being identified „only‟ with personal and emotional 
concerns. I didn‟t want her to be diminished as a woman‟s novelist, 
inhabiting only private spaces. One way of doing this was to give 
her her rightful place in literary history, to look at the reading and 
the influences that lay behind her writing.
84
  
 
Bowen‟s writing thus presents, for Lee, a „central paradox‟: „a satirical self-awareness 
superimposed on a sensation-hungry romanticism‟.85 Lee goes on to gather a series of 
observations from Bowen scholarship that contrasts the interest in emotion suggested 
by Bowen‟s plots with detachment, self-awareness, and impersonality. It is as if these 
might allow us to distinguish a more publicly and culturally interesting, and politically 
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charged, Bowen.
86
 Rather than secure Bowen‟s „rightful place‟, however, I want to 
suggest that these distinctions destabilise the very historical, literary and critical 
boundaries they imply, and that Eva Trout threatens to disrupt.  
In their 2005 collection of essays „Impersonality and Emotion in Twentieth-
Century British Literature‟, Christine Reynier and Jean-Michel Ganteau suggest that 
twentieth century literature and criticism revolve around „impersonality‟ and „emotion‟ 
as categories; attention to these „enable[s] us to re-read modernist and postmodernist 
texts‟. 87 Postmodernism, they argue, is defined against emotion, an „impersonal literary 
game deprived of emotion, artificial and indulging in self-reflexivity‟.88  Investigating 
the relationship between emotion and impersonality thus „sends readers back‟89 to 
modernist writers. Yet in doing so, Reynier and Ganteau encounter a kind of critical 
knot, where emotion is not only defined against impersonality but also formulated out 
of it. Reynier and Ganteau‟s encounter articulates the kinds of paradoxes and problems 
emotion begins to present to contemporary literary critics. Modernism is, they observe, 
on the one hand, „defined as an art of indirection…an impersonal art…a reaction 
against Victorian sentimentality and representational writing…non-figurative and anti-
representational‟, but it is simultaneously „an art of subjectivity, hence of what‟s most 
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personal or human; an art focusing on the self, desire, feeling and emotion‟.90  For the 
editors, this presents „contradictory visions of modernism‟ as either „impersonal, aloof, 
elitist and highbrow‟ or with the „emotional power‟ articulated by Eliot‟s impersonal 
aesthetic emotion.
91
  And yet, they argue, if impersonality and the eventual death of the 
author and the subject come to characterise first modernist and later post-modernist 
writing, how do we make sense of Eliot‟s „radical personality‟ that makes 
impersonality the „locus of personal emotion‟?92  If „impersonality‟ is what leads to 
powerful emotion, they ask, is this „undone by the author‟s choice of words; is personal 
emotion reintroduced or transmitted in choice of language? Isn‟t there a connection 
between “artists” emotion and “aesthetic emotion”?‟93 Such questions, they note, are 
important:  „we read the modernists…because they transmit emotion‟.94 For Reynier 
and Ganteau, these contradictory notions of impersonality and emotion divide questions 
of authorial intent and the status of the text and go to the heart of twentieth century 
literature, theory and criticism:   
Since [Eliot], literary criticism seems to have been caught in the 
same mesh of contradiction:  the theses of the early Barthes about 
„The Death of the author,‟ of the anti-intentionalists like W.K. 
Wymsatt and Monroe Beardlsey, of the New Critics have been 
contradicted by those of Foucault, the later Barthes and even more 
recent ones.  If we agree….that post-structuralist criticism is 
„primarily a discourse of and about modernism‟ to such a degree that 
it can be seen „as a theory of modernism,‟ how can such theories, 
which are so much at variance with each other, help us apprehend 
modernist British literature?
95
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At stake in this, they suggest, is the critical capacity of post-modern theoretical and 
literary discourses to cohere around an emphasis on this „lack of emotion‟. Reynier and 
Ganteau argue that this capacity begins to be undermined by its own interest in self-
reflexivity. They ask:  „…isn‟t self-reflexivity a sign of the return of the author and 
therefore, of what‟s most personal to him/her, and first of all of his/her emotions?...We 
may therefore wonder whether, in the aftermath of Fredric Jameson‟s famous 
commentary on the „waning of affect,‟ the lack of emotion in contemporary literature 
should be taken for granted‟.96 
I want to return to the assumption that emotion is grounded in (or grounds) the 
„personal subject‟, however an important point emerges from Reynier and Ganteau‟s 
discussion to do with the kinds of geographies that emotion is supposed to prove, and 
that I am arguing Bowen‟s textual affect troubles.  Observing that an „attention to 
impersonality and how it precludes or, on the contrary, foregrounds emotion‟97 sends us 
forward, into the post-modern, Reynier and Ganteau remark that it also reads us 
backwards. Changing theoretical orientations to, or distinctions about, emotion, they 
suggest, indexes an inability to accommodate emotion which is, at the same time, still 
present. This persistence of emotion is read as a resistance to theory, one which asks us 
to redefine our categorisations of both twentieth century literature and critical theory:   
Since critics like Barthes have contradicted themselves or at least 
come back on their first sayings; since Eliot‟s theory of 
impersonality is either riddled with contradictions or can be 
interpreted in various ways…we may try to revise, in the light of 
these two multi-faceted notions of impersonality and emotion, the 
canonical definitions of modernist and post-modernist literature or 
at least come back to the critical tools forged to apprehend them as 
well as to the contradictions or dark zones in our knowledge of this 
literature.
98
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Through attention to these „dark zones‟, impersonality comes to be twinned with 
emotion – implicated even when absent:  „…in a body of texts that reputedly favour 
such impersonal practices as ludic overkill and in which meta-fictional games and the 
ascendance of inter-textuality have come to assume full hegemony, there appears to be 
room left for emotion‟.99  What Reynier and Ganteau identify is an aspect of emotion‟s 
„secrecy‟, how it might be thought of as both everywhere and nowhere in the literatures 
and criticism of the twentieth century, a slippery movement that challenges our critical 
and literary conceptions of, and perhaps investments in, what it is to be modern or 
postmodern: „the debate on postmodernism has taken many unexplored and divergent 
paths, and that what some critics have seen as the prevalence of the ludic, the 
gratuitously metafictional, the overtly intertextual has also been commented on as the 
locus of the apocalyptic, of the sublime and of the ethical‟.100 
Reynier and Ganteau‟s observations suggest some of the ways emotion is 
discussed without being identified, even, or I would suggest especially, when occluded 
by impersonality. Reynier and Ganteau observe that „what emerges is the trace of a 
perennial tradition:  that which concomitantly revives the impersonal practices of 
intertextual ventriloquism, for instance, the better to solicit the reader‟s emotional 
return to the past….that which calls forth the metafictional conventions of the early 
novel to protest the impossibility of impersonality‟.101 Returning to emotion not only 
links the modern and postmodern, but returns them to the „traditions‟ with which they 
supposedly break, yet such that the constitutive terms of these are no longer stable: 
What thus appears in the contemporary practice of impersonality, in 
a production that has been doxically referred to as „postmodern,‟ is a 
special interpretation of the prefix „post‟ as meaning less „against‟ 
than „continuous with‟ modernism.  In other terms, the contemporary 
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reader is presented with no less than a vision of tradition that echoes 
Eliot‟s in more ways than just one while positing a radical and 
flexible adaptation of the relations both differentiating and uniting 
impersonality – or the impossibility thereof – and emotion.  The 
postmodern is thus seen as a return to the modern and, beyond, to the 
romantic (pace Eliot) and onwards to the baroque (enter the 
metaphysical poets again)…102 
 
What I want to agree with, here, is that revisiting distinctions between emotion and 
impersonality has important destabilising effects on the temporalities a genealogy of 
literary criticism and theory might describe. But I disagree with Reynier and Ganteau‟s 
insistence on casting emotion as proof of the „impossibility of impersonality‟ by 
delineating that contradictory categories of emotion or impersonality, or emotion and 
impersonality, identify a persistent irruption of the personal subject whose critical 
presence undoes what Reynier and Ganteau call the post-modern „lack of emotion‟. 
Their argument hinges on observing, rightly, that emotion persists: this persistence then 
produces a tension or critical lacunae whose presence counters the latest (or, given the 
timing of their essay, the late twentieth century) version of impersonality in the death of 
the subject. Reynier and Ganteau‟s remarks cast emotion as theory‟s undermining 
point; that emotion persists counters a project that does away with the personal subject 
that grounds emotion.  
By implying that this theoretical climate cannot or does not accommodate or 
account for emotion and is uninterested in it, however, Reynier and Ganteau repeat one 
of the narratives about emotion that tends to dominate rationales for the study of 
emotion since about the 1970s onward, and which this project seeks to interrupt.
103
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disagree with Reynier and Ganteau and instead argue that the story of twentieth-century 
literature and criticism they tell does not indicate emotion‟s absence from this thinking, 
but suggests that a discussion of the impersonal treats emotion, precisely by keeping it 
under cover. It is not attending to emotion as opposed to the more recent preoccupation 
with impersonality that „sends us back‟, but observing that „impersonality‟ is not 
opposed to emotion. Instead, an aesthetic of „impersonality‟ is a critical discourse about 
emotion that distinguishes between emotions, generates particular currencies of feeling 
for those emotions identified with „impersonality‟ and „unemotionality‟, diagrams a 
distance from or proximity to those categories, and naturalises the distinctions it is 
supposed to indicate. 
The aesthetic discriminations Reynier and Ganteau describe index a twinning of 
critical and clinical discourses of emotion that, as Lutz and Clark help us to observe, 
turn around the notions of discerning emotion, or distinguishing between emotions, so 
that it or these may be mobilised. Brian Parkinson observes that „functional theories‟ of 
emotion are those that ask what emotion is for
104; what Reynier and Ganteau‟s 
invitation to look back draws out is an ideology of emotion that entangles a profound 
critical investment in the presupposition that emotion has a purpose, with a clinical 
                                                                                                                                                           
occupy a high place in classical models of subjectivity‟ (8). Pointing to the difficulty the „passions‟ 
presents Descartes‟ dichotomy between the „brain‟ and „body‟, she argues that the pineal gland, where he 
locates the passions, provides the capacity to „literalize the internal difference the passions make and the 
double edge of their location. Kicked upstairs with the thinking soul, passions are both circumscribed and 
dangerous. This kind of move is far more common than hostility to emotion as such: philosophy vies with 
emotion by elevating it, not by slighting it‟ (9). It is this model of containment and reification that is at 
work in my discussion of Coates. One of the implications of Terada‟s observation is that, taking her 
discussion of Descartes as an example, we cannot locate the history of emotion only in the particular kind 
of emotion a discourse takes as its object, but the very distinction that discourse makes between emotions. 
Although I agree with Terada that this narrative tends to be somewhat more complicated after 1990, 
particularly in the humanities, the level of complexity attributed to the history or study of emotion is, still, 
very much dependent on the discipline or field from which one approaches it; this is, itself, one way of 
thinking about the ideology of any given genealogy of emotion theory or inquiry.  
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investment in stabilising and containing emotion so that it can be deployed. That 
emotion needs to be „for‟ something belies an anxiety about being able to define 
emotion. The fluidity of emotion here is crucial, because it is what makes mobilising 
emotion possible and what threatens the integrity of the discourse that mobilises it. This 
very fluidity, however, suggests that emotion always threatens to „stick‟, just as it also 
is not contained by our taxonomies or critical frames for speaking about it. Observing 
that it is the very ways emotion exceeds critical consensus that has been a „sticking 
point‟ for emotion‟s thinkers, Sara Ahmed also reminds us, elsewhere, that what 
„sticks‟ is disgusting. From „bad-taste‟105, disgust, I suggest, shares an intimacy with 
the aesthetic distinctions for which literary theory and criticism have a „taste‟. My 
interest in disgust, then, is that it helps us consider how the distinction between emotion 
and impersonality, differentiation between various emotions, and the reification of 
some emotions as more interesting or productive for criticism and theory, work through 
critical disgust. Critical discourses about emotion, I am suggesting, are also discourses 
of disgust.
106
 
Recent studies of disgust disagree about the extent to which disgust has 
interested, or failed to interest, literary and cultural theory and criticism. Winnifred 
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Menninghaus‟s Disgust: Theory and History of Disgust locates an accumulation of 
tropes, images and aesthetics of disgust across literary and cultural theory that seems to 
gather force in the twentieth century. Sianne Ngai argues, however, that, even when it 
is explicitly the object of interest, „disgust‟ tends to be overshadowed by „desire‟: „the 
striking asymmetry between the careers of disgust and desire in literary and cultural 
theory raises the broader question of why repulsion has such a long history of being 
overshadowed by attraction as a theoretical concern‟.107 What these two studies share, 
however, is that they locate the work of disgust only in an interest in disgust – thus they 
debate the extent to which textual „objects‟ (theory, criticism, literature) that are 
identified as disgusting prove an intensity of interest, or dis-interest, in disgust. But, as 
Sara Ahmed observes, disgust works to locate, and thus contain, or identify, that which 
is perceived as disgusting. Disgust is not located in an object, but at work in the 
designation of an object as disgusting; if we want to observe disgust, it is at work in the 
distinctions between what is and is not disgusting.
108
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Disgust involves a „contact zone‟ of simultaneous attraction and repulsion.  This 
oscillation between proximity and distance is crucial to the making of borders that, 
appearing to thicken into an object that keeps bodies apart and corroborates this 
separation, still continues to read the „inter-corporeality‟ of the disgust encounter. 
Disgust involves a persistent clinging, or sticking, of the disgusting that contours the 
„I‟, the „subject‟, or the „body‟ that has been distinguished. Therefore while William Ian 
Miller observes that „the sticky and disgusting have been linked, if not reduced to each 
other‟109, Ahmed notes that not everything that sticks or clings is disgusting: instead, 
stickiness becomes disgusting only when the integrity of the subject is at stake. What is 
disgusting is that which, in threatening to stick to us, threatens the order of inside and 
out – it is not, as Sarah Ahmed points out, what „has got inside us‟ but what is both 
inside and outside us – this „turns us out, as well as outside in‟.110  
Because Ahmed doesn‟t locate disgust in what is designated as disgusting, but 
considers it as something closer to an event or encounter, her study is able to show how 
the circulations and movements of disgust can be at work in establishing communities, 
political bodies, and I would suggest the kinds of intellectual, critical, and aesthetic 
bodies suggested by Reynier and Ganteau‟s discussion. Once disgust encounters are 
acknowledged to exceed those situations where the „property‟ of disgust is readily 
identifiable, as they must be if we are to understand disgust in political and cultural 
contexts, disgust suggests a history of reading.
111
 Rather than derive from inherent 
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disgusting properties, the disgust encounter involves reading a contact with what has 
previously been in contact with (or could be anticipated as coming in contact with) 
what is associated with or designated as disgusting. In this sense „disgust‟ always 
doubles with interpretation and cannot be extracted from it.
112
 Rather than understand it 
as an emotion that names or identifies how one feels about an object that „is‟ 
disgusting, then, disgust is the interpretive event that constitutes an object as disgusting 
and this constitution involves a reading of the past and possible contacts that the 
encounter might also put one into contact with. Reynier and Ganteau‟s discussion 
elaborates an accumulation of distinctions about emotion and discernments between 
emotions that registers the very kinds of border-work Ahmed attributes to disgust.
113
 
What has stuck out for them from the narratives about emotion and impersonality in 
twentieth-century literature and criticism is that emotion sticks around, despite 
„impersonality‟ and despite „the death of the subject‟. This, they argue, requires us to 
rethink our theoretical investment in these ideas, and „return‟ to emotion, which 
opposes these. By re-reading the distinction between „emotion‟ and „lack of emotion‟, 
„personality‟ and „impersonality‟ as a discourse of critical disgust, however, these 
distinctions are denaturalised and we can see how they work as reciprocal relations of 
                                                                                                                                                           
asked to rate my level of disgust if a homeless woman smelling of urine sat next to me on a bus. I was not 
asked to rate my disgust if I were to come into contact with an affluent body that smelled of urine. 
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sanitization and expulsion, ejection and containment rather than proof of different 
critical or aesthetic categories. The „zone of contact‟ between these distinctions reads 
emotion both as a threat to the integrity of the „bodies‟ that make these distinctions and 
the slippage, or slipperiness, that might enable a critical body to cohere. Emotion 
disgusts, as Jean-Paul Sartre writes of „slime‟, because „it is a fluidity which holds me 
and which compromises me‟.114 It is the promise of a critical, aesthetic, and theoretical 
„body‟ that I am suggesting emotion compromises in the discussions Reynier and 
Ganteau review. As Elizabeth Grosz points out, what is disgusting is so „only given the 
maintenance of an order of things which allows absorption to become threatening‟.115 
Coates‟ reading of love and Eva‟s tears of joy, then, mobilises the discourses of 
contamination, containment and sanitization involved in disgust. For love to work for 
his argument, it must be contained and managed, handled in such a way that the 
argument about emotion sticks but emotion doesn‟t. Instead, undifferentiated emotion, 
emotion that can‟t be put to use (the excessive emotion of the „over-emotional‟, 
dysfunctional emotion), is identified as contaminating not only the critical reading with 
which he disagrees, but its entire critical project. Still Lives argues Eva Trout is a 
„slippery fish‟ that slips away from us everything we believe about what it means to be 
real – as Eva Trout remarks, „[a]nyhow, what a slippery fish is identity; and what is it, 
besides a slippery fish?‟ (193):  
The sliding of the phrase „slippery fish‟ into the questioning of 
identity activates the polysemic references to fish which slip through 
the text and swallow up not only our certitude of Eva‟s identity as 
„realistic‟, but also, in a very deep sense, the very possibility of 
identity. The slipperiness of Eva‟s name entails the slipperiness of 
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identity and of language….In order to suggest the lubricious and 
even demonic force of „Eva Trout‟, we might speak rather of an 
imperson.
116
  
 
It is these consequences of „imperson‟-ating Eva, however, that Coates‟ is concerned 
about:  to get hold of the novel‟s slipperiness he tries to get hold of the stability of 
emotion and, through it, secure the very „order of things‟ that these dissolutions 
threaten to absorb. What he catches, however, is not love, or the novel, but emotion‟s 
slipperiness, in the dissolving effects of Eva‟s tears. For, just as Bowen‟s texts „stray 
across boundaries and resist neat identifications‟117, such „shiftiness turns out to be 
characteristic of emotion‟.118  
Eva‟s „brimming‟ and Bowen‟s „sheer gush‟ intersect emotion and Bowen‟s 
writing in a fluid dynamics that registers Zoltán Kövecses observation of emotion‟s 
„force‟.119 Emotion language, he observes, never simply reports or indicates emotion. It 
is, instead, always metaphorical. Our languages about emotion, however, lack 
consistency: metaphors of emotion do not stabilize an origin, direction, intensity, or 
density of emotion. What qualifies emotion will differ across metaphors for different 
emotions, but it also differs between references to what is supposed to be the same 
emotion. What emotion metaphors share, however, is that they describe emotion „as 
force‟: this force affords „materiality‟ a specific dynamic. Whether described as a fluid 
in a container, an explosion, a pressure, a gripping, a burning, or a spilling, the dynamic 
of emotion‟s force not only designates the limit, and integrity of that limit, to the 
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materiality it conceptualises, but also corroborates the positionality or relationality of 
that materiality to its context. Emotion‟s „force‟, then, materializes that material whose 
capacity to affect and be affected it also designates, and reinforces.  Emotion doesn‟t 
originate from the materiality whose substance it makes possible, nor is it outside this: 
it constitutes and dissolves these distinctions.  
Because individual emotion metaphors „point‟ to emotion everywhere and 
nowhere, these do not cohere around a location or origin for emotion but instead work 
to differently substantiate emotion as a movement or force that materializes not only 
what it acts on, with, against, or through, but at the same time designates the capacity of 
that material to act. The emotion that is referred to thus appears to brace the epistemic, 
ontological, and conceptual effects of the relationality to which its metaphor refers. 
Vital to this is that the density or intensity of the effects that an emotion metaphor 
describes is passed to the „emotion‟ rather than the „theory‟ (folkloric or otherwise) of 
what that emotion does, which is produced in place of emotion.  
This suggests that our thinking about emotion needs to inflect a dimensionality 
that does not locate emotion only in a linear sequence, or even a circuit of cause and 
reaction, and that does not ascribe to its contracture or stilling, the inertia of a state. 
That emotion metaphors conceptualize emotion not just as force, but often as the „force, 
event or object that leads to emotion in the first place‟120 helps us to observe the 
difficulty with ascribing a temporal, material or representational boundedness to 
emotion. While studies of emotion rely on being able to point to and indicate emotion, 
Kövecses‟ observations remind us that it is our representations of emotion that produce 
what we interpret as emotion – and these representations gain their effect by referring 
to other potential representations, not by indicating a „real‟ emotion that pre-exists the 
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representation. As Brian Parkinson, who theorises emotion as „online communication‟, 
remarks, studies of emotion in „real life‟ are characterized by methodologies flawed by 
their presupposition  
…that our minds contain more or less accurate knowledge about 
emotions which can be conveyed…by language. Thus self-reports are 
the key empirical measure of emotion, and studies of the meanings of 
emotion words and concepts remain the most popular way of 
understanding how real emotions are different from, or similar to, one 
another…The traditional approach to emotion representation, then, 
assumes that what people say about emotion….gives as good 
information as it is possible to get about the deep structure of emotion 
experience itself. According to this view, there is a simple and 
unidirectional descriptive connection between emotional reality and 
emotion representation.
121
 
 
What makes emotion „online‟, in Parkinson‟s view, is that emotion does not pre-exist 
the interpretive contexts in which it happens, and yet it is also never not happening.
122
 
For Parkinson, the „reality‟ of emotion is not a state that is then indicated by 
representation. Instead, he argues that representation „should be seen as right at the 
heart of emotion rather than as indirect indices of an underlying state. All that emotion 
is, in many circumstances, is a particular form of communication‟.123 What Parkinson 
makes clear, however, is that „communication‟ should not be confused with 
„transmission‟ (which he notes is „one of the cornerstones of cognitive theory‟), 
because this assumes that the „private‟ emotional experience is first encoded „within‟ 
the individual, transmitted, and then „decoded‟ by the receiver.124 Instead, emotion 
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involves a complexity of mediations – adjustments, responses, and hypotheses –  that 
reverberate with and interpret each other. Emotion is not in the specific moment we 
„capture‟ in facial expression studies, for example, but constituted by „reading‟ this 
moment in relation to what has, or might have happened right before, after, or 
alongside it. Parkinson observes that in order to begin to approximate „decoding‟ a 
„simple‟ encounter, it would be necessary „to record 10,000 bits of information every 
second to give an accurate picture‟.125 Emotion, Parkinson argues, is not passed 
between interactants as an exchange of information, instead emotion is the 
communication of emotional communication: „it is not necessarily emotion per se that 
is communicated when we pick up information from other people‟s verbal and 
nonverbal behaviour. Rather we coordinate ourselves to what they do and somewhere 
along the line emotion occurs between us or is attributed by one of us to the other or to 
ourself‟.126  This attribution is generated from prior emotion encounters. Hardly 
unimportant or inauthentic, these attributions are also what determine the possibility of 
emotion.  Parkinson‟s thinking about emotion as „online‟ generates a theory of emotion 
whose „reality‟ is always virtual, and whose presence is always in place of itself.127  
This is almost exactly how emotion is pictured in Bowen‟s 1927 novel The 
Hotel, and this is noted by Bennett and Royle: 
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As Sydney looks down from a hill above the hotel, she sees Veronica 
and Victor, two  hotel guests, in the embrace of their first kiss: „To 
her, looking down unawares, the couple gesticulating soundlessly 
below her in the sunshine appeared as in some perfect piece of 
cinema-acting, emotion represented without emotion‟(42). Emotion 
represented without emotion is both an emotionless representation, 
and, more curiously, a representation of emotion in the absence of 
itself. The latter formulation would suggest a radical fictionalization 
of emotion as such: that emotion can be represented as without 
emotion figures the possibility of emotion only ever being an empty 
representation, a simulacrum with no referent.
128
 
 
The difference here would seem to be a matter of intensity; a difference between lack 
of emotion and its presence: a distinction, perhaps, between real and fictional emotion, 
aesthetic or live, mimetic or genuine. Parkinson‟s theory attributes the „reality‟ of 
emotion to its unreality; its live intensity is the effect of emotion in place of emotion. 
Bowen‟s representation, however, blurs Sydney‟s „emotionless representation‟ with 
emotion in the absence of itself. While this might appear to imply that that what leads 
to a „radical fictionalization‟ is a lack of emotion, a „waning of affect‟, instead it 
suggests that any representation of emotion is emotionless because that is how emotion 
works: emotion requires non-coincidence to be felt. Rei Terada makes this argument 
when she argues that the „experience of being impassioned is itself an outcome of 
feeling compelled to look for passion although we cannot finally identify it. Because 
one does not find the source of it, one also does not run out of it‟.129 
In Bowen‟s 1938 novel The Death of The Heart, sixteen year old Portia 
wonders „whether a feeling could spring straight from the heart, be imperative, without 
being original‟.130 In a parenthetical address that inflects the absolute interiority of 
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Portia‟s thoughts with the absolute exteriority of the narrator‟s observations, Portia‟s 
question is qualified: „(But if love were original, if it were the unique device of two 
unique spirits, its importance would not be granted; it could not make a great common 
law felt. The strongest compulsions we feel throughout life are no more than 
compulsions to repeat a pattern: the pattern is not of our own device)‟ (72). Here The 
Death of the Heart initiates the kinds of dimensionality I suggested earlier is mobilised 
by emotion. Not only does an absolute interiority and absolute exteriority of emotion 
involve a circularity or citationality that precludes the most private of emotions and the 
most public from ever being „real‟, but it also inflects these with each other. Thus the 
deepest feeling, that which is most private and substantive of the „self‟, gains its sense 
of depth and subjective authenticity  not from the degree of failure to express it, but 
from the degree to which the impossibility of saying what it is coincides with the idea 
of what it is.
131
  The absolute reality of Portia‟s love is „measured‟ by its absolute 
unoriginality. Her depth of feeling does not emerge from a depth of subjectivity, but 
from the intensity of the difference between originality and unoriginality that implies 
them.  
Emotion exceeds sequential or linear schematizations as well as distinctions 
between the real and fictional: in The Death of the Heart, the severity of Portia‟s 
suffering is not that she discovers passion can never be original, or pathos is not 
unoriginal, but that pathos and passion are implied.
132
 Pathos and passion move each 
other – this is what Rei Terada describes as the economy of emotion, the „recirculating 
                                                                                                                                                           
that the novel „obliges us to associate „whatever feeling is in the heart‟ with…the uncanniness of sensing 
the heart as other‟ (72). Subsequent references provided in text. 
131
 In her discussion of the textuality of emotion Rei Terada draws on Derrida‟s discussion of Rousseau‟s 
„giant‟ in Of Grammatology. Terada observes that for Derrida, it is „the inadequation of the designation 
which properly expresses the passion‟ (42). Terada argues that it is „not the sign‟s literalness with respect 
to the idea, then, that represents my fear itself…Nor is it the sign‟s imprecision regarding the man (its 
being able to say at most what he is like, not what he is). It is the difference between the sign‟s falseness 
with respect to its object and its accuracy with respect to its idea that represents the passion‟ (42-43). 
132As the OED Online observes, „pathos‟ and „passion‟ share the root „pati-‟, to „suffer‟.  
77 
 
infinity of feeling living on‟.133 To explain this, Terada recalls the concept of Planck 
length. Max Planck proposed that, at a certain point, the „classical description of gravity 
ceases to be valid, and quantum mechanics must be taken into account‟.134 This point, 
though theoretically uncertain and unprovable, is both the smallest unit of measurement 
possible and the moment when quantum physics takes hold: it implies mass, space, and 
time.  For Terada, Planck length articulates how „…feeling never quite 
disappears…shrinking circles that approach the Planck scale start to appear as though 
they are getting larger. Pathos is the Planck length of emotion bounding the theory of 
emotion as the least that can be said‟.135 The diminishment of emotion then is also its 
acceleration: the „ebbing of pathos makes more as well as less pathos: the less pathetic 
the end of pathos is, the more pathetic it is that it isn‟t pathetic any more. This regress 
typifies the structure of emotion‟.136 Emotion, stilled, is not only moving, but exceeds 
the frame that stills it.  Stilled emotion is still in motion: diminishment and acceleration 
contract.  
Portia‟s question and Sydney‟s emotion without emotion echo the virtuality of 
the person that circulates in criticism of Eva Trout. In her discussion of the novel, 
Maud Ellmann remarks:  
…Eva leaps to the postmodernist conclusion that the depths do not 
exist: there is nothing hidden underneath the surface, no inner life 
behind the mask. Pictures are at least as real as people. Does the 
novelist endorse this vision? It is difficult to tell, particularly because 
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Bowen turns off the voice-over depriving the reader of the guidance 
of the narrator.
137
 
 
Eva‟s tears are undecidable in their working over of our ideas about what it means to 
have an interior, to be someone who loves. They overwhelm her „two-dimensional 
conception of the world‟138 by producing the sign of an inside that confirms, through 
theatricality, the reality of what they express: „As soon as they appear, these tears 
become the crowning Kodak moment, splashing on Eva‟s brooch like diamonds upon 
diamonds…But as Henry observes, „an unreal act collects round it real-er emotion that 
a real act, sometimes‟[sic].139 Shooting Eva, Ellmann remarks, „also shatters the 
delusion that a person is nothing but a picture. Eva has – or had – an inside after all‟.140 
While Ellmann‟s discussion contrasts Eva‟s postmodern two-dimensionality with the 
three dimensioned „inside‟ revealed by her death, it also observes that this distinction is 
made possible only by „words of love‟: „…it is crucial that Eva‟s tears are summoned 
from the depths by words of love. Blurring her vision these tears mark the limits of 
Eva‟s “visual universe,” and open up a world of love beyond the world of spectacle‟.141 
Yet if Henry‟s words of love insist Eva is really loved, they also offer Eva reality 
precisely in the form of virtuality. Just before Eva‟s „brimming‟, Henry says: „That 
could have been a fake, full of bricks and things. – But it isn‟t, Eva; it isn‟t. Do you 
mind?‟ (266). Rather than indicate his love, these words can only be of love: they can 
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only measure it as the greatest distance between what could be fake and what isn‟t: 
Eva‟s „Kodak‟ tears reply – where pathos and passion meet.  
That pathos and passion seem to end with Eva‟s death, I want to suggest, does 
not dissolve the virtuality with which the novel presents us. Ellmann observes that, 
„[c]orny though they are, Eva‟s tears elicit real emotion in the reader…This is a lesson 
Bowen learned from Dickens the master of melodrama‟.142 More melodramatic than 
even Eva‟s „Kodak moment‟, perhaps, Eva‟s death pushes the limits of an unrealistic 
ending that comes at the absolute limit of a fictional world that has taken fictionality to 
its limit.  If Eva‟s tear is the sign of her becoming, however, then stilling her, stopping 
her in motion, when she has perhaps begun to learn how to create the fiction of 
emotion, does not cancel out the instabilities of her virtual world but, under the physics 
of emotion, increases it – because it is no longer Eva‟s world in question, but the 
„reality‟ of the world of love beyond Eva Trout. Eva‟s final „still‟, her abeyance, leaves 
the novel in dissolution. Eva, Bennett and Royle write, like a „novelist or like a reader 
unable to make sense of events because unable to concatenate‟ utters the last words 
„what is “concatenation”?‟.143 Answered only by her final „dissolution: still life‟, Eva 
Trout, they argue, leaves us with the dissolutions of our own lives: „Still lives are 
movie-lives, going, in the instantaneous mobility of the convulsive event, of reading. A 
dissolution: mobile, fluid and uncontainably still, uncontainable still‟.144  
Bowen‟s novels interest Bennett and Royle precisely because of the novels‟ 
conventionality – they appear to accommodate „highly traditional notions of literary 
criticism (a focus on „life‟, close reading, the affective power of literary texts, etc.)‟ 
while also representing „powerful, theoretically-informed sites of cultural and 
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ideological disruption‟.145 Their remark has its echo in Terada‟s interest in emotion: 
„there does not seem to be anything unconventional, anything potentially radical in 
emotion‟.146  Yet reading emotion, it turns out, turns up its movements; this is not 
immobilizing, but moving. As Roland Barthes remarks, emotion is „a disturbance, a 
bordering on collapse: something perverse, under respectable appearances; emotion is 
even, perhaps, the slyest of losses‟.147 Eva‟s tears do not redeem the „deconstruction of 
everything that is seemingly most conventional and reassuring‟148 nor do they locate the 
blind-spot of these deconstructions, because, although Bennett and Royle don‟t discuss 
Eva‟s tears, these have been at work all along, implied with the fluid dynamics of 
dissolution.  
By observing the difficulty of knowing whether Bowen „endorses‟ this vision, 
Maud Ellmann‟s question summons the otherness of Bowen‟s reading effects: to 
endorse is not to merely „approve‟, but to do so by „writing on the back‟.149 I want to 
propose, then, that this is Eva Trout‟s final dissolution: the novel needn‟t endorse its 
textual affects, because we do – reading the novel, we write Eva‟s person on the back 
of our own feeling for reality. This reality, we have, already, endorsed with the fiction 
of our feelings. Whether we read in Eva‟s „brimming‟ a subject to be expressed, 
discovered beneath or behind her imperson, or don‟t – and whether Eva‟s person is 
punctured by or punctuates the novel‟s end – reading Eva Trout can neither confirm nor 
deny Eva‟s interiority. But it does dissolve our own. The only way we might decide the 
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depth of her representation is to measure our distinction between „reality‟ and „fiction‟ 
– discerning this, we find it virtually no bigger than a tear. Awed by Eva‟s 
„bewildering, brilliant blurring filling up, swimming and brimming over‟, Henry 
Dancey exclaims that he „can‟t get over those tears, those extraordinary tears!‟ Perhaps, 
as Eva replies to Dancey, „We must go back, now‟ (267).  
  
Chapter Two 
Frederick’s Tears and the Literariness of Emotion 
 
According to Elizabeth Bowen, the short story „revolves round one crisis only – one 
might call it, almost, a crisis in itself‟.1 For Phyllis Lassner, this crisis is exemplified in 
Bowen‟s 1936 short story „Tears, Idle Tears‟, about seven-year-old Frederick 
Dickinson, who suffers from „incontinence in the matter of tears‟.2 The crisis of 
Bowen‟s story, Lassner argues, lies in the emotional history behind Frederick‟s tears; it 
makes known the grief the story confronts, playing this out along with the unfolding of 
its history. In doing so, Lassner argues, the story performs „an act of reparation‟.3 While 
for Lassner uncovering the emotion behind Frederick‟s tears resolves the crisis, I 
propose that this is its beginning. Rather than offer us a reading of Frederick‟s tears that 
discovers their emotional origin, the story‟s crisis is the readability of Frederick‟s 
„catastrophe of tears‟ (482), the meaning of „Tears, Idle Tears‟. 
 „Tears, Idle Tears‟, is torn open, opens at a tear, by tears, Frederick „burst into 
tears in the middle of Regent‟s Park‟ (481). The story takes place one May in London: 
Mrs Dickinson, sensing Frederick‟s imminent tears, cries out „Frederick, you can‟t – in 
the middle of Regent‟s Park!‟ (481). But Frederick does cry, horrifying, once again, his 
mother and himself. For Mrs Dickinson, Frederick‟s tears are „a shame of which she 
could speak to no one; no offensive weakness of body could have upset her more‟ 
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(481). Mrs. Dickinson directs Frederick to look at a duck until he stops crying: 
Frederick, standing still, looks at „the duck that sat folded into a sleek white cypher on 
the green, grassy margin of the lake‟ (483) until „something unseeing in its expression 
calmed him‟ (483). While he gazes at the duck, Mrs Dickinson walks on and the story 
unfolds the origins of her disappointment with Frederick, and her own stoicism, leading 
back to her husband‟s death, five years earlier. After this loss, Mrs Dickinson „became 
the perfect friend for men who wished to wish to marry but were just as glad not to, and 
for married men who liked just a little pathos without being upset‟ (484).   
From this history, the story returns to Frederick who, no longer crying, is left 
„perfectly blank, so that he stared at the duck with abstract intensity, perceiving its 
moulded feathers and porcelain-smooth neck‟ (484).  Reaching out to touch it, the duck 
slides away from him; staring after it, Frederick‟s „passion of observation‟ (485) is 
interrupted by a bespectacled girl wearing „four celluloid bangles, each of a different 
colour‟ (486), who has witnessed the scene. The girl asks Frederick about his tears and 
proceeds to tell him about a young man named George, who also cries: he „knots 
himself up and bellows‟ (486).  They discuss George‟s tears whilst eating an apple, 
until, seeing Mrs. Dickinson‟s approach, they shake hands and Frederick returns to his 
mother.  Frederick seems at the end of the story to be a different boy; he skips and 
shouts, and tells his mother about nearly catching the duck.  When she tells him he is 
silly, that he couldn‟t catch a duck, he doesn‟t cry but instead counters:  „Oo, yes, I 
could, I could. If I‟d had salt for its tail!‟ (487).  „Tears, Idle Tears‟ ends with a 
Bowenesque turn:  „…years later‟, the story closes, „Frederick could still remember 
with ease, pleasure, and with a sense of lonely shame being gone, that calm, white duck 
swimming off round the bank.  But George‟s friend with the bangles, and George‟s 
trouble, fell through a cleft in his memory and were forgotten soon‟ (487). At the end of 
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the story, Frederick‟s tears are resolved into this cleft, this cleaving of „Tears, Idle 
Tears‟. 
How do we read Frederick‟s tears? What can they tell us about emotion?  Do 
these tears, in fact, mean anything?  While these questions might seem to deliberately 
miss the point of Frederick‟s tears (a point the story appears to make very clear), they 
are echoed in the questions that impelled Tom Lutz‟s 1999 study Crying: The Natural 
and Cultural History of Tears.
4
 Curious about the lack of scholarship on a phenomena 
so ubiquitous to everyday life, Lutz‟s study tracks tears across historical periods, 
cultures, scholarly disciplines, and aesthetic forms, to ask: „Why do we cry?...Why do 
certain ways of feeling make us cry and why does crying feel the way it does? How do 
we understand other people‟s weeping?...Why and how do we stop crying?...What, 
exactly, do tears express?‟5 Moving from the earliest written record of tears in the 
fourteenth century tablets that record the grieving goddess Anat „sating herself with 
weeping, to drink tears like wine‟6, to Man Ray‟s stylized „prototypical modernist 
representation of tears‟7 in the 1932/33 photograph „Larmes (Tears)‟, Lutz‟s study 
works up to Jerome Neu‟s proposition that emotions are a „kind of thinking‟, a 
cognition Neu suggests is best expressed by William Blake‟s injunction that „a tear is an 
intellectual thing‟.8  
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While Lutz‟s study is hopeful about the work that was, in 1999, beginning to 
emerge about emotion, he found that the capacity to organize the constellation of 
accounts, anecdotes, speculations and theories of emotion that his study brought to bear 
on understanding the representation, meaning, function and origin of tears, was 
complicated by their tendency towards occlusion:  
in any time and any place, the meaning of tears is rarely pure and 
never simple…The best we can do is to translate tears into a variety of 
languages – historical, physiological, psychological, sociological, 
anthropological, literary, and philosophical, for instance…None of 
these disciplinary lenses puts the full depth of crying in focus, but 
each achieves its own kind of clarity.
9
 
 
Tears, Lutz suggests, are an enigma. Despite their „conspicuous physicality‟ they „resist 
interpretation‟, remaining „the most substantial and yet the most fleeting, the most 
obvious and yet the most enigmatic proof of our emotional lives‟.10  Asking in „The End 
of Tears‟, „how or why we stop crying, or sometimes don‟t‟, Lutz concludes his study 
by gathering together some of the then emerging work on emotion from neuroscience, 
anthropology, literary theory, and psychology, to suggest that the turn towards emotion 
across disciplines would inaugurate an end to the questions tears pose. Quoting Roland 
Barthes, Lutz writes: „ “Who will write the history of tears?” Roland Barthes asked. We 
all will.‟11 Just a few years later, Keith Opdahl declared that „the twentieth century may 
someday be known for its quiet rediscovery of emotion‟.12  
Certainly Lutz‟s inconclusive emphasis on the mysteriousness of tears might 
now, only a decade later, seem outdated, given the critical preoccupation with emotion, 
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feeling and affect across the disciplines. But as Rei Terada observes, the relationship 
between the „proof‟ of emotion and emotion itself is far from certain. Instead, what is 
remarkable about the abundance of work on emotion is that not only has it not produced 
a coherent theory of what emotion is, but it operates, often by borrowing between 
disciplines, as if it has. As Jenefer Robinson, whose cognitive account of emotion seeks 
to elaborate the „special relationship between the arts and the emotions‟13 wrote in 2005: 
Until very recently…there was little consensus about what the 
emotions really are and how they actually operate, and so it has been 
hard to adjudicate exactly how they function in relation to the arts. 
This situation has now begun to change. Within the last thirty years 
or so there has been an upsurge of research into the emotions in 
disciplines as diverse as experimental and clinical psychology, 
neurobiology, anthropology, sociology, and philosophy. We now 
have a much better idea of what emotions are. Not that there is a 
complete consensus: far from it. Competing theories are rife. But 
none the less there is growing agreement about emotion and what its 
most important ingredients are.
14
 
 
Disciplines other than literature are marshalled here as if to exert an epistemic pressure 
to staunch the uncertainty the softer „arts‟ might bring to emotion. But while Robinson‟s 
use of these theories, particularly cognitive and evolutionary psychology, compellingly 
argues that fiction affects us materially by provoking emotional reactions that „may 
become encoded in emotional memory, making new connections between affective 
appraisals and bodily responses (somatic markers)‟15, her account is restricted to the 
„encoding‟ activity that can be read in canonical literatures. When it comes to the „post-
modern‟ story, she writes, „the emotions evoked are managed to such a high degree that 
we are mainly aware as we read of the cognitive pleasures of intellectualizing and 
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distancing than of the rewards of deep emotional engagement‟.16 Robinson‟s account 
finds emotion „at work‟ only in certain texts because these demonstrate the emotions 
that her rubric can recognize. Very few of the literary, visual, or musical case studies 
Robinson finds fruitful for her theory of emotion occur during or after modernism, and 
none are amongst those she categorises as the „postmodern‟. Instead these are precisely 
the kinds of case studies that she suggests resist her theorizations because they are not 
emotional or, rather, do not express the specific emotions her theory discerns as 
evidence of deep emotional engagement. Rather than identify a theory of emotion, then, 
Robinson‟s work mobilizes emotion theory to recycle not only the kind of aesthetic 
periodisation Rei Terada observes is attributed to Fredric Jameson‟s inauguration of the 
„waning of affect‟, but also the diagramming of a subject by emotion, and the 
assumption that the postmodern text is unemotional.
17
  
 What Robinson‟s theorization of emotion exemplifies, then, is that the study of 
emotion is complicated by the problem of „the case-study‟ – that, as Jacques Derrida 
reminds us, the „object‟ of study is produced in analysis, not only described by it: the 
analyst‟s „offering‟ is „already a discourse, at least the possibility of a discourse, putting 
a symbolicity to work‟.18 But it also registers the urgency of Rei Terada‟s recognition 
that this problem is particularly acute for emotion research. There is, at heart, a certain 
uncertainty about what emotion is, and emotion continues to exceed the frameworks and 
taxonomies we employ to describe it. Rei Terada, observing emotion‟s uncertain status, 
suggests that this forms a „proverbial loci of anxiety‟ for its thinkers: „[t]he 
impossibility of identifying particular emotions by signs leads to the deeper worry that it 
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is not possible to know what emotion is‟.19 Rather than pose this problem as something 
to be overcome, however, she urges us to consider it as vital to thinking about what 
emotion might be:  „It is not possible to talk about what emotion is,‟ she notes „apart 
from arguments about how it can be conceived [because] [t]he difficulty of representing 
emotion…is the difficulty of knowing what it is‟.20  In this way, she suggests, „emotion‟ 
may be thought of in relation to „the secret‟, noting that, for Derrida, „passion‟, is 
„tucked into‟ secrecy:  „Passion, open but illegible, fits the definition of a secret‟.21  For 
Derrida, there „is no passion without secret, this very secret, indeed no secret without 
this passion‟.22 Passion is „in place‟ of the secret which, „without content‟ neither 
conceals, nor reveals itself: it „simply exceeds the play of veiling/unveiling‟.23 I begin 
with Bowen‟s story to suggest it stages and interrupts the emergent literature of emotion 
by re-reading the apparent readability of idle tears. The crisis of Elizabeth Bowen‟s 
„Tears, Idle Tears‟, I suggest, is the problem of reading emotion according to signs, 
reading emotion in and beneath signs. Exemplifying passion‟s secret, emotion too 
„remains inviolable even when one thinks one has revealed it‟.24  
Bowen‟s story re-reads tears from the outset, taking its title and subject – „idle 
tears‟ – from one of the „idylls‟ in Tennyson‟s 1847 poem „The Princess‟: 
Tears, idle tears, I know not what they mean,  
Tears from the depth of some divine despair 
Rise in the heart, and gather to the eyes, 
In looking on the happy Autumn-fields, 
And thinking of the days that are no more.
 25
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Here the speaker dwells upon idle tears, contemplating the meaning – or not knowing 
the meaning – of tears that „from the depth of some divine despair / rise in the heart and 
gather to the eyes.‟  „Idle‟, the Oxford English Dictionary tells us, means empty, 
worthless:  „void of any real usefulness or significance, void of meaning or sense, 
without result, without cause‟.26  Tennyson‟s poem responds to the apparent idleness of 
these tears by hooking them onto nostalgia, melancholy and remembrance.  These „idle 
tears‟, the poem suggests, are not empty or idle at all, but instead full of signification 
and meaning.  Rising as if pushed out to the surface of the body by a swell or brimming 
of inner emotion,  their movement is a response to „looking on the happy autumn-fields, 
and thinking of the days that are no more‟[italics mine]; the tears „gather to the eye‟ 
where, there expressed, they become „readable‟ or analysable. The purpose of these 
„idle‟ tears, then, may be recuperated by catching them into a causal relation with 
cognition and perception; not „idle‟ at all, these tears function as a somatic signifier of 
the emotional depth behind the eye, within the subject „I‟.  Once secret and mysterious, 
Tennyson‟s „idle tears‟, through reading and analysis, become solvable, and can be 
slipped from idleness into an economy of function and purpose. As the OED notes, the 
„idle‟ machine is a broken one; repairing the disconnection its repetitions signal restores 
it to its proper function. I am not suggesting an uncomplicated reading of tears on 
Tennyson‟s part nor do I want to suggest the poem‟s status is stable or decided in 
Tennyson criticism. Instead I want to consider how his poem initiates through an appeal 
to recuperation, a „de-idle-ing‟ of „idleness‟, the problem of reading tears. If the poem is 
about „idle‟ tears, and these tears become „de-idled‟ through the very act of reading, 
then what remains?  How do we read these „idle‟ tears?  Bowen‟s text in turn picks up 
on this problem of reading tears, tripping, or idling, over Tennyson‟s. 
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Bowen‟s „idle tears‟ are caught up in Frederick, whose „burst‟ carries the title‟s 
anaphora to his tears themselves, as if he too suffers the repetitions of a faulty 
connection.  Unlike Tennyson‟s „I‟, Frederick cannot solve his tears; contemplation 
does not lead him to a meaning or cause.  Instead, they are „shocking‟ to him, „bowing 
down‟ and „annulling‟ – „he never knew what happened‟ (28).  They do not rise, nor do 
they seem divine.  Their violent involuntariness makes Frederick „his own shameful and 
squalid enemy‟ (28) and his mother‟s as well:  „His tears were a shame of which she 
could speak to no one; no offensive weakness of body could have upset her more‟ (27). 
For both Frederick and his mother, his tears are inexplicable and disturbing. By 
speaking the unsolvability of his tears, the text makes them „secret‟, invoking the desire 
for detection, for meaning and explanation, for a „key‟ to Frederick‟s tears.  With 
Frederick unable to offer a key, the text looks to itself to furnish one.     
At the centre of the story, when Frederick is gazing at the duck and trying to 
stop crying, we have a scene that looks back into his infancy and seems to describe the 
origin of his tears. Structurally, this takes place at the mid-point of the narrative, 
suggesting itself as a fulcrum, a textual pivot on which the narrative turns. Up to this 
point we are confronted with confusion, speculation, mystery – after this scene, it 
appears, everything in the story falls into place.  The scene suggests what 
psychoanalysis describes as a „primal scene‟, a moment in the depths of Frederick‟s 
past, as well as the narrative‟s, that provides what LaPlanche and Pontalis in „Fantasy 
and the Origins of Sexuality‟ call „a representation of, and a solution to, the major 
enigmas which confront the child…a moment of emergence, the beginning of a 
history…the origin of the subject himself‟.27   
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In this „primal scene‟, we learn that Frederick‟s father died unexpectedly when 
Frederick was only two.  Throughout her husband‟s hospitalisation, Mrs. Dickinson 
„had hardly turned a hair‟ (30). Her stoicism, however, is soon perceived by those 
around her as an unhealthy failure to express her feelings, to the point of their own 
discomfort.  A friend, who finds Mrs. Dickinson‟s failure to cry too much of a strain 
suggests they look in on Frederick.  When his mother sees Frederick „flushed, and 
drawing up his upper lip in his sleep as his father used to do‟ she gives way: 
Something suddenly seemed to strike his mother, who, slumping down 
by the cot, ground her face and forehead into the fluffy blanket, then 
began winding the blanket round her two fists.  Her convulsions, 
though proper, were fearful:  the cot shook.  The friend crept away 
into the kitchen, where she stayed a half-hour, muttering to the maid. 
They made more tea and waited for Mrs. Dickinson to give full birth 
to her grief. (30) 
 
Here then, the text suggests, is the secret origin of Frederick‟s tears:  Mrs. Dickinson‟s 
giving birth to her grief, through a gesture of violent overlay.  Usually composed and 
distant, here she becomes a smothering form, sensual and intimate, gyrational bodily 
gestures covering Frederick with an intensity of contact. The „properness‟ of her grief is 
undermined both by her friend‟s inability to stand it and the peculiar absence of tears – 
Mrs. Dickinson convulses, and grinds her face into the blanket, but does not cry.  This is 
her only moment of grief, and it is marked by the absence of tears, the very excess from 
which Frederick suffers.  It is as if she has transferred her absent tears to him.  
Afterwards Frederick lies awake, as if „he knew‟ (484) – in giving birth to grief, Mrs. 
Dickinson has given birth to „Frederick‟.  Frederick‟s primal scene suggests that the 
„solution to his enigma‟ is this moment of contact between himself and his mother, the 
transmission of her grief.  He cries because of his mother‟s failure to mourn; this 
refusal, at a crucial moment, has resulted instead in incorporation. 
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In The Shell and the Kernel, Abraham and Torok note that Freud‟s formulation 
of healthy and unhealthy mourning, or mourning versus melancholia, pivots on 
„identification‟:  in mourning, „the bereaved become the dead for themselves and take 
their time to work through, gradually and step by step, the effects of the separation‟.28 
This takes place through introjection, the gradual „recovery of investments‟ (i.e. the 
object-relations) placed in the lost object.
29
  Introjection is vital to healthy mourning – it 
is through introjection that the self is „reconfigured‟ after loss.  In this model of 
mourning, however, introjection can be painful; for some, this pain is avoided, and the 
„object‟ is instead „swallowed‟ and kept whole within the subject.30  This is 
„incorporation‟: by „swallowing‟ the loss instead of expressing it, the subject is exempt 
from the painful reconfiguration of the self that mourning would require.  Incorporation, 
then, is a kind of „magical cure‟ for mourning, it is the „refusal to introject loss‟. 31  
Incorporation „reveals a gap within the psyche; it points to something that is missing 
just where introjection should have occurred‟.32 The incorporated objects, the loss that 
has not been introjected, „stand like tombs in the life of the ego‟ and, „thirsting for 
introjection …[the ego] tricks itself with a magical procedure in which “eating” is 
paraded as the equivalent of an immediate but purely hallucinatory and illusory 
“introjection”‟.33   Incorporation is marked by an external „display‟ that is a false 
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introjection, allowing the „swallowing‟ of loss to persist:  such external signifiers of 
incorporation include hiccupping, salivating, vomiting, or, in Frederick‟s case, crying.  
Frederick‟s tears begin when a „cold, black pit with no bottom opened inside 
himself‟, and „a red-hot bellwire jagged up through him from the pit of his frozen belly 
to the caves of his eyes.  Then the hot, gummy rush of tears…‟ (482). As if his mother‟s 
„convulsions‟ have crossed his wires, this „jagged bellwire‟ transmits to Frederick‟s 
eyes, that, figured as „caves‟, mouth their orality in the form of their openness, their 
cleaving and cleft lids or lips suggesting what Derrida calls „eyelid-lips‟.34 Overspilled 
by Frederick‟s „gummy rush‟, this strange confusion between the „wounds of his eyes‟ 
(486) and the „terrible square grin he felt his mouth take‟ (482) initiates a kind of 
lachrymal vomit congested with suggestions of all the other secrets, or private 
secretions, these tears might expose: „crying made him so abject…it dragged up all 
unseemliness into view. No wonder everyone was repelled‟ (482). Unable to utter more 
than a sob, Frederick‟s tears register Tom Lutz‟s observation of the perception that tears 
„supplant articulation‟.35 It is Frederick‟s eyes that are opened and full, seeming to 
speak – not his mouth. 
For Abraham and Torok, the surface affects that mark incorporation are a 
„disguised language‟ „signalling introjection, without actually accomplishing it…‟.36 As 
such they point to the place where the analyst needs to „operate‟.37 The illusory 
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introjection, although appearing on the surface to have no meaning, does then have 
purpose as an „invitation extended to the analyst to proceed with the exhumation [and] 
an appropriate directive for this stage of the analysis‟ –  the false introjection says 
„“Accuse me”‟.38  Frederick‟s tears, through the intervention of analysis, then, become a 
readable somatic signifier, visible to others, that there is a secret within the subject to be 
„exhumed‟, an origin to be discovered, and a meaning behind the signifier to be 
recovered.  Frederick‟s „idle‟ tears signify not just a desire to be read but suggest how to 
read them – they signify incorporation and the illusory introjection. His „idle tears‟ are a 
somatic language that asks for accusation; beneath them is his mother‟s grief, whole and 
unassimilated, destined to be repeated, to idle, in Frederick, rearing its ugly head until it 
is read. Through reading „idle‟ tears their secret meaning may be discovered, analysed, 
and, finally, exhumed.  Analysis, critical intervention, offers a „solution‟ by articulating 
the emotion these idle tears mark. 
Certainly, following the „primal scene‟, the extraction of the secret, the text 
seems to fall into place.  The „bespectacled girl‟ (485) who witnessed Frederick‟s tears 
is able, with her doubled vision, to stand in as analyst.  Where incorporation has 
occurred, the analyst‟s task is to provide a means for reflection without also re-enacting 
the false introjection. The girl asks Frederick „what‟s been biting you?‟ and, while he 
contemplates this question, offers him an apple „with a waxy, bright skin‟ (485).  This 
provides a means for him to replace the hallucinatory introjection his tears signify; 
while crying only makes him more „abject‟, the girl reassures Frederick that eating the 
apple, a real rather than figurative swallowing, will make him feel better:  „Go on,‟ she 
said „swallow:  it‟ll settle your chest‟ (485).  Frederick „bites the apple‟ much as his 
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grief has bitten him – he „opened his jaws as wide as they would go, then bit slowly, 
deeply into the apple‟ (485).   They discuss the strange story of George, a boy in the 
girl‟s office, who, like Frederick, doesn‟t know why he cries.  The girl helps Frederick 
to see his tears as a kind of narrative; they are „all the way you see things‟ (486).  
Through analysis, discovering the secret of what the tears „mean‟, they can be solved.  
Not idle at all, Frederick and the text‟s „tears‟ signify the desire to be read; they say 
„accuse me‟, „exhume my secret‟.   
Bowen‟s  „Tears, Idle Tears‟, then, appears to offer the perfect case study to 
demonstrate the interpretive powers of analysis to not only „get at‟ emotion, but also a 
text – it would posit the „tears‟ of Frederick‟s body as the „tears‟ of the text‟s title – both 
Frederick and the narrative are marked by tears from the very beginning; both are about 
tears.  In this way the story writes a crucial correspondence between the subject‟s body 
and the text‟s.  By finding a secret source behind Frederick‟s tears, his body and the text 
become open and readable, their displays pointing to a certain cause beneath the 
surface, expressing a beneath to be brought to the surface. 
  
And yet, here we trip, or idle.   
 
The heart of the text, the „primal scene‟, we remember, is fiction.  The origin of 
Frederick‟s tears is a fictional moment that Frederick himself does not remember nor 
recount; it is told to us as readers by Bowen‟s strange omniscient narrator who threads 
together the apparent interior of each character to provide a sense of getting at or behind 
tears, solving them, and the text.  Frederick does not remember his primal scene, nor 
does he discover it – we do.  By reading the origin of Frederick‟s tears we are able to 
read his incorporation and subsequent introjection – yet the primal scene is only ever 
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the emergence of an origin, a subject – it is a dramatization, itself a fiction, a moment of 
and in interpretation that simultaneously reads and writes the scene. In „Fantasy and the 
Origins of Sexuality‟, we are cautioned to remember that the primal scene is „not merely 
material to be analysed‟; it is, like the case study or example, „the result of 
analysis‟[italics mine].39   If we forget that Frederick‟s idle tears emerge not from the 
scene offered, but from reading, the story reminds us by locating literature at the heart 
of Frederick‟s origin, enfolded in the primal scene.   
We recall that the friend urges Mrs Dickinson to „give birth to grief‟ because the 
friend cannot bear the strain of Mrs. Dickinson‟s inability to cry:  
…another officer‟s wife who had been her friend had said she was 
braver than could be good for anyone. When Toppy finally died the 
other woman had put the unflinching widow into a taxi and driven 
back with her to the Dickinson‟s bungalow. She kept saying: „Cry, 
dear, cry you‟d feel better.‟ She made tea and clattered about, 
repeating: „Don‟t mind me, darling: just have a big cry.‟ The strain 
became so great that tears streamed down her own face. Mrs 
Dickinson looked past her palely, with a polite smile. (483) 
 
Mrs. Dickinson‟s absence of tears makes tears stream down the other woman‟s face. 
Unable to bear Mrs Dickinson‟s failure to cry, the friend finally leads Mrs Dickinson 
„into the room where Frederick lay in his cot…[where] [s]omething suddenly seemed to 
strike his mother‟ (484). The breaking point for Mrs Dickinson‟s friend, the point that 
causes her to take Mrs. Dickinson to Frederick, is when she „almost tittering with 
despair thought of a poem of Tennyson‟s she had learnt as a child‟ (483).  
This return, at the centre of not only the text but the heart of the fulcrum, to the 
poem over which the entire text idles, suggests that the friend‟s need for Mrs Dickinson 
to cry comes from her own literary formations of mourning and its language.  When 
Mrs Dickinson does not „write‟ her grief in the way her friend can read – does not offer 
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tears as proof of her grief – the friend brings her to her son so that her grief might 
become „expressed‟, visible, readable by signs.  If Mrs Dickinson‟s overlay is the origin 
of Frederick‟s „idle tears‟, then, the condition of this origin is literature:  one might 
wonder whether, without Tennyson‟s idle tears, Frederick would cry.  The very 
foundation of analysis, the apparent „origin‟ of Frederick‟s tears becomes instead a 
„radical fictionalization‟ of emotion, „the possibility of emotion only ever being an 
empty representation, a simulacrum with no referent‟.40 The meaning behind tears, 
uncovered by reading, returns us again to fiction; analysis turns up only reading, and 
tears would turn up only interpretation.  Nothing would have been expressed or 
exhumed.  What then of Frederick‟s „idle tears‟?   
Here we might remark upon two peculiar features in the final lines of the story:  
the cleft on which it closes, and the white duck this cleaving secretes: „Years later, 
Frederick could still remember, with ease, pleasure and with a sense of lonely shame 
being gone, that calm, white duck swimming off round the bank. But George‟s friend 
with the bangles, and George‟s trouble, fell through a cleft in his memory and were 
forgotten soon‟ (487). Here the entire event has „fallen through a cleft‟ in Frederick‟s 
memory; we are still reading the text, but instead find ourselves reading an odd layer in 
the narration, an interstitial space between the „end of the story‟ and the end of our 
reading, where what we have read is enclosed. This closing of the text, of Frederick‟s 
memory, counters the opening of the text, in which Frederick „burst‟ into tears. Here at 
the end the text‟s „lids‟ cleave, enfolding the origin of Frederick‟s tears and their 
dramatisation: discovered, his tears are recovered, secret-ed. Yet Frederick is still 
visible, calm and holding onto the white duck his mother had directed him to look at 
when he suffered from idle tears.  In „secret-ing‟ the idle tears, it is as if the text secretes 
                                                     
40
 Bennett and Royle, p. 7. 
98 
 
Frederick and the duck through the force, the pressure, of reading and of interpretation.  
But what has been secreted?  The duck, if we recall, had sat „folded into a sleek white 
cypher‟ (483). 
„Cypher‟, from „cifr‟, the Arabic numeration for „zero‟ or „nought‟, 
simultaneously invokes emptiness, absence and function.
41
  It is a character „of no value 
by itself‟, but which increases or decreases the value of other figures according to its 
position.  This originary „nothing‟ provides an interpretive possibility to that with which 
it comes in contact: as such a „cypher‟ also describes a „secret or disguised manner of 
writing‟, „anything written in cipher‟, and the „key to such a system‟. The cypher, then, 
is what appears to be a code, the method for writing it, and the method for reading it – a 
cypher is an „intertexture of letters‟ that figures the problem of interpretation and the 
impossibility of reading. To read a cypher is to already be determined by that cypher, to 
read according to the cypher.  Remarkably, a cypher is also the „continuous sounding of 
any note upon an organ, owing to the imperfect closing of the pallet or valve without 
any pressure upon the key‟. This sound of this „cypher‟ has an apparent completeness or 
integrity that is conditioned by its own imperfection as an instrument.  The failure of the 
cypher to „be closed‟ is what brings it into being.  Frederick‟s duck, a sleek „cypher‟, 
becomes then an idle cry that is both empty and figures its own emptiness, readable yet 
unresolvable – it is the directive to read, the anticipation, and determination, of that 
reading, as well as the reading event itself.  
Earlier, I observed Rei Terada‟s argument that, rather than overcome the 
problem of the relationship between the idea of emotion and its representation, we 
might use this problem as a locus for thinking about what emotion is.  Terada suggests 
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that we think of emotion as the phenomenology of the textual difference between 
ideality and substance. In Bowen‟s „Tears, Idle Tears‟, this phenomenalisation, I 
suggest, is figured as the „secreted‟ cypher, itself the reconfiguration, through reading, 
of Frederick‟s tears as neither meaningful nor empty, but rather a radical fictionalisation 
of textual affect as the space of interpretation itself. Through the cypher, Bowen helps 
us to think about emotion as neither readable nor recoverable; instead, the story registers 
Bennett and Royle‟s observation that, in reading Bowen, we are reminded that there 
„fiction at the origin…there is no clinical or any other purportedly real context which is 
not worked over, cut up in advance by fiction, by literarity‟.42  I want to suggest that 
emotion, as Derrida writes of the secret, „gives rise to no process…It may appear to 
give rise to one (indeed it always does so), it may lend itself to it, but it never surrenders 
to it.‟43  Rather than invite a critical practice for „reading‟ literary emotion, then, for 
discovering emotion in literature, „Tears, Idle Tears‟, and the cypher it secretes requires 
us to think instead about a literariness of emotion, emotion as literary.  
Critical readings of „Tears, Idle Tears‟ are scarce, and the few readings critics 
have undertaken rarely exceed a few sentences.  The story is briefly discussed in 
Lassner‟s 1991 study of Bowen‟s short fiction with which I began my discussion, and 
she reads it as the story of a „child‟s painful entry into individuality‟ that offers a 
powerful feminist critique by eliciting an empathy that „extends from the child‟s needs 
to a denial that women achieve fulfilment and identity only by wishing to satisfy those 
needs‟.44 For Heather Bryant Jordan, Frederick‟s tears point to his mother‟s failure: 
they „make overt what she fears, namely, that all may not be right with the environment 
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she has fostered for him‟.45  In William Heath‟s 1961 study he suggests the story, 
through its intertextuality with Tennyson‟s poem, is about the past‟s „first idyllic, 
finally destructive‟ force.46 For Hermione Lee, Frederick weeps „terrible and 
involuntary tears inherited from the suppressed grief of his widowed mother‟ that 
demonstrate how, in Bowen‟s writing, „[c]hildhood despair is often witnessed, though it 
may not be understood‟.47 Finally, in an essay exploring the relationship between 
„Tears, Idle Tears‟ and „Happy Autumn Fields‟, which also takes its title from 
Tennyson‟s poem, Martin Bidney attends to the ways Bowen‟s story develops or, as I 
would suggest, „idles over‟, the language of Tennyson‟s poem. For Bidney, however, 
these allusions expose the themes of Tennyson‟s lyric, so as to extrapolate, and express, 
the cure for the problems they pose: Bowen „radically re-imagines…a Victorian lyric of 
nostalgic melancholia…in order to show how this condition fosters, and is fostered by, 
a regressive, narcissistic mindset‟.48 Bidney locates in Frederick‟s tears not only a case 
study in „the psychological pattern‟49 of narcissistic melancholy that „rewrites 
Tennyson‟s lyric in a modern psychological context [but] radically revises it to show 
how narcissistic melancholy may be cured‟.50 By learning to read Frederick‟s tears, 
Bidney argues, they are resolved: by understanding the hidden meaning behind his 
tears, Frederick, and his mother, are able to look beyond them – this new way of 
looking breaks their „daily deadlock‟.51 Bidney‟s cure is effected by correctly reading 
Frederick‟s tears; like the „bespectacled girl‟ whose encounter with Frederick is 
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accompanied by the opening and closing of her dispatch case, Bidney, having solved 
the problem of Frederick‟s tears, „snap[s] the case shut again‟ (486). 
The readings I have touched on here each detect in Frederick‟s tears a secret: 
uncovering this enables them to locate the meaning of the story and resolve it; this, in 
turn, enables it to be categorised within Bowen‟s oeuvre, an oeuvre that is, as I have 
explored already, notoriously difficult to categorise. Underlying this project, then, is an 
interest in the ways reading emotion invites and resists the „satisfactions of closure‟52 
that Bowen‟s texts disrupt. This is not to say these aren‟t fruitful readings. Lassner‟s 
observation that the story engages with a politics of maternal feeling points to a 
preoccupation with containment and contagion that draws a correspondence between 
this story and Catherine Lutz‟s observations about discourses of mothering touched on 
in Chapter One, registering the story‟s engagement with the rhetorics of gender and 
control that Lutz argues are always at work in discourses of emotion. Frederick‟s tears, 
for example, are designated as „shameful‟, „an offensive weakness‟, „disgraceful‟, an 
„incontinence‟ (481). The story corroborates a deployment of emotion as a disciplining 
mechanism that genders Frederick and his mother, not only when she tells him „You 
really haven‟t got to be such a baby!‟ (482), but also when she is described as „not the 
sort of woman you ought to see in a Park with a great blubbering boy belonging to her‟ 
(481) and when she admonishes Frederick with the implicit threat tears pose to 
masculinity: „You know, I so often wonder what your father would think‟ (482). That 
Frederick‟s tears are a threat not only to „Frederick‟ or „Mrs Dickinson‟ but to their 
abilities to identify themselves as such and, along with this, the entire structure of 
gender, class, manners, and social order itself, is at work in Mrs Dickinson‟s own secret 
revelation: 
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Once she had got so far as taking her pen up to write to the Mother‟s 
Advice Column of a helpful woman‟s weekly…She began: „I am a 
widow; young, good tempered, and my friends all tell me that I have 
great control. But my little boy – ‟ She intended to sign herself „Mrs 
D., Surrey.‟ But then she had stopped and thought no, no: after all, 
he is Toppy‟s son.‟ (481)  
 
But for Lassner, the story is, importantly, a reparation: Frederick‟s „cleft‟ signals the 
powerful effects of closure achieved by discovering, and reading the emotional history 
of his tears. Of the readings I‟ve discussed, only Hermione Lee‟s registers the 
possibility that „Tears, Idle Tears‟, like Frederick, may have „just done a turn‟ (485).  
While all these readings point to Frederick‟s tears as a cipher for the story‟s 
meaning, only Bidney and Lee remark on the cypher itself. For Bidney, the cypher  
proves the story‟s curative effect: it is resolved, along with Frederick‟s tears, into the 
cure the story provides. „In a lakeside epiphany,‟ Bidney concludes, „the story shows 
that there is hope for Frederick, and that this hope lies in a change from seeking 
attention to lending attention – preferably by attending to something that will not even 
flatter the perceiver by looking back…Only the wonderful, unseeing eye of the quirky 
duck remains‟.53 That this has been the resolution Bidney seeks is belied by how the 
„cypher‟ has been reduced to a quirk – a comedic moment, perhaps, of Bowenesque 
irregularity – odd and unusual, but accidental, a dictional eccentricity. The cypher for 
Bidney is only proof that there is an emotional condition that has been solved. Yet this 
„quirk‟ discloses the text‟s refusal to be solved, preserving in its background the 
comedic echo of „quack‟. Bidney‟s reading seems unaware of the effect of reading over 
the „quirky duck‟, who continues to utter its cry through the very language used to 
defuse it, sounding on after its supposed closure.  Lee, though touching only lightly on 
the story, mentions the duck in relation to what Sean O‟Faolain called Bowen‟s 
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„language of undertones‟: this „charged, discreet, versatile‟ and „nervy‟ quality, Lee 
observes, makes things „separate themselves from their owners‟ and „seem to loom 
larger than life‟:  the „effect is phantasmagorical‟.54 For Lee, this effect is not accidental 
but rather the result of Bowen‟s „typical ploy‟ of displacing the story‟s „emotional 
focus‟.55  Attending to the duck as not an eccentricity, but rather as part of what 
Bowen‟s texts do, allows Lee to draw out of the cypher the way Bowen‟s short fictions 
resist interpretation precisely by inviting it: certainly Lee‟s observation of the haunting 
affect of such „displacement‟ helps us to think about how the cypher invites reading, not 
only through its unusual spelling.
56
 We may recall that when the duck „rolled one eye 
open over a curve, something unseeing in its expression calmed him‟ (483). For Bidney 
this is the point of Bowen‟s story: ducking the strangeness of this figure, the duck‟s 
„unseeing expression‟ punctuates the recuperative effect of looking objectively at what 
tears mean. Lee‟s reading, which acknowledges that the despair the story exposes „may 
not be understood‟57, begins to question the clarity of this unseeing expression. For Lee, 
however, the duck is but a decoy: redirecting the emotional focus of the story, the duck 
still speaks the secrets Frederick and Mrs Dickinson can‟t. Lee, too, in her own way 
insists upon closure.  
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Yet, if we extend Lee‟s observation, this duck‟s strange expression returns 
another tear; this time the anatomical peculiarity of a duck‟s translucent nictitating 
membrane. From „nictitare‟, to „wink‟ or „blink‟, this „third eye-lid‟, sweeps across the 
eye sideways, starting from the side near the beak, to moisten and clean the eye.
58
 If the 
duck helps us to locate the emotional focus of the story, then its „unseeing expression‟ 
suggests it does so with a wink. Scrutinising the very readings it offers, Bowen‟s 
„cypher‟ contracts the literary, physiological and critical topographies of emotion that 
„Tears, Idle Tears‟ might unfold with reading into the very problem of reading emotion: 
reading „tears‟ tears at the security of their reading. The intensity of this correspondence 
to what Derrida discerns as the „law of the cipher‟59, not only registers at work in 
Bowen‟s story the „crypt-effect‟ of the literary – that, as Nicholas Royle observes, the 
cipher does not „offer…itself simply as “a critical tool” but a tool if one can still use that 
word, of the other, of alterity and otherness in general‟60 – but it does so with a tear. In 
his discussion of the crypt-effect, Royle makes a „case for a cryptaesthetics of 
literature‟, one that would touch on the „telepathic capacity of the text to see us coming, 
read us, determining us and our strange inclusion, cryptaesthetically working over our 
“own” language, working over us, ourselves.‟61 What I am proposing is that Bowen‟s 
short fiction makes a case for a cryptaesthetics of emotion. „Tears, Idle Tears‟ 
exemplifies Maud Ellmann‟s observation that Bowen‟s fiction „interprets its 
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interpreters‟; reading Bowen, she cautions, is „a risky enterprise, for Bowen‟s fiction is 
“a trap baited with beauty,” which constantly outsmarts the interpretive methods 
brought to bear on it‟.62 Yet Bowen‟s „Tears, Idle Tears‟ intersects Ellmann‟s caution 
about reading Bowen, with a caution about reading emotion: this trap is set, and springs, 
with feeling.  
With its appeal to notions of secrecy, ciphers and textual affect, „Tears, Idle 
Tears‟ extends to Bowen‟s short fiction what both Bennett and Royle, and Ellmann, 
have observed as the „crypt-effects‟ or effects of „encryptment‟ at work in Bowen‟s 
novels, which anticipate the „psychoanalytic and deconstructive methods‟ they invite.63  
Bowen‟s fictions, Ellmann remarks, „rarely unfold chronologically, but tend to 
psychoanalyse themselves, tracing present crises to past causes‟.64 For Ellmann, this is a 
kind of „incubism‟, a boxing in of the past in the present.65 This is at work in the 
structures of Bowen‟s novels, such as the central flashback to the past in The Little 
Girls, which creates a kind of incubisim at the level of Bowen‟s oeuvre by summoning 
the „envelope structure‟ of The House in Paris in which, Ellmann writes, „ “The Past” is 
boxed into the coffin of “The Present”‟.66 But it is also at work in the circulation of 
letters and other objects, and Ellmann develops the ways Bowen‟s writing traces 
reading as irrevocably bound with the promises and resistances of encryptment, of 
disincubing what is incubed.  In their study, Bennett and Royle trace the ways Bowen‟s 
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„texts are traversed by crypt-effects‟ to elaborate a „cryptanalysis of reading‟ – a study 
of „reading as itself the haunting of a crypt-effect‟. 67 This is what „might lead to an 
acknowledgement of the idea that there is fiction at the origin, that there is no clinical or 
any other purportedly real context which is not worked over, cut up in advance by 
fiction, by literarity, by otherness‟.68 Recent scholarship has developed these 
observations to consider Bowen‟s writing of trauma but, although I can only be 
suggestive with regard to trauma itself
69, I want to suggest that „Tears, Idle Tears‟ 
figures what Bennett and Royle call a „traumaturgy‟, or reading of the wound, that 
undercuts any reading of the short stories as dramatising a trauma that would find a 
meaning for the present emotional crises in the emotional causes of the past to offer a 
recuperative reading or exhumation. Instead, emotion itself might be thought of as a 
kind of traumaturgy, a wound whose secret is its literariness. At stake in this is the 
fictionality of the very self that emotion is supposed to express, the subject emotion is 
supposed to signify through its expressions. Ellmann remarks that A World of Love and 
The Little Girls „show that the lost object must be disincubed in order to be laid to rest: 
the work of mourning can begin only when the crypt is shattered and its secrets are 
released‟.70 „Tears, Idle Tears‟, however, suggests that when it comes to emotion, this 
disincubation is only a consolation, an act of reparation rather than an exhumation itself. 
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Reading Frederick‟s tears, we secrete his secret, so as to preserve our own. There is no 
cure for this – this is how we go on feeling.  
 Incubisms accumulate across Bowen‟s novels to the extent that these begin to 
thicken into an accretion that Maud Ellmann suggests „verges on the passionate 
hoarding that Freud associates with anal eroticism‟.71 Ellmann‟s remark merges passion 
and incubism or encryptment into a fascination with feeling that points forward to the 
discussion I undertake in Chapter Four, where I draw on Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick and 
Renu Bora‟s theorisations of feeling and texture, which they also develop through 
attention to anal eroticism and Henry James‟ „fascination with the image of a hand that 
penetrates a rectum and disimpacts or “fishes out” the treasure imagined as 
collecting‟.72 What I want to note here however is that crucial to the work of 
„disimpacting‟ is that the satisfaction of analytic disclosure is not produced by 
discovery, but by the textures, or feeling, of searching; this, in turn confirms the 
productivity of that feeling. It is this very kind of productivity (pleasurable or 
otherwise) that I suggest preoccupies Bowen‟s short fiction, whose „vital fortuity‟ 
implies the form‟s invitation to reading with its emotion: „The sought-about-for subject 
gives the story a dead kernel, however skilfully words may have been applied…The 
story should have the valid central emotion and inner spontaneity of the lyric; it should 
magnetize the imagination and give pleasure – of however disturbing, painful or 
                                                     
71
 Ellmann cites Dinah‟s catalogues in The Little Girls and also refers to Bowen‟s own „compulsive lists 
and inventories‟, and her emphasis on things in Seven Winters (197-198). Bennett and Royle‟s reading of 
lists and collecting in The Little Girls offers a sensitivity to the importance of feeling when they pick out 
what Dinah articulates as the business of Mopsie Pie – the prefabrication of feeling: „There‟s a 
tremendous market for prefabricated feelings: customers simply can‟t snap them up fast enough. They 
feel they carry some guarantee. Nothing‟s so fishy to most people as any kind of feeling they‟ve never 
heard of‟ (167). Dinah‟s speech demystifies the business of consumer society and, along with it, the 
„paradox of the postmodern simulacrum‟: „in postmodernism, the simulacrum is only ever the copy of a 
copy. There is an indefinite deferral back to a past which is empty, like a coffer. Fabricated objects, and 
the feelings that they produce, are always already copies, prefabrications‟ (Bennett and Royle, p. 130).  
72
 Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, Touching Feeling: Affect, Pedagogy, Performativity (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2004), p.13. 
108 
 
complex a kind‟.73 Not only do Bowen‟s stories, I suggest, make a „case‟ for the 
literariness of emotion, reminding us that emotion falls under the law of the case study, 
but it also implies a correspondence between the work of analysis and the work of 
emotion. That the short story‟s feeling corresponds to the work of analysis is intensified 
when Bowen introduces the Demon Lover stories as „cases‟: „the past, in all these cases, 
discharges its load of feeling into the anaesthetized and bewildered present‟.74 The 
stories become a „case‟ for emotion, figuring the short fiction as another „passionate 
hoard‟ of incubisms within Bowen‟s oeuvre, distinguished by their offerings of 
emotion. Rather than subsume emotion to analysis, however, the stories instead actuate 
it: as Bowen writes, these cases „counteract fear by fear, stress by stress‟.75  
Bowen‟s remark taps into the history of the short story, which, as Mary Louise 
Pratt observes, can trace its status as an „exemplum‟ or „illustration‟ back to biblical 
practice, and, more recently, the short narrative in 18
th
 century periodicals, „where it 
merges with the essay‟.76 Much of Bowen‟s short fiction deploys structural envelopes, 
which we can think of as what Karl-Heinz Stierle calls the „frame‟ of the case story.77 
Those that follow the 1935 House in Paris, such as „Tears, Idle Tears‟, „Ivy Gripped the 
Steps‟, „The Happy Autumn Fields‟, „The Inherited Clock‟, and „Songs My Father Sang 
Me‟, as well as the uncompleted „Home for Christmas‟, offer a collection of variations 
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on an unfolding of the present that reveals its past.
78
 Earlier, in „The Apple Tree‟ a 
young married woman is haunted by a classmate‟s suicide, and in „The Needlecase‟ a 
seamstress reveals the illegitimate son that will haunt her employers‟ family.79 „The 
Disinherited‟ offers a rare instance of first person narration in Bowen‟s short fiction that 
appears to open out the secrets suggested by the un-readability, the impersonality, of a 
chauffeur‟s face: „always shadowless, abstract, null; a face remembered as being 
unmemorable. The only look he gave you was level and unmoving‟.80 Burning candles 
late into the night, Prothero continues to disturb his employer, and the reader, by 
confounding the comprehensive potential of reading to reveal what is behind his face. 
At the centre of the story we move with the powers of omniscience into his private 
quarters to see that he spends his nights writing; we then move into the writing itself, 
into the first person mode of confession that should secure the veracity of what is 
revealed. Summoning the rush of Frederick‟s tears, Prothero‟s writing deploys the fluid 
dynamic of an interiority subject to an expression, that, by expressing, has the capacity 
to confirm a „person‟ behind the face:  
His hand with the twitching pen went rushing from line to line at a 
fever-high pace. He did not once pause. The pen rushed the hand 
along under some terrific compulsion, as though something, not 
thought, vital, were being drained out of him through the point of the 
pen. Words sprang to their places with deadly complicity, knowing 
each other too well. (392) 
 
Shifting into the first person, Prothero‟s writing spills as if unmediated his secret past: 
that he murdered his lover and fled to France, where he killed a man and assumed his 
identity to become Prothero, the chauffeur. At the heart of Prothero‟s interior, however, 
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he remains a fiction. Withholding any disclosure of who he really is, Prothero‟s letter 
rushes towards an accretion or thickness of syntactical and dictional slippage that 
resonates with Susan Osborn‟s description of Bowen‟s writing as a „Braille-like 
tangibility...[a] strange materiality…more often associated with plastic arts than written, 
arts in which we more often find a salient concern with the relation between flatness and 
depth‟. 81 This for Osborn evokes the unsettling movements effected by the texture of 
language itself, that Bowen‟s style „realizes itself not solely to be looked through but as 
a style to be looked at as well; what is unsettling about her stories is as much a function 
of its surface as it is of the various depths it conceals‟.82 Evoking the trickiness of 
writing, Prothero‟s writing textures the depth effects of revealing through feeling itself. 
Spending this rush of feeling and writing, the text climaxes in an involution of 
subjectivity, writing and feeling that irrevocably compromises readerly hopes for 
introspection and the satisfactions of disclosure: 
If I were to write, „I love you, I cannot bear this, I want you, come 
back‟ –  you might be tricked. You might come back to see me see 
you, then you would see me not see you, you would unthink the 
thought you thought under the pillow, as much as you thought. Yes, 
look, if I tricked you this way, you‟d come back, you could not not 
come back, you could never resist that. Yes, so look, I‟ll trick you I‟ll 
write loud, like a scream would be if anyone was in the dark with 
nothing (but I am not in the dark) I‟ll write so loud you will hear 
though you can‟t hear, Anita – (397)83 
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On the verge of revealing Anita, the story tears us out of this sense of immediacy, itself 
an effect of writing, and out of „Prothero‟. The narrator intervenes, and Prothero‟s „pen 
charged in his hand. Dragging his hand down to the foot of the paper, in staggering 
charging characters it wrote – „Anita, I love you Anita, Anita, where are you?‟ (397). As 
if awakened by the narrator, Prothero „gathered up by feel the close-written 
sheets…..flung open the lid of the stove with a pothook and thrust the papers in…So his 
nights succeeded each other‟ (398). Whether it is Prothero or Anita who „becomes‟ each 
night, their becoming is an effect of the textures and feeling of writing that touches back 
on itself through a series of knotted doublings and syntactical foldings, materialising 
what appears to be disclosed through the productions of discourse, of writing and 
reading effects. Prothero‟s writing undoes what it is supposed to verify – a self behind 
his expression. 
„The Disinherited‟ suggests a fascination with the affects of reading that is also 
at work in the haunting effects of Bowen‟s 1929 story „The Cat Jumps‟;  but here it is 
registered with a scepticism about the potential for analysis to diagnose, rather than 
produce, its objects of study.
84
 The Harold Wrights take over a house in which Harold 
Bentley murdered his wife. The Harold Wrights, however,  
…were not deterred. They had light, bright, shadowless, thoroughly 
disinfected minds. They believed that they disbelieved in most things 
but were unprejudiced; they enjoyed frank discussions. They dreaded 
nothing but inhibitions; they had no inhibitions. They were pious 
agnostics, earnest for social reform; they explained everything to their 
children, and were annoyed to find their children could not sleep at 
nights because they thought there was a complex under the bed. They 
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knew all crime to be pathological, and read their murders only in 
scientific books. (362) 
 
The Harold Wrights‟ analyses and discourses, which they had meant to employ in „their 
practical way…to expel, live out, live down…to „lay‟ the Bentley‟s‟ (363), do not lay 
the Bentleys to rest, however, but summons them.  
When they have friends for the weekend, diagnosis and pathologisation lose 
definition: like the fabric of Mrs Wright‟s „wrap‟, their „feathered edges crept a little‟ 
(368). The Wrights‟ „intelligent discussions‟ (365), diagnoses of „sex-antagonism‟ 
(365), their healthy children that „never had been repressed‟ (364), and their „being 
natural‟ (365) all begin to slip, and the language of diagnosis opens out, spreading 
across the text to destabilise, rather than secure, the boundaries between the discourse of 
analysis, and its object, between the Harold Wrights and the Harold Bentleys. Without 
these securities, personality and persons lose coherence: „… on the intelligent sharp-
featured faces all round the table something – perhaps simply a  clearness – seemed to 
be lacking, as though these were wax faces for one fatal instant exposed to a 
furnace….You would have said that each personality had been attacked by some kind of 
decomposition‟ (366). Losing clarity, the light becomes „a film‟, „smoke-like‟, 
„creeping‟, „thinning‟, „darkening‟ (366). Without its definitions, they are brought into 
contact with the tenuousness of their distinctions: „ “If you can see,” said Harold, 
“Something seems to be going wrong with the light.”…They had noticed, but each with 
a proper dread of his own subjectivity, had not spoken‟ (366). As both an extreme fear 
or apprehension about the future, as well as a doubt (a fear of something being „proved 
otherwise‟), dread registers an irreducible „incubism‟ of emotion and the work of 
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reading.
 85
 As Bennett and Royle remark, dread is a „kind of reading…the deferred 
arrival of an event which can never be known but only conceived, apprehended, 
dreaded. But dread has, therefore, always arrived already‟. 86 Dread‟s work is a „final 
figuration of traumaturgy: the work of reading, of the wound, is structured by the 
temporal and cognitive displacements of dread‟.87 Not only the work of time or thought, 
however, dread is also the work of feeling. As a „shrinking apprehension‟, dread is a 
recoiling from touch whose contact with what it apprehends is, also, always missed 
through an infinitely doubled movement towards and away: what dread apprehends, it 
apprehends with a shudder, what it appears to cohere, it also keeps open.
88
 In „The Cat 
Jumps‟, the immediacy of feeling as a guarantor for the boundaries of the subject is, 
along with the light, thinning, creeping, blurring. In the house of the Harold Wrights, no 
one knows whether they are coming or going: they are living dread – yet they go on 
living. At this point in the story the reference library, installed because Harold‟s „friends 
hated to discuss without basis‟ (366), loses its critical authority: the „library stools, rugs 
and divans‟ are „strewn‟ with volumes of „Krafft-Ebing, Freud, Forel, Weiniger and the 
heterosexual volume of Havelock Ellis‟(366). Medicine, philosophy, psychiatry, 
psychoanalysis, and neurology are merged into an indiscriminate oeuvre whose cases 
cannot contain Bentley‟s „crime passionel‟ (365), and these are added to the collection 
of „paper-knives and small pieces of modern statuary‟ (366) that press them open.  
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 The Oxford English Dictionary Online lists the following senses for dread (noun): „extreme fear; deep 
awe or reverence; apprehension or anxiety as to future events‟; „a person or thing (to be) dreaded; an 
object or cause of fear, reverence, or awe‟; „doubt, risk of the think proving otherwise‟. The definition for 
its verb characterises dread as a „shrinking apprehension‟. 
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 Bennett and Royle, p. 61. Their discussion considers the proliferation of „dread‟ in The House in Paris. 
87
 Ibid. 
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 As Sara Ahmed remarks, „emotions create the very effect of the surfaces and boundaries that allow us 
to distinguish an inside and an outside in the first place. So emotions are not simply something „I‟ or „we‟ 
have. Rather, it is through emotions…that surfaces or boundaries are made: the „I‟ and the „we‟ are 
shaped by, and even take the shape of, contact with others‟ (10). 
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Yet the ghosts of Harold and Lucinda Bentley are not released but, like 
Prothero‟s Anita, summoned, produced by the disclosures of Muriel Barker. Her name 
resonating with the speech of both the mad and the animal, Muriel Barker mobilises the 
deconstructive threats of emotion, whose history of distinctions between passive and 
active, cognitive and physical, primitive and civilised, derange the boundaries between 
the rational and irrational, sane and mad, human and animal. With an almost 
preternatural apprehension, it „was remarkable how much Muriel knew‟ (366).89 
Revealing the secrets of the case of the Bentley murder one by one in a slow 
disassembly of Mrs Bentley, Muriel trails the narrative thread of the murder, like 
Lucinda‟s body parts, across the story, room by room, moving through the house until 
the atmosphere feels, as did the house after the murder, „sticky‟ (367). Muriel reveals 
the final touch: „He put her heart in her hat-box. He said it belonged in there‟ (367). 
Displacing even the heart from its proper place, Muriel‟s story impels the group to 
finally go to bed where at last they are „given up to terror‟ (368).  The instabilities and 
slippages that have dripped, dragged, crept, trailed, shed, and shivered throughout the 
text bring Jocelyn and Lucinda, Harold and Harold, face to face in dread, dissolving 
their distinctions at last: 
With a strange rueful smile, like an actress, Jocelyn, skirting 
the foot of the two beds, approached the door of the bathroom. „At 
                                                     
89
For example, Muriel explains that Harold Bentley was hanged because his defence, the crime of 
passion, failed: „He didn‟t really subscribe to it. He said having done what he wanted was worth anything‟ 
(367). For an excellent study of the ways in which the crime of passion indexes the ways emotions can 
involve discourses of responsibility, yet, crucially, rely on a naturalisation of passion, see James Averill‟s 
„An Analysis of Psychophysiological Symbolism & its Influence on Theories of Emotion‟, where he 
compares criminal passion to the Papa New Guinean emotion of „being like a wild pig‟. Only affecting 
young men with pressing and unavoidable social obligations, and explained as being bitten by a ghost, the 
perceived passivity of being like a wild pig is important because it enables a mitigation of responsibility 
both for the „victim‟ and for the community that responds by reassessing social obligation. For Averill, 
„being like a wild pig‟ and „crimes of passion‟ demonstrate the ways emotion can be a „way of realigning 
social obligations within the community, while still proscribing any deliberate deviation from the 
established norms‟ – crucially, this demonstrates the discursive intersection of passivity and activity 
entailed by passion (James Averill, „An Analysis of Psychophysiological Symbolism & its Influence on 
Theories of Emotion‟ in Gerrod Harré and Rom Parrott (Eds.), The Emotions: Social, Cultural and 
Biological Dimensions (London: Sage, 1996), pp. 204-228, p. 223-224).  
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least I have still…my feet.‟ For some time the heavy body of Mrs 
Bentley, tenacious of life, had been dragging itself from room to 
room. „Harold!‟ she said to the silence, face close to the door. 
The door opened on Harold, looking more dreadfully at her 
than she had imagined. With a quick, vague movement he roused 
himself from his meditation. Therein he had assumed the entire 
burden of Harold Bentley…The Harolds, superimposed on each 
other, stood searching the bedroom strangely. Taking a step forward, 
shutting the door behind him: 
„Here we are,‟ said Harold. 
Jocelyn went down heavily. Harold watched. (369) 
 
Jocelyn‟s faint releases Harold, but faces him with a more urgent and chilling 
apprehension: he, and the other inhabitants, are locked in their rooms. Having, since the 
beginning „noticed something about Edward Cartaret…a kind of insane glitter…utterly 
pathological‟ (368) Muriel Barker has, on her way to bed, „turned all the keys on the 
outside, impartially. She did not know which door might be Edward Cartaret‟s. Muriel 
was a woman who took no chances‟ (370). Having pathologised – read and diagnosed – 
Edward, Muriel‟s security of closure slips: her analysis has produced what she thought 
she‟d contained.  
„The Cat Jumps‟ stages the very discourses of diagnosis that it invites. Engaging 
with the practices and methods of analysis whose volumes and dictions it enfolds within 
its narrative, it anticipates the readings these might produce. In this ghost story, it is the 
languages and methods of analysis, rather than the supernatural, that turn out to generate 
the haunting affects of the story. Indexing the relationship between the short story and 
the case, „The Cat Jumps‟ also registers the proximity of the short story to the case 
study. Disturbing the boundaries between the scientific and the literary, between the 
explanative and the affective, the diagnostic and productive, „The Cat Jumps' 
materialises what Mary Louise Pratt describes as the short story‟s „conspicuous points 
116 
 
of contact between imaginative literature and other kinds of discourse‟.90 The story is 
not simply a scepticism or critique of analysis, but an acute engagement with the 
reading effects – the textual affects – of analysis. In this sense, I want to suggest that at 
work in Bowen‟s short fiction is a case study of the case study: these stories re-read the 
possibility for analysis to produce anything other than a literary reading, particularly 
when it comes to reading people through their feelings.  
I want to close this case of the literariness of emotion, then, by suggesting that, 
encased within the cases of Bowen‟s short stories there is another hoard: of cases 
themselves. Opening and closing with alarming regularity, these suggest the disclosures 
of those to whom they are attached, an expression of their persons. Yet in each case, 
these reveal, as Bennett and Royle suggest of The Little Girls, only prefabrications, 
allusions to a self rather than confirmations
91
 that offer a collection of empty 
interiorities. In „The Easter Egg Party‟, Hermione wants a „green celluloid box to keep 
her toothbrush in‟ (CS: 532); when her guardian, who „did not approve of buying hearts 
with small gifts‟ refuses to buy it, Hermione „gave the green box a last look, the first 
fully human look she had spent on anything‟ (532). In „Mrs Moysey‟, a great-aunt is 
suspected of being a tippler; left in charge of two children, these are at first kept at 
arm‟s length, then „engulfed in the innermost secrecy of that secret house‟ (CS: 339). 
When their „complexions, manners, tempers were beginning to deteriorate‟(339) the 
cause is traced to Mrs Moysey‟s accumulation of chocolate boxes, their contents gorged 
for the sake of „a collection‟ spurred by her appetite for a „feeling for beautiful things‟ 
(344).  In one of Bowen‟s later stories, „Candles in the Window‟, a girl prepares for her 
first ball. To commemorate her first coming out, a ritual of „becoming‟, her Aunt Kay 
gives her a purse:  
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 Pratt, p. 103. 
91
 Bennett and Royle, p. 130; see also footnote 70 of this chapter. 
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she brought from the wardrobe, undid from its tissue wrappings, a 
little purse – or, more exactly, reticule…The lining was of delicate 
sea-blue taffeta. “Oh!” I cried, overcome. “It‟s not new,” she pointed 
out. And indeed as I held it nearer the candles, I saw the silk was 
faded, the silver tarnished. “No, old – how could it not be? It has a 
story. Mine.” (B:199)  
 
This sense of unfolding a person from a case materialises, perhaps most dramatically, in 
„Making Arrangements‟.92 Hewson Blair prepares to read a letter sent by his wife 
Margery, who has left him. In a series of folding and unfoldings, Margery exists only in 
her textures, only through the feeling of Hewson Blair. About to read the letter, Hewson 
stands „with his back to the fire…Then he let Margery out of the envelope‟ (171). 
Writing that she „never quite knew what you wanted me for‟ (171), Margery asks him to 
send her dresses. Her letter initiates a revealing of Hewson‟s interior, which, it turns 
out, is made out of feeling for Margery: „Many people had, indeed, admired Margery, 
which gratified Hewson who had married her. Many more people praised her clothes, 
which still further gratified Hewson who had paid for them. When he married Margery 
he stamped himself as a man of taste‟ (172). What Hewson wants Margery for is her 
impressions: „Margery was becoming to him‟ (173). Not only do the dresses fabricate 
Margery, rather than express her, but they offer textures for feeling through which 
Hewson can feel himself feeling; her „becoming‟ allows him to read himself. It is as if 
Margery is the medium through which Hewson expresses himself. When he opens her 
wardrobe, from „the dusk within, cedar-scented and cavernous, Margery leaped out to 
him again as she had leaped up out of the envelope. There were so many Margerys in 
there, phalanx on phalanx‟ (175). Coming to life, the fabrics, and fabrications, of 
Margery are clinging, sweeping, irritating, touching him: they „seemed to follow him‟ 
(175). The dresses threaten to enfold him, and when he tears the red dress in which 
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 „Making Arrangements‟ (CS, pp. 170-179) was first published in Everybody‟s Magazine, Vol. 50, No.6 
(June 1924). Subsequent citations from CS are provided in-text. 
118 
 
Margery was most becoming to him, he „quailed a little, feeling the quick storm of her 
wrath about him‟(176), then „gripped the folds in both hands and tore‟ (177). Losing the 
Margery through which he discerns himself, Hewson murders „Margery‟:  
Without these dresses the inner Margery, unfostered, would never 
have become perceptible to the world. She would have been like a 
page of music written never to be played. All her delightfulness to 
her friends had been in this expansion of herself into forms and 
colours…Hewson expressed this to himself concisely and heavily, as 
a man should, as he stood looking down at the bed, half smiling, and 
said, „She has committed suicide.‟ (177) 
 
Touching the coolness of the folds, the „creamy stuff that trickled icily away between 
his fingers‟ (178), Hewson fingers the pile of dresses on the bed: „It seemed to him, as 
he softly, inexorably approached them, that the swirls, rivers, and luxuriance of silk and 
silver, fur and lace and velvet, shuddered as he came‟ (178). Shuddering, the dresses 
„tremble with dread‟ (178), and yet Hewson cannot stop their feeling:  „The silks – they 
seemed still sentient – quivered under his touch; the velvets lay there sullenly…‟ (178). 
Having taken Margery out of the envelope, and out of her wardrobe, he packs the torn 
tissues of her into a trunk. 
We can trace similar work of cases, folding and unfolding, revealing and 
concealing, in the hat keeper of „Ann Lee‟s‟, whose haberdashery specialises in 
anticipating the desires of its clientele, offering the perfect „expressive green‟ (CS: 103). 
In „The Evil that Men Do –‟, a woman replies to an invitation from a would-be lover. 
Seeming to be on the verge of accepting and arranging a liaison, she writes that „ – Of 
course my husband has never entered into my inner life‟ (86). But the letter is 
interrupted by her husband, who brings her the gift of a handbag. Encountering the 
pleasures of the „silk folds‟ (88) of its interior, its collection of a little notebook and gilt 
mirror, she returns to her letter. Where before her potential lover had begun to touch her 
with his letter‟s promise of an interior life, her reply now concludes, inflected by the 
119 
 
gift: „You must not think that I do not love my husband. There are moments when he 
touches very closely my exterior life‟ (88). And, in „Tears, Idle Tears‟, the story accents 
the beginning and ending of Frederick‟s encounter with the bespectacled girl – the 
reading of tears –  with the opening and closing of a „despatch case‟. In each of these 
cases, people are unfolded, opened out as if to reveal their interiority; yet this interiority 
turns out to be fictional, an enfolding of reading rather than the unfolding of a subject 
whose expressions can be read.  Registering a preoccupation with the invitation people, 
like texts, offer to reading, the stories also turn around the ways these resist 
interpretation. In so doing, they destabilise the boundaries between the case study, and 
the short story, rendering the distinction between these as only a matter of feeling. 
  
Chapter Three:   
 
‘Nobody illustrates now, I wonder whether they could’: Motion, Pictures and 
Fictional Feeling in the Short Fiction of Elizabeth Bowen 
 
At the end of 1939, Elizabeth Bowen re-read Maupassant.
1
 Finding the process „rather 
brutalising‟, one story stood out. Although „particularly preposterous‟, Maupassant‟s 
„Yvette‟ offers something for Bowen: „Looking at the pictures which are so good and 
open sort of windows in the writing, I wondered whether illustrations were such a bad 
thing. Nobody illustrates now, I wonder whether they could‟.2 If, for Bowen, 
illustrations „open sort of windows‟ in Maupassant‟s writing, her remarks have a 
doubled effect for her contemporary reader, as if her very sense of the potential of these 
illustrations may open its own sort of window, framing an invitation to read the pictures 
in her writing.  
Certainly, Bowen‟s attention to these illustrations foregrounds scholarly interest 
in the visual at work in her writing. Bowen herself remarks that, „[e]mbarking on my 
first story…already I had failed to be a poet; I was in the course of failing to be a 
painter‟.3 Victoria Glendenning describes how Bowen had as a child preferred drawing 
to writing, and it was her plans to be an artist that first brought Bowen to London. After 
two terms at the LCC School of Art in Southampton Row in London, however, Bowen 
was „disillusioned. At fourteen she had been considered very good – but she had never 
got, nor would now get, any better. She gave up, but she regretted the lost gift, and 
                                                     
1
 Bowen writes about reading Maupassant in her letter dated January 5
th
, 1940, to Virginia Woolf (Monks 
House Papers, Virginia Woolf Archives, University of Sussex Library Special Collections).  
2
 Letter dated January 5
th
, 1940, p. 4. 
3Bowen‟s remark introduces her second edition of her collection Encounters (in MT, pp. 118-121, p. 118). 
First published by Sidgwick and Jackson in 1923, Encounters was reprinted in by Sidgwick & Jackson in 
1949 and was accompanied by Bowen‟s preface.   
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transferred its qualities to writing‟.4 Bowen affirms this in her own writing, which she 
described as „verbal painting‟.5 The interest Maupassant‟s pictures – these story 
illustrations – hold for Bowen, then, not only registers her interest in the visuality of 
writing, but more specifically recalls her insistence on the particularity of the visual to 
the short story. It was a writer‟s appeal to vision that often elicited Bowen‟s approval, 
such as her admiration for how, in Katherine Mansfield‟s short fiction, „the external 
picture came…first. She found herself seized upon by a scene…Appearances could in 
themselves touch alight her creative power‟.6 Bowen would eventually go on to 
introduce her own stories, collected in The Demon Lover and Other Stories and those in 
The Ivy Gripped the Steps, as „disjected snapshots‟.7 Later, in her introduction to the 
second edition of her first collection, Encounters, Bowen would find much to criticise, 
but what she liked was „a striking visual clarity…sense and feeling seldom bog down in 
words‟.8   
Bowen‟s reading of her own work appears, here, to invite a critical distinction 
between the visual and emotional for readers of her short fiction, and Victoria 
Glendenning observes Bowen‟s remark that her stories are „a matter of vision rather 
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 Victoria Glendenning, Elizabeth Bowen: Portrait of a Writer (London: Phoenix Publishers, 1977), p. 41. 
See also Phyllis Lassner, Women Writers: Elizabeth Bowen (London: MacMillan, 1990), p.10. 
5
 Glendenning, p. 41. Glendenning quotes Bowen: „It seems to me that often when I write I am trying to 
make words to the work of line and colour. I have the painter‟s sensitivity to light. Much (and perhaps the 
best) of my writing is verbal painting‟. Glendenning‟s refers to Bowen‟s „Autobiographical Note‟ (p. 242) 
for the quotation. Although the source is not clear in Glendenning‟s text, the quotation comes from an 
unpublished manuscript in the Harry Ransom Centre at the University of Austin, Texas (Bowen archive, 
box 1.5) dated 11/10/1948 (p.2). I am grateful to Professor Andrew Bennett for providing me with this 
clarification.  In „The Experience of Writing‟, collected in Phyllis Lassner‟s study of Bowen‟s short 
fiction, Bowen‟s notes for a 1950 lecture at Wellesley College insist upon the visuality of the short story:  
„I began writing fiction at 19, still under the influence of…the wish to paint…The short story was good 
for me in two ways. 1) visual 2) the poetic stress on the moment. The impression for its own sake – 
spotlit, isolated – only slight need for rationalization and explanation. All my short stories have departed 
from a visual impression…‟ (Bowen, „The Experience of Writing‟ in Lassner, 1991, p. 122).  
6
 Elizabeth Bowen, „Stories by Katherine Mansfield‟ in Afterthought (New York: Longmans, 1962), pp. 
53-74, p. 58. 
7
 Bowen used the same preface for The Demon Lover and Other Stories (London: Jonathan Cape, 1945) 
and The Ivy Gripped the Steps (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1945) . Quoted from the preface to The 
Demon Lover and Other Stories in MT, p. 99. 
8
 MT, p. 121. 
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than feeling‟.9 This primacy of vision over feeling is echoed by Phyllis Lassner‟s 
emphasis on Bowen as „both a student and an artist of the short story‟10, but for Lassner, 
this matter of vision was vital for the short story because it is both what provides its 
intensity, and the means by which detachment and impersonality (and the subsequent 
possibility for scholars to „rescue her from the world of personal feeling‟11) might be 
effected. Although the „settings ‟of Bowen‟s stories are „intense passions‟12, Lassner 
also argues that „[i]ntensely imagistic and impressionistic, the short story for Bowen 
must dramatically and poetically evoke the writer‟s sensation while maintaining a 
dispassionate narrative stance, thus preventing the story from sliding into mere 
sensationalism or inflated emotion‟.13 This, for Lassner, is what attracted Bowen to 
Maupassant‟s work; it initiated her „admiration for the “dispassionate understatement of 
Maupassant”‟.14  Bowen‟s stories, then, are intense in their feeling, yet also wholly 
dispassionate – what mediates is their visuality. This suggests rather more of an overlap 
between „vision‟ and „feeling‟ than Lee‟s distinction allows for, and Bowen‟s own 
reading of Maupassant offers a rather striking discernment. 
What Lassner terms „admiration‟ for Maupassant appears rather absent from 
Bowen‟s letter:  „Ever since June I felt I couldn‟t bear to read French, then I thought I 
would begin again with someone I liked least, so I bought some collections of 
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 Bowen, quoted in Glendenning, p. 1. 
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 Lassner, 1991, p. 119. 
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 Lee, Elizabeth Bowen: An Estimation (London: Vintage, 1981), 2. 
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 Lassner, p. 119. Lassner argues that it is the „setting‟ and the „dispassion‟ of Bowen‟s work, enabled by 
the stories‟ visuality, that distinguishes the short fiction both in terms of Bowen‟s ideas about writing and 
the actual stories she wrote: „…from her reviews of other writers‟ stories and prefaces to their story 
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she found useful serve her ambiguous language, which both reveals and leaves open to speculation the 
nature of the intense passions setting the atmosphere of her stories‟ (p. 119). 
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Maupassant I hadn‟t got already, and brought them here‟.15 Bowen concedes that 
Maupassant „had sharp senses‟ but accuses him of „rather a boring mind…You soon get 
to know the formula‟.16 What is „extraordinary‟ about his stories is the fascination they 
exert, „like watching someone doing the same card trick over and over again‟.17  Bowen 
is so compelled to „watch‟ that she „wondered if I were getting rather brutalised myself‟: 
and it is on this speculative, brutalising fascination that Bowen turns to the 
illustrations.
18
 What I am curious about is how in Bowen‟s letter it seems that 
Maupassant is not fascinating for the dispassion of his writing: instead, it is precisely 
the affect of his story illustrations that impress. The short story for Bowen is not a 
matter of vision rather than feeling, but instead gains its very force, its brutalising 
affect, from its visuality. 
Bowen‟s insistence on this is not unconventional. In his 2006 essay on the 
phenomenology of the short story, Timothy Clark observes that this association invokes 
the form‟s relationship to realism, a matter „where clarity, not novelty, is the issue…the 
narrator is all-seeing‟.19  But more importantly, Clark‟s discussion recalls the double 
work being done by „vision‟:  „[v]isual metaphors…abound in short story theory‟.20 
This is, in part, to do with what he describes as the privileging of vision as „the sense 
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 Letter dated January 5
th
, 1940, p. 4.  
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 Ibid. 
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 Ibid. 
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 Ibid. Bowen also, just after remarking on the illustrations, effects an almost filmic cut to asking Woolf 
if she „has snow‟ in Rodmell that again puts the visual in proximity with feeling: „I have a card you sent 
me with Rodmell church with snow on it. This makes me feel very homesick. I feel a sort of despair about 
my own generation – the people the same age as the century, I mean – we don‟t really suffer much but we 
get all sealed up.‟  
19
 Timothy Clark, „Not Seeing the Short Story: A Blind Phenomenology of Reading‟ in The Oxford 
Literary Review, Vol. 26 (Durham, 2006), pp. 5-30. 
20
 Clark quotes Dominic Head, who observes that this not only „underlies the „spatial‟ aspect of the genre‟ 
but also „obscures the illusory nature‟ of the insight or comprehension and comprehensiveness the form 
appears to offer (Dominic Head, The Modernist Short Story: A Study in Theory and Practice (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1992), p.10).  
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that is most comprehensively and most immediately knowing‟.21 For Clark, the 
insistence on the visual in short story theory registers the „metaphorics of sight as the 
relation between a detached, commanding subject and an object whose visual 
availability is also its domination…the force of visual metaphors lies in relation to the 
idea of a total understanding‟.22 Lee‟s insistence on „vision‟ rather than feeling, for 
reading Bowen‟s short fiction, then, intimates that this very visuality offers a vision: 
rather than „personal‟ feeling, her work invokes insight and clarity. Clark observes that 
short story criticism and theory revolves around the idea of the epiphany, sudden 
comprehension, and cognition – the sense that the short story puts us in touch with more 
than the real: it offers what has, until reading, been concealed even from us. Pointing to 
our blind spots, it clarifies what we refuse to see. As Clark points out, it is an 
investment in this model that characterises the directions short story theory and 
criticism – despite its relative dearth in recent inquiry – has taken. 
For Clark, the relative lack of interest in short story theory at the end of the 
twentieth and beginning of the twenty-first century might be understood as a response to 
how formalist models have dominated discussions of the short story. As Clark observes, 
critics aiming to dissolve formalist or structural readings have emphasised thematic 
anthologisation to attend to the ways short stories are often deployed to make visible 
marginalised nationalities, gender, race or sexual orientations.
23
 But the turn away from 
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 Although outside of the scope of the discussion to hand, Mary Louise Pratt develops this point in her 
1981 Essay „The Short Story: The Long and the Short of it‟, first printed in Poetics Vol. 10 (1981) and 
later collected in Charles E. May‟s The New Short Story Theories (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 
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address taboo subjects such as sexuality and class, and argues that the form has been deployed by Irish 
writers such as Joyce, O‟Flaherty, O‟Faolain, O‟Connor, Moore, and Lavin for the „establishment of a 
modern national literature‟ (p. 104-105). Pratt draws attention to its role in the development of a modern 
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form in favour of theme simultaneously risks undermining the relationship between the 
short story and marginality, occluding the formal uncertainties that afford the potential 
to make the marginal hidden and seen:    
The brevity of the short story makes it peculiarly liable to this  
kind of cultural appropriation. Such themed collections necessarily  
set up a critical frame of reference that may direct in advance how 
the stories are to be read. This can open familiar stories to new 
possibilities. However, the device is also a clumsy one…This 
strategy threatens to suffocate one of the classic features of the short 
story, its making a rare space for the quirky, the „submerged‟, the 
dislocated, the overlooked or merely the eccentric.
24
 
 
At the same time, Clark‟s discussion suggests that the other turn in short story inquiry 
towards the cognitive, characterised by Susan Lohafer‟s work, is equally problematic.25 
Observing Lohafer‟s claim in a 1997 interview that questions about form or genre „will 
be passé – at least for the next hundred years‟26, Clark helps to highlight how this 
divorcing of „form‟ from „cognition‟ not only contradicts the investment of her 
cognitive model in formalist associations of the form with vision and insight, but also 
does not account for her own concern, in the same interview, about the risks that 
                                                                                                                                                           
literature of the American South, and argues that it has emerged in those places „at an early stage of 
decolonization‟ such as small-town life in Canada, and Latin America‟s Argentinean „jungle frontier‟ and 
Peru‟s „modern indigenous life‟ (p. 106). The very marginal status of the short story thus allows for the 
portrayal of that which is marginal – the „disorder of frontier society, or of traditional societies 
disintegrating in the face of modernization‟ (p. 105). Pratt also observes that the association of the short 
story with insight in the form of intuition is one of the ways it is distinguished from the novel: „…in the 
age of empiricism, the short story seems to have been the special domain for…topics marginalized and 
stigmatized by a novel consolidating itself around realism‟ (p. 107). 
24
 Clark, p. 6. Clark observes that critical attention to the short story as a form or genre „withered‟ in the 
1990s, and that this is intrinsically linked to the assumption that attention to the kinds of questions short 
story theory and criticism has asked about what makes a short story a short story – the very kinds of 
questions that preoccupied Bowen – rendered short story theory „almost  a non-starter within a critical 
culture that tended to associate any suggestion of „formalism‟ with moral or political evasion‟ (p. 5). For 
Clark, the turn towards cognition (e.g. Lohafer‟s work) or thematics, suggests its own kinds of cultural 
appropriation. The development of „the American Short Story‟ in particularly highlights for Clark these 
institutionalizations of the form, demanding „the divorcing of this genre from an institutional 
Americanism that is perhaps more deeply ingrained in this field than in any part of literary culture‟ (p. 7). 
25
 Clark identifies Lohafer‟s Short Story Theory at a Crossroads as one of the last significant books on 
short story theory. See Lohafer, Susan and Clarey, Jo Ellyn (Eds.), Short Story Theory at a Crossroads 
(Louisiana: Louisiana State University Press, 1989). 
26
 Lohafer quoted in Clark, fn 3 (24) from „An Interview with Susan Lohafer‟, in Speaking of the Short 
Story: Interviews with Contemporary Writers, ed. Farhat Ifterharuddin, Mary Rohrberger, and Maurice 
Lee (Jackson: University of Mississippi Press, 1997), pp. 167-80, 168. 
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thematisation poses to „issues of poetics‟.27 It is worth noting here that Lohafer‟s use of 
„poetics‟ to identify what formalist definitions of the form offer invokes a distinction 
between knowledge and emotion, or feeling and vision and I want to suggest that these 
thematic and cognitive approaches are predicated, in part, on a fundamental assumption 
that feeling is a structural or formal aspect of storyness. Although vital to how a story 
works, it does not demand theorisation. This, in turn, makes the question of feeling and 
form less interesting for criticism and yet this distinction is what has enabled thematic 
and cognitive approaches to the short story, which concentrate on what the emotional 
work of a short story makes possible – insight and vision.  Clark‟s emphasis on the 
relationship between the quirky or dislocating and what a short story can make visible 
attends to the importance of the short story‟s affective force, and although his 
discussion does not elucidate the emotional, I would argue that it is folded into the 
arguments he makes as both the hidden stuff of singular insight and the critical other 
around which thematic and cognitive criticism consolidates itself. As Clark‟s discussion 
highlights, thematic and cognitive studies of the short story are linked by their uneasy 
marriage of a simultaneous lack of interest in apparently formal questions and their 
indebtedness to these very distinctions about the form‟s vision and insight. While 
thematic or cognitive approaches to the short story may illuminate how the short story 
sees (or makes seen) what is hidden, these do so through a critical disinterest in, or 
selective blindness to, discerning the form and unpicking the ways these formalist 
aspects have been formulated in relation to emotion and feeling. The relationship 
between what the short story discerns, and how we discern the short story, then, is both 
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a blind-spot that limits what thematic and cognitive approaches might offer and the very 
cornerstone of these approaches.
28
  
What is vital here, however, is what Clark describes as the „trick‟ of the short 
story. Although the critical turn to thematics or cognitive studies has aimed to account 
for what the short story makes known and allows us to see, there is little recognition in 
this scholarship about the very fictionality of insight. Clark observes that the trick of the 
short story is precisely that – to make something be seen, rather than to see it. This 
reminder helps us to understand that insight, in the short story, takes the form of a 
feeling of, feeling for, or feeling like, insight.  For Clark, it is precisely this trick that 
makes what he calls those more basic and simple questions about the short story 
continue to be relevant, and it is Clark‟s return to this formalistic association between 
the short story and the vision it invites that enables him to observe that the visual bias in 
short story theory is so ingrained (so invisible, perhaps), that it begins to appear to be a 
form of denial.
29
 Clark suggests that to account for this phenomenological slippage 
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 While a full engagement with Lohafer‟s theories are outside the scope of this work, they do point 
towards potential future work which might develop the ways cognitive theories of the short story 
correspond to cognitive theories of emotion, and which Bowen‟s short stories and criticism might 
challenge. In her essay „A Cognitive Approach to Storyness‟ (originally published in Short Story (Spring, 
1990), and re-printed in Charles May‟s The New Short Story Theories (pp. 301-311), Lohafer cites 
Bowen‟s insistence that the short story requires a „vital fortuity‟ to exemplify what Lohafer calls a 
„tradition of ineffability‟ that gets in the way of being able to theorise the short story (p. 301). Lohafer 
argues that cognitive theory offers „an experimental approach to essentialist, honorific concepts inherited 
from Poe: “unity,” “totality,” and “single effect.” Instead of asking how stories are composed, or even 
how stories “mean,” we can ask how storyness is recognized, by what cognitive strategies it is processed‟ 
(p. 303). Lohafer argues the short story can be broken into „units‟, or smaller stories (an „anterior‟, 
„penultimate‟ and „final‟ story). This sequence „stages‟ or advances closure by inviting cognitive 
processes through which the reader negotiates and interprets the events of the story, until, when they 
reach the „last‟ in the sequence, they are prepared to recognise this as „closure‟, in whatever form that 
story has constructed it (p. 304-308). Lohafer argues that by turning to „closure‟, short story scholarship 
can „turn short story criticism into short story theory‟ (p. 309). This in turn provides a „critical tool‟ which 
„turns even the most naive student into a valued analyst‟ by turning „intuitions into data‟ – these „data 
yield insight‟ (p. 309-310). These conclusions however are complicated by Lohafer‟s remarks that only 
when „I shifted my attention from the modifier “short” to the noun “story” …was [I] able to ask a 
different question:  what is it that accounts for the perception of storyness in short stories?‟ (p. 302). 
Dropping the „short‟ from „story‟ points to the ways the short story escapes definition: rather than develop 
a theory of the short story, Lohafer has developed a theory of storyness.  
29
 Clark, p. 7. Clark remarks: „The visual bias in short story theory is so strong that it raises the question 
of how much it may be a form of denial‟ (p. 11). 
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perhaps what we need is a model of „not seeing‟, a blind short story.  What I want to 
suggest, however, is that the relationship between insight and feeling invites a slightly 
different take, one that draws out the movement of the short story, how it turns between 
and revolves around vision and blindness, insight and feeling. I believe Clark‟s 
discussion helps us to understand that every moment of insight associated with the short 
story is, phenomenologically, a moment of blindness. As Clark has shown, what the 
short story and reader sees relies on a blindness both to what is not seen and to the 
verisimilitude of insight. But I propose the short story reader is further blinded by the 
sense of insight: if insight is turned up, then feeling is no longer either what guarantees 
insight, nor the authentic remainder once the trick of insight is unveiled. Instead feeling 
is at work in the movement between blindness and insight. It is the very stuff of 
verisimilitude, a motion that is vital to what the short story may – or may not – discern. 
By attending to the way the short story moves between and feels for or like both insight 
and blindness, I hope we might more closely approach a sense of the short story as 
moving pictures. Rather than Clark‟s model of „seeing‟ or „not seeing‟, of „vision‟ or 
„blindness‟, I suggest we need a theory of the short story that attends to emotion 
pictures, a space where vision and feeling overlap and form a discerning point on which 
blindness and insight turn.  
While Hermione Lee describes Bowen‟s short fiction as a matter of „vision‟ 
rather than feeling, this distinction, although part of a tradition of short story theory, is 
not so easily made, and I want to draw attention to the movement Bowen suggested at 
work in the relationship between vision and feeling. Although Bowen recognised the 
short story by „a striking visual clarity…[how] sense and feeling seldom bog down in 
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words‟30, the visual, a story‟s „pictures‟, are not enough to make a short story a short 
story. For Bowen, the short story is discerned by how those pictures move. This is her 
chief criticism of some of her earliest work. Lacking clarity about „the difference 
between a story and a sketch‟, a short story, Bowen insists, „to be a story, must have a 
turning point‟.31 Its sense of completion and wholeness comes not from its ending, nor 
from its content, but from its movement, from its moving pictures. That a short story 
turns, I would argue, returns Clark‟s observations about the visuality of the short story 
to thinking about emotion. Carrying the sense of a pivot point, a change or revelation, as 
well as a paring back or peeling, Bowen‟s „turning point‟ names the very moment of 
insight or clarity – vision – that Clark suggests is short story theory‟s blind spot. 
But „turn‟ also calls attention to the trickiness of this turning point, which only 
appears to turn up or reveal. The short story‟s movement, its very ability to turn, 
suggests underhandedness, how in turning it misleads, beguiles, or cheats.
32
 Bowen‟s 
writing about the short story corresponds with the arguments Clark sketches out, but it 
is the „turning‟ point of her story „Tears, Idle Tears‟ that, through its spectacular interest 
in the ocular, exemplifies how the trick of „insight‟ already turns into a problem of 
reading emotion. Here we can extend my earlier remark that this story does a turn by 
attending to how, when Frederick cries, he is seen, and sees himself being seen, by the 
bespectacled girl.  In my previous discussion of „Tears, Idle Tears‟, I argued that the 
question of how one „sees‟ tears is at work from the beginning of the story, with the 
earlier parts preoccupied by Frederick‟s tears as seen by his mother, and himself, who 
sees from the outside, from within, and even from behind. But this language of looking 
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 „Encounters‟ in MT, p. 121. 
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 Ibid, pp. 120-121. 
32
 See the Oxford English Dictionary Online, entry for „turn‟ (verb). To do a „turn‟, as used below, is 
derived in English from the verb turn, in sense 21: „a subtle device of any kind; a trick, wile, artifice, 
stratagem‟. 
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at tears accelerates and by the time the bespectacled girl sees Frederick we are so awash 
in a semantics of vision and insight that the language is, like Frederick‟s eyes, bunged-
up with seeing. Frederick‟s encounter with the girl is all about looking at tears, and it is 
clear that gaze and reading are overlain with insight and analysis. Forming the turning 
point in Frederick‟s cognition about his tears, his parlay with the girl is constituted 
through a relay of looking and vision that has the reader seeing the girl seeing 
Frederick, and seeing Frederick seeing himself being seen. The narration offers so many 
lenses through which to look that the reader is both bespectacled – offered insight – and 
blinded in the very attempt to see tears. Rather than an interpretation of Frederick‟s 
tears, the blurring of seeing and reading in this last section of the story constitutes the 
problem of reading emotion that his tears makes visible, and this is iterated by the girl‟s 
oblique advice to Frederick that he should „…snap out of that, if you can…It does you 
no good. It‟s all the way you see things‟ (486).  
Insight‟s trickiness is glaring here, but what is particularly striking about this 
formulation of insight, vision and feeling is how the reader sees the girl looking at 
Frederick. After he approaches her bench, the girl offers Frederick an apple and, whilst 
he eats, she questions him about his tears, and observes him while we observe her 
observing him. What we see is the way he, or we, see her looking at him. We see her 
insight:  
The girl re-crossed her legs and tucked her thin crepe-de-chine skirt 
round the other knee. „What had you done – cheeked her?‟ Frederick 
swept the mouthful of apple into one cheek. „No,‟ he said shortly. 
„Cried.‟ 
„I should say you did. Bellowed, I watched you all down the path.‟ 
There was something ruminative in the girl‟s tone that made her 
remark really not at all offensive; in fact, she looked at Frederick as 
though she were meeting an artist who had just done a turn. He had 
been standing about, licking and biting the apple, but now he came 
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and sat down at the other end of the bench. „How do you do it?‟ she 
said. 
 Frederick only turned away: his ears began burning again. 
(485) 
 
Here the girl‟s reading revolves around the sense that Frederick, in crying, has „done a 
turn‟, drawing together vision, feeling and motion. If Frederick appears to „do a turn‟, 
the very watching of this trick turns his watcher‟s mind, and in reading, our own:  to 
ruminate is to „revolve, turn over and over in the mind‟.33 Frederick‟s turn – the 
apparent fictitiousness, and all too realness – of his tears, affects his watcher, making 
her mind move as well. Like Bowen, brutalised by the very fascination of watching 
Maupassant‟s stories „doing a trick‟ over and over, the bespectacled girl is moved, in 
turn, toward cognition by watching Frederick, and discerning the possibility that his 
tears are both visible, and fictitious. Frederick feels this discernment and is moved by it: 
before her rumination „he had been standing about‟ but it is her turning him over that 
draws him closer: „but now he came and sat down at the other end of the bench‟ (485).  
Yet, despite the intimacy his being read initiates, by asking „how he does it‟, the girl 
makes this trick or verisimilitude visible, intimating that his tears are, or may be, 
something he „does‟ rather than experiences – and this insight causes him to turn away. 
What is vital here is the interplay between seeing, moving, and feeling. At no point does 
„Tears, Idle Tears‟ see anything: what it registers is a discerning of the movements that 
make up seeing and reading, and the ways these movements turn in, with, toward and 
away. The short story‟s effect does not come from its pictures or what we see, but from 
how those pictures move, and the simultaneity of the revelation and concealment on 
which they revolve.  The short story‟s turn is its moving pictures: its excessive appeal to 
insight and its dependence on blindness are intrinsic to its affect. This is how it feels for 
                                                     
33
 See the Oxford English Dictionary Online, entry for „ruminate‟ (verb). 
132 
 
the other. For Bowen, vision and feeling correspond:  picking out the best of her stories, 
she observes that the most powerful are „given frame by emotion‟.34 This is what I want 
to suggest we might do with Bowen‟s remark on Maupassant‟s illustrations: use these, 
as a sort of window, in her short fiction – not as a way of gaining access or entry into it, 
but instead to discern how Bowen‟s short fiction frames motion, pictures and fictional 
feeling.  
Moving, feeling, framing, emotion, pictures: writing about Bowen‟s vision of 
the short story summons a language of the cinematic. Bowen‟s interest in the cinema 
and her own cinema-going is well documented. In the 1930s, shortly after taking on the 
house at Clarence Terrace, she and her husband took as a lodger Billy Buchanan, Alfred 
Hitchcock‟s nephew who had come to learn filmmaking from him.35 In the contributor‟s 
notes to Footnotes to the Film, editor Charles Davy‟s entry on Bowen observes her 
husband‟s role as Governor of the British Film Institute; Bowen herself is described as a 
member of the London Film Society who has „done only one piece of film criticism and 
has no technical knowledge of the cinema‟.36 Though her association with film 
according to Davy is minimal, her inclusion suggests she offers a persuasive and well-
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 Elizabeth Bowen, „Encounters‟ in Afterthought (London: Longmans, 1962), p.88. 
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 See Bowen‟s letter to Virginia Woolf, July 31st, 1935, from Waldencote, Oxford (Monks House Papers, 
Virginia Woolf Archives, University of Sussex Library Special Collections). Bowen discusses house-
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 Charles Davy (Ed.) and Martin S. Dworkin (Advisory Ed.), Footnotes to the Film: The Literature of 
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shaping the civilisation of to-day and to-morrow. It is by offering a critical survey of a subject of such far-
reaching human importance that this book hopes to justify itself‟ (p. v-vi).   
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positioned personal and critical, rather than technical or theoretical, response to film, a 
valued point of view.  And in her correspondence with VS Pritchett, Bowen records his 
insistence that there is much for the writer to „learn‟ from the cinema.  Bowen 
scholarship has observed the ways the cinema, and cinematic are figured in her work, 
whether as a setting or subject, or through technical qualities such as gaze, lighting, 
focus and cutting, as well as discussions about the cinematographic existence of Eva 
Trout.
37
  But for Bowen, the cinema shares a special affinity with the short story: of „the 
same generation,‟ she writes in the Faber Book of Modern Stories, these have been 
„accelerating together‟.38 Invoking both a language of speed and correspondence, the 
cinema and the short story share this sense of revolution, turning, in motion – of being 
moving pictures.   
Bowen‟s remark about the technology of the short story and the movies extends 
to the short story what Laura Marcus, in her work on writing about the cinema in the 
Modernist period describes as the „locomotive‟ effect of the cinema.39 Building on 
Lynne Kirby‟s work, Marcus argues the train should be seen as a „mechanical double 
for the cinema‟ by offering a „protocinematic…perceptual paradigm, which helped to 
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 Laura Marcus, The Tenth Muse: Writing about Cinema in the Modernist Period (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press: 2007), p. 68. 
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train the cinema spectator in a new, specifically modern mode of perception‟.40 What 
the train – and the cinema – do is conduct a kind of „conceptual and perceptual 
rupture‟.41 For the early film viewer, the starting or flinching evoked by films 
representing movement required a sense adjustment, much like for the early train 
passenger startled by being in motion:  both the passenger, and the film viewer, with 
„untrained cognitive habits‟ needed to learn what kind of „mode of operation‟ these 
technologies required.
42
 Marcus notes that this spectator relationship is echoed in 
Christian Metz‟s identification of the train and cinema as technologies that were 
perceived to actuate the primitive, making „the panicking spectator …the credulous 
„child‟ in cinema‟s own „infancy‟‟.43 Here Marcus highlights how writing about „motion 
pictures‟ is, in the modernist period, inextricably linked to discussions of emotion.  
Noting that critical responses to film were „frequently framed in visceral terms, as if 
film were an assault on the senses and the body‟44, Marcus points out that writing about 
the cinema by the 1920s distinguished between „mechanical locomotion, and movement 
as a question of empathy and aesthetics‟45 – the cinema „moves‟, but does not create 
„emotion‟.  What is at stake, then, in writing about film in this period, are questions 
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about what kind of movement the cinema produces: this is irreducibly tied to anxieties 
about emotion.
46
 It is not only thinking about modernist writing about film that is at 
stake in this: as Marcus observes, postmodernism „absorbs this distinction between 
mechanical and authentic emotion‟ and, through it, „produces the human as subject‟.47 
If, as Marcus argues, cinema and modernist writing about the cinema locate an 
epistemological and ontological shock, an attempt to find a language to describe this 
medium‟s „unprecedented power of movement‟48, then, it also registers a sense of 
anxiety about how to contend with that movement.  Marcus argues that central to the 
development of a film aesthetic was a disaggregation of movement as „mere mechanical 
motion‟ from „movement connected to sensation and emotion‟– this differentiation 
resonated throughout writing about film, and its relationship to the arts, in the 1920s.
 49
    
We can see this distinction, and anxieties about the cinema, in Virginia Woolf‟s 
1918 remarks about film in „The Movie Novel‟, a review of a Compton MacKenzie 
novel.
50
   In the essay Woolf observes the excess of pictures, and how they reel together 
into a cinematic, rather than literary experience. Unlike the „slow moving‟ characters of 
earlier fiction, who leave an impression after the novel is finished, and about whom  „we 
can know many things‟, MacKenzie‟s characters are unknowable because the pictures 
of the writing, „as in a cinema, follow another without stopping, for if it stopped and we 
had to look at it we should be bored‟.51 Like the cinema character, about whom we 
„never care whether he is wet or hurt or dead‟, this writing is not a novel, but „a book of 
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cinema‟.52  Laura Marcus observes that Woolf had a significant interest in aspects of the 
visual in cinematography and photography, but particularly with regards to the 
representation of emotion.
53
 While these altered substantially in the 1920s, most 
markedly in Woolf‟s 1926 essay „The Cinema‟, to which I will return, what I am 
interested in at this point for thinking about Bowen is how for Woolf, in this early 
writing, the problem with cinema is that of ineffectual writing. Distinctly unable to do 
what writing could (and should), Marcus observes that cinema for Woolf offered only 
„motion without emotion‟, a „surface vision‟ that was „incapable of suggesting 
interiority‟.54 For Woolf, while literature‟s „slow moving characters‟55 left an after 
image in the readers‟ mind, film engaged only the retina: it is watched and discarded, 
seen but not returned to. Film characters had „only the life of their immediate 
projection‟56 and moved the physical eye, not the cognitive „I‟.  Here film becomes 
doubly an anxiety not only about authenticity, but also life and livingness itself:   
The distinction between…the „eye‟ and the „mind‟ or „brain‟ [is] a 
contrast at the heart of writing about cinema in this period and 
expressive of the concern, indicated briefly in Woolf‟s review, that 
the new medium of the film was able to engage the eye but not the 
mind, so that its impact was purely retinal.  Hence Woolf‟s 
suggestion that literary characters such as those of Fielding and 
Defoe („slow-moving‟ as opposed, presumably, to the mechanically 
agitated figures on the cinematic screen) had an afterlife in the 
reader‟s mind (which could indeed be understood as a form of after-
image). Moving images, by contrast, were perceived to have only the 
instantaneous life of their immediate projection and brief retinal 
reception, each image being replaced by the one that succeeds it.
57
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The cinema is risky not only because it provokes feeling without producing authentic 
emotion, but because what it does provoke, its „immediate perception‟, does not provide 
any insight – motion pictures offer no vision. They are instead an excess of pictures 
without real emotion.  
Woolf‟s 1918 essay registers the way anxieties about motion pictures in the 
1920s are also anxieties about emotion and insight; and these are anxieties about what 
literature might, can or should do. Given Bowen‟s twinning of the short story and 
cinema technologies, we do not have to go far to draw a correspondence between these 
anxieties about cinema-e-motion and anxieties about the marginal position of the short 
story. Discussions of the short story turn, especially in the first part of the twentieth 
century, on distinctions between mass production, sentimentality and aesthetics
 58
 and, 
as Suzanne Clark observes (as discussed in Chapter One), modernist „anxieties over 
sentimental writing‟ intersect discourses about authorship with gender.59 Certainly, as 
Leslie Hankins argues, motion pictures are at the heart of modernist aesthetics, and 
Woolf was acutely aware of the risks this posed to her as a woman writer: „[e]motion 
was a loaded term within Virginia Woolf‟s cultural moment, as it remains in 
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ours…Woolf‟s struggle with the censors of sentiment was not an isolated personal one, 
however, but one shared by a generation of modernist women writers‟.60 Woolf‟s 
developing aesthetic, and its emphasis on film‟s degradation of authentic subjective 
emotion, is even more palpable in her 1926 review of Stern‟s „The Deputy was King‟:  
The grudging voice will concede that it is all very brilliant; will 
admit that a hundred pages have flashed by like a hedge seen from 
an express train; but will reiterate that for all that something is 
wrong….There is a proof that there are no values. There is no shape 
to these apparitions. Scene melts into scene; person into 
person…There is no grasping them…We have sat receptive and 
watched, with our eyes rather than our minds, as we do at the 
cinema, what passes on the screen in front of us…For all their 
brilliancy the scenes are clouded; the crises are blurred.
61
  
Here film effects a receptive melting, smudging and blurring of the mind and subject as 
it does the hedges flashing by: it is as if too much film will dull discernment, sight and 
insight. Laura Marcus emphasises that it is around the same time that Woolf‟s writing 
suggests a significant shift in thinking about cinema and cautions us not to read these 
few essays as either a damning of the cinema or a disinterest in what it can offer.
62
  
Bloomsbury writers were remarkably silent about cinema up to the mid 1920s, despite 
their interest in the visual, but Marcus reads this absence of work not as a lack of 
something to say, but instead as an indication that these writers, and Woolf in particular, 
were effectively feeling out the problems and possibilities of cinema and its relationship 
to literary aesthetics, particularly in regards to „…“vision” as a question of the eye or of 
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the mind and imagination…‟.63 It is the cinema‟s effect on Woolf‟s formulation of the 
relationship between seeing and perceiving, or vision and insight, that Marcus argues 
comes to inflect Woolf‟s work.  
For Marcus, modernist writing about film forms a kind of „talking in the cinema‟ 
that lends to Woolf‟s (and Bloomsbury‟s) „relative silence‟ not an indifference, but a 
„necessary pause – a reticence in the face of the unfamiliar‟.64 Picturing Woolf and 
Bloomsbury much like cinema scholars picture the early train and film spectators, these 
are an audience taken aback by the cinema, training their own cognitive senses. 
Modernist writers who damned the cinema might be symptomatic of a lack of 
adjustment, their writing registering the very kinds of perceptual shock the cinema (and 
train) represented. Unlike Woolf and other writers still trying to get a sense of how to 
make sense of cinema and its potential, however, Bowen‟s writing is remarkably vocal 
about the cinema, and I am suggesting that this is precisely because there is something 
to which it appeals in her own writing: if Woolf is silent about film, Bowen has much to 
say.  This is partly what Bowen‟s letter, with which I opened, registers. The letter is one 
of several correspondences between Bowen and Woolf. If Woolf was, in the 1920s, 
reticent about the cinema, and cautious about how film could not express authentic 
emotion, Bowen‟s letter in the 1930s seems to open a window in time to go back to the 
cinematic in her own writing in this period, to consider how her writing speaks into this 
filmic pause. 
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For Woolf, what film needs is to learn a sense of intention, and authenticity, 
from writing: it „seems to have everything to say before it has anything to say‟65 and she 
envisions a time in the future when the cinema, which, unlike writing, does not leave an 
„after image‟, may discover how to express „visual emotions‟.66 I will return to consider 
how Woolf‟s thoughts on this changed in the late 1920s, but for the moment, I am 
interested in how Woolf‟s remarks until the 1920s, for Marcus, indexes how cinema and 
modernist writing about the cinema locates that epistemological and ontological shock, 
the problem with how to contend with the disaggregation of motion and emotion.  For 
Bowen, however, what writing might learn from film is that the disaggregation of 
motion and emotion, film‟s apparent inability to produce authentic emotion, is not a 
shock because it is an absence of emotion, but instead because it forces a cognitive shift 
in the idea of emotion itself: what it makes seen is the investment in keeping invisible 
emotion‟s non-subjectivity. For Bowen, cinema does not just change emotion, or fail to 
achieve emotion, but visualises its unreality. Its movement kills the authenticity of 
feeling: motion pictures are emotion pictures – they make emotion „reel‟. 
This has not gone unobserved. As discussed previously, in Still Lives, Bennett 
and Royle remark upon the erasure of interiority figured by Bowen‟s visualisation of 
emotion when Sydney, a character in Bowen‟s 1927 novel The Hotel, describes 
watching two people who „appear as in some perfect piece of cinema-acting, emotion 
represented without emotion‟. 67  This „emotionless representation and a representation 
of emotion in the absence of itself‟, Bennett and Royle write, „would suggest a radical 
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fictionalization of emotion as such:  that emotion can be represented as without emotion 
figures the possibility of emotion only ever being an empty representation‟.68 „The 
difficulty,‟ they note, however, is that „under the regime of representation, 
representation without object or origin is no longer thinkable‟. 69 But it is precisely this 
possibility – the representation of emotion without an emotional origin – that emotion is 
a representation without origin – that I want to suggest is at work in Bowen‟s short 
fiction and the correspondence she draws between cinema and the short story. It is this 
that she writes into the cinematic pause left by both the absence of writing on the 
cinema (for those who „didn‟t talk in the cinema‟), and that extended by aesthetic 
anxieties about the inauthenticity of cinema emotion. I want to turn now to Bowen‟s 
story „Dead Mabelle‟, one of Bowen‟s lesser known, but perhaps one of her most 
obviously „cinematic‟ stories.70 
Published in 1929, „Dead Mabelle‟ overtly takes as its subject both cinema and 
what would come to be described as modernist anxieties about cinema emotion and 
aesthetics.  The story opens in 1927, when Mabelle, a screen actress, is murdered 
shortly after completing her last film „Purblind‟. A few months before her death, 
however, William, an awkward banker who finds it difficult to know – or to be known 
by – others, apparently falls in love with her image. Taken to the cinema, almost against 
his will, by Jim, a fellow bank clerk, William appears entranced by and soon obsessed 
with Mabelle‟s image.  After the first outing with Jim, William begins going to 
Mabelle‟s films in secret.  He watches them in the order they are shown at all the 
cinemas he can get to, already watching her in the past. The first films he sees are from 
                                                     
68
 Bennett and Royle, p. 7.  
69
 Bennett and Royle, p. 7. 
70
 „Dead Mabelle‟ (CS, pp. 276-285)  was first published in Joining Charles and Other Stories (London: 
Constable & co., 1929). Subsequent citations are provided in text and refer to CS. 
142 
 
1924, and, as he watches her, his spectatorship accelerates in time to the box office 
trend for Mabelle films. He is reeled forward up to what we know is coming: that her 
most recent release is also her last. When he finds out about her death, William initially 
stays away from the cinema, but finds himself drawn back, looking for her.  Watching 
her last motion picture, which finished filming right before her murder, William 
attempts to reconcile her fleetingness with her death, the intense livingness of her 
picture with her not being real:   
He looked back, once, towards the town and the Picturedrome. One 
moment „Mabelle‟ was blazing emerald over the white façade; the 
next the lights were out, „Mabelle‟, the doors beneath, had 
disappeared. So she went….what of her?  „You‟re here,‟ he said, and 
put out a hand in the darkness. „You know I know you‟re here, you 
proud thing! Standing and looking. Do you see me?...You‟re more 
here than I…‟  (284) 
Outside the Picturedrome, William experiences a kind of shock: startled by a pair of 
lovers „plastered together speechlessly under the wall‟ he „shuddered at the thought of 
such a contact‟ (284). This is when Mabelle reappears to him: 
…he had lost her. Mabelle…Mabelle? Ah, here… 
Here, by him, burning into him with her actuality all the 
time. Burdening him with her realness…ghostly chrysanthemums 
drained of their pinks and yellows raised up their heads….As he 
watched, one stem with its burden detached itself and swayed 
forward, dipped through the lamplight and vanished…How – why – 
while the other stems stood up erect and unmoving, sustaining their 
burden? Who had - ?  
Oh no, not that! He began to be terrified. „Don‟t press me too hard, I 
can‟t stand it…Mabelle, look here – don‟t!‟ He looked beyond the 
chrysanthemums, left and right, everywhere. She was there, left, 
right, everywhere, printed on darkness…   (284) 
The story cuts away from the image of Mabelle‟s ghostliness, a linguistic absence or 
nothing that is „everywhere‟, and we re-open in William‟s sitting-room, staring at his 
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books and pictures as he examines how life, „that abstraction behind the business of 
living, was due to begin again‟ (285). Alone with his livingness, William contemplates 
being and feeling and, in search of a „fit gesture that he could have offered her‟ (285), 
he stages a pistol shot to his head. But the gesture, empty, turns into an examination of 
the objects – „the note-books, the bitten pencil-stump, match-ends, attempt at a sonnet, a 
tie, crumpled up and forgotten‟ – that, instead of a gun, „littered the drawer‟ (285).  
„Dead Mabelle‟ stages an acute awareness of anxieties circulating in the 1920s 
about the consuming power of the cinema and its fleetingness as it chews up actresses 
and spends them for the ticket buyers. Mabelle‟s movies are not enduring art, the story 
reminds us – they are „it‟, „glamour‟, „fashion‟, a trend that even the real horror of 
Mabelle‟s murder doesn‟t quell but instead accelerates and amplifies, folded back into 
the cinema by the industry‟s capitalising on and spending of a vogue for feeling:  
The release of her last, Purblind, was awaited breathlessly. Her last, 
when brimming with delighted horror, horrified delight, with a sense 
of foreknowledge as though time were being unwound from the reel 
backwards, one would see all Mabelle‟s unconsciousness under the 
descending claw of horror. Nothing she had ever mimicked could 
approach the end that had overtaken her. It was to be, this film, feast 
for the epicure in sensation; one would watch the lips smile, the 
gestures ripple out from brain to finger-tips. It was on her return 
from the studio at the end of the making of this very picture that she 
had perished so appallingly. (276) 
Mabelle‟s film sensation is explicitly linked to her commodification, reminding us that 
Mabelle‟s glamour is only for the moment: „in another month or so, when her horror 
faded and her vogue had died, her films would be recalled – boiled down, they said. He 
had heard old films were used for patent leather; that which was Mabelle would be a 
shoe, a bag, a belt round some woman‟s middle.  These sloughed off, what of her?‟ 
(284). 
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Mabelle is emptied out, spent, her subjectivity reduced to a filmic materiality 
that lives only as long as it generates interest and transactional value. Here „Dead 
Mabelle‟ might open itself out to being read through the figure of the „femme fatale‟, 
which Mary Ann Doane locates as „a figure of discursive unease and potential 
epistemological trauma‟.71 Certainly, Mabelle‟s fatality is initiated in the title, and, as 
with Doane‟s description of the femme fatale, Mabelle‟s „power and fascination‟ also 
appears to be generated by how she „comes to overrepresent‟, with her simultaneous 
excess of presence and lack of substance: „Not subject to her conscious will‟, Doane 
argues, the femme fatale „blurs the opposition between passivity and activity‟.72 „Dead 
Mabelle‟ registers how the filmic femme fatale is, as Doane describes, „localised…as 
spectacle‟73, and here „seeing‟ and being seen is crucial, with Mabelle‟s subjectivity 
subsumed into an eye without an „I‟, an eye only for others.  Mabelle‟s eyes are not 
eyes, but in pictures, isolated in parts:  „Her under lids were straight, she would lean 
back her head and look over them. Her upper lids arched to a point, she had three-
cornered eyes‟ (278). Mabelle herself is disconnected from the spectacle of her own 
body: „when her face went into repose the lids came down slowly, hiding her eyes for 
moments together‟ (278).  
Mabelle is reduced here to filmic technology, her eyes a screen with lids that, 
like cinema curtains, open and close, rise or fall, revealing and concealing the eye from 
the audience, and herself. This movement of her lids, the alternation between Mabelle‟s 
blindness, and the audience‟s, offers a movement between the visible and hidden that 
leads William to speculate about Mabelle‟s „I‟ on the other side of her cinema eyes:  
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„There was [another]thing about Mabelle: the way she made love. She 
was tired, oh fearfully tired. Her forehead dropped down on the man‟s 
shoulder, her body went slack; there seemed no more hope for her 
than for a tree in a hurricane. When her head fell back in despair, 
while the man devoured her face horribly, one watched her forgotten 
arm hang down over his shoulder: the tips of the fingers twitched. 
What was she thinking about, what did women think about – then?‟ 
(279) 
As a screen presence, Mabelle is dead, not real, and without subjectivity, but here she is 
for William also alarmingly alive: „her personality flashed like a fused wire‟ (276). 
Mabelle‟s body is not her own, yet it is shocking in its livingness, a livingness that 
invites a sense that there is an interiority. For Doane, this figure of the femme fatale 
registers „fears linked to the fading of subjectivity, loss of conscious agency….[wherein 
the femme fatale‟s] textual eradication involves desperate reassertion of control on the 
part of the threatened male subject‟.74  
This is precisely how Mabelle has been read. In her study of Bowen‟s short 
fiction, Phyllis Lassner thematises „Dead Mabelle‟ as one of Bowen‟s „Comedies of Sex 
and Terror‟. These stories „enact the violent emotions‟75 hinted at in her other stories, 
and it is in those like „Dead Mabelle‟ that Lassner argues men „avenge their betrayed 
expectations…on women who will not play their assigned roles‟.76 Lassner reads 
William‟s responses to Mabelle‟s images as an accelerating violence that releases his 
„violently repressed eroticism‟.77  The story, for Lassner, „charts William‟s growing 
obsession with and appropriation of Mabelle‟s image. In a world in which William has 
little power he can use his male gaze to construct a figure whose reflection of his desire 
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makes him feel powerful‟.78 Mabelle haunts him because, in the end, William has no 
control over his creation, his fantasy woman. I want to look rather to the side of 
Lassner‟s reading, though, and observe that Lassner doesn‟t actually identify what is 
funny about „Dead Mabelle‟: unlike the other stories in this group, she doesn‟t explain 
what makes it a comedy of sex and terror. I will come back to this point, but I want to 
suggest that embedded in her analysis of „Dead Mabelle‟ is the assumption that part of 
William‟s character – his subject position – is a certain deficiency, what Lassner cites as 
his „suppressed erotic desires‟79 – William creates an erotic fantasy in part because he 
won‟t acknowledge his own desires. What Lassner seems to be pitching this argument 
around is the assumption that William cannot distinguish between authentic and 
cinematic emotion.  
What we might attend to, however, is how William is already in search of a 
perceptual, or cognitive shock, when he encounters the movies: what he discovers, in 
Mabelle, I suggest, is not the projection of his own fantasy, but instead is a theory of 
cinema – of „reel‟ feeling.  In this way, Doane‟s observations about the figure of the 
femme fatale might be connected, through emotion, to Marcus‟ argument that film 
initiated a perceptual rupture and „filmic ontology‟, a „blurring of the borderline 
between the living and the dead‟80, but that this rupture is intimately connected with an 
intense visibility of, and preoccupation with, emotion. The blurring Mabelle figures 
between life and death, emotion and motion, might be read not as a loss of subjectivity, 
but a representation of subjective emotion as a blindspot in aesthetic theory. In this way 
the visual detail of Mabelle‟s sensation demands an attention to how it pictures her 
feeling and their movements: gestures ripple out from brain to finger-tip, the lips smile. 
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In this visualisation of the „feast for the epicure in sensation‟ (276), Mabelle is the film, 
the subject-less actor whose body‟s movements themselves become motion without 
emotion, visualisations of feeling and sensation that may merely elicit reactions rather 
than form, express or invoke any meaningful emotion. 
„Dead Mabelle‟, then, not only registers the kinds of criticism about film 
spectatorship and mass consumption – and the aesthetic arguments that were emerging 
– in the 1920s, but it also mobilises these discourses, puts them in motion by drawing on 
the rhetoric and language of film and emerging film criticisms.   William is pictured as 
„cinema-shy‟ (277), his character given shape through his relations to cinema: „he 
resisted the cinema till a man with important-looking initials mentioned it in a weekly 
review as an „art-form…then he went there with Jim and saw Mabelle‟ (277).  Bowen‟s 
story figures resistances to film, and anxieties about cinema, as much as it engages with 
the cinematic itself. Here the dating of Bowen‟s text is significant. Although not 
published until 1929, „Dead Mabelle‟ pays an acute attention to its timing. The first 
paragraph introduces Mabelle with an attention to when her death takes place, the 
cinematic sensation of this timing of her death, and the effect her death has on the speed 
of film showings. Introducing Mabelle through time, the intensity with which we are 
reminded of when the story begins, of the time it covers, and of when it leaves us, 
explicitly makes „Dead Mabelle‟ about the timing and time of cinema. We begin in 
what looks like the present, with the „sudden and horrible end of Mabelle Pacey‟ (276), 
whose name paces a significant and sensational time for cinema. We are then flashed 
back to three years in the past, a movement back in time that happens through Mabelle‟s 
visuality itself: „Her personality flashed like a fused wire. Three-year-old films of 
Mabelle – with scimitar-curves of hair waxed forward against the cheeks, in the quaint 
creations of 1924 – were recalled by the lesser London and greater provincial cinemas‟ 
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(276). Here the timing of the story is marked by glamour and the past, to indicate that 
the story begins sometime in 1927. What seems crucial here is that the timing of 
Mabelle‟s death, and of „Dead Mabelle‟, has something to say about the time that her 
filmic career covers: Mabelle‟s cinema explicitly speaks about the mid 1920s. The 
importance of time, and the way Mabelle‟s past bleeds into the uncanny present of 
1927, is reiterated a few lines down, when we are brought back to the effect of the 
release of her last film, just after her death: „with a sense of foreknowledge as though 
time were being unwound from the reel backwards, one would see all Mabelle‟s 
unconsciousness under the descending claw of horror‟ (276). Even Mabelle‟s afterlife 
with William is a matter of pacing, the effect of her moving in time. The text reminds us 
that five weeks pass between her death and the showing of her last film; when asked if 
he‟s going to see her, William replies „I don‟t know that I‟ve got time‟ (281), and 
Mabelle herself becomes a matter of time: „On Monday and Tuesday he did not go to 
the Picturedrome; he disappeared utterly, no one knew where he had gone. The last day 
of Mabelle was Wednesday; Wednesday came‟ (281). Through Mabelle, we are offered 
a film of cinema itself between 1924 and 1927, a reel wound back and forward to realise 
something about the movies.  
Timing itself, „Dead Mabelle‟ interjects in a moment of cinema writing. As 
David Trotter has observed, the emergence of English film criticism took an important 
turn in 1925 when Ivor Montagu founded the London Film Society, which aimed to 
„exhibit foreign films otherwise unavailable in Britain‟.81 The Society responded to the 
same preoccupations as the founders of Close Up, a journal of cinema criticism and 
film-writing established a few years later in July 1927. Its ethos was to contest what 
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Anne Friedberg describes as the „commercial illusionism‟ of Hollywood82, and the 
changing cover text of Close Up dramatised the journal‟s distinctions between its 
writers‟ and readers‟ interests in aesthetics, intellectualism, and the avant-garde from 
more commercial and popular interests in glamour, gossip and Hollywood. The cover of 
the first edition announced this, describing itself as „an English review, the first to 
approach films from the angles of art, experiment and possibility‟ and subsequent Close 
Up covers proclaimed „WE WANT BETTER FILMS!!!‟; identified the journal as „The 
Official guide to Better movie! – With illustrations from the best films – TECHNICAL. 
FRIENDLY. INFORMATIVE.‟; and reiterated its place as „The Only Magazine 
Devoted to Films As An Art – Interesting and Exclusive Illustrations – THEORY AND 
ANALYSIS – NO GOSSIP‟.83 What is particularly important about the emergence of 
Close Up and the London Film Society, however, is that this literary and critical 
dialogue about cinema not only set itself against commercial „glamour‟ films – exactly 
the kind of films that Bowen‟s Mabelle makes – but more particularly did so on the 
basis of concerns about authentic and experimental aesthetics as opposed to commercial 
„illusionism‟ and sensation without meaning, what Woolf expresses as motion without 
emotion. The title of Close Up itself is pitched directly into this concern – as Friedberg 
observes, the filmic „close up‟ is a double for „magnification through a lens‟ and „it 
meant close analysis, scrutiny, an “optic” ‟.84 This twinning of visibility and analysis 
registers the relationship between the vision and insight preoccupying my earlier 
discussion of the short story as a form. More importantly, however, the effect of this as 
a rhetoric of cinema foregrounds the anxieties about emotion implicit in this discussion. 
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Friedberg‟s discussion highlights how the role of the „close-up‟ in the emerging rhetoric 
of the visual in the 1920s turns on the possibility that intense and framed visibility 
might register or produce possibilities for reading emotion, which in turn would provide 
insight into the subject. Close Up, then, identifies a preoccupation in the mid 1920s with 
the philosophical possibilities for film, possibilities that were expressed through a 
discourse of emotion: 
…the close-up was an essential component of photogenie – it limited 
and directed attention, indicated emotion, magnified aesthetic 
import…the close-up produced revelations of a new emotional and 
dramatic magnitude in showing the „microphysiognomy‟ of the 
human face…the close-up supplied a new visual order, rendering 
„entirely new structural formations of the subject‟…The close-up 
provided a particularly modern optic, a newly revelatory 
epistemology. As the title for a film journal, Close Up implied the 
conflation of technical specificity with philosophical endeavour‟.85  
These possibilities turned on the ability of the camera to capture emotion as it really is.
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The preoccupation with film, writing and aesthetics, then, not only revolves around 
emotion, but is at the heart of what it came to mean to be modern, and, for critics, what 
enabled the identification of modernist aesthetics.  
„Dead Mabelle‟ is written out of the very discourses about cinema that were 
circulating at the time the story was written, and this is one way we might read the story 
as speaking into the silence about cinema. But „Dead Mabelle‟ does not merely poke 
fun or satirise the distinction between Hollywood and experimental cinema and the 
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emerging discourse of cinema (or the right kind of cinema) as „art‟ in the mid 1920s, 
nor does it simply comment on the discourses of emotion and sensation that undergirded 
these distinctions. Instead, „Dead Mabelle‟ seems to suggest that, if the close up is to 
offer a new rhetoric of the visual that might offer new directions for aesthetic and 
philosophic analysis, it will do so only through an attention to the very commercial 
illusions these new forums for experimentalism dismissed, because these have 
something to say about the cinema of emotion itself. And it chooses the form of the 
short story to do so. Rather than step away from the wet and sentimental „eye/I‟ of the 
Hollywood screen, or the commercial position of the short story, „Dead Mabelle‟ 
embraces, and is embraced by, it. The story overtly directs itself towards the kinds of 
epistemological and cognitive shock that writers about the cinema were grappling with. 
I want to suggest that Bowen, through „Dead Mabelle‟, is not only participating in 
modernist writing‟s dialogue about cinema, but interrupting it: more specifically, the 
speaker „Dead Mabelle‟ interrupts is Virginia Woolf. 
It is in relation to the same preoccupations that characterise „Dead Mabelle‟ that 
David Trotter contends that Virginia Woolf has something important to say when she 
(as Marcus might put it) finally does „speak‟ into the filmic silence on cinema, and it is 
this that he argues comes to offer the forms of thinking and perceptual shifts that would 
come to mark her (and modernisms‟) literary experimentation. Movie-going, Trotter 
argues, is crucial to what Woolf, and the experimentalism of literary modernism would 
come to write. Earlier I noted that, as Laura Marcus observes, Woolf‟s attitude to film 
shifts significantly in the 1920s such that her 1926 essay „The Cinema‟ is preoccupied 
not with what film can‟t do, but rather with what it might. What Woolf pictures as 
film‟s potential is emotion: 
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If it ceased to be a parasite, how would it walk erect? At present it is 
only from hints that one can frame any conjecture. For instance, at a 
performance of Dr Caligari the other day, a shadow shaped like a 
tadpole suddenly appeared at one corner of the screen. It swelled to 
an immense size, quivered, bulged, and sank back again into 
nonentity. For a moment it seemed to embody some monstrous, 
diseased imagination of the lunatic's brain. For a moment it seemed 
as if thought could be conveyed by shape more effectively than by 
words. The monstrous, quivering tadpole seemed to be fear itself, 
and not the statement, 'I am afraid.' In fact, the shadow was 
accidental, and the effect unintentional. But if a shadow at a certain 
moment can suggest so much more than the actual gestures and 
words of men and women in a state of fear, it seems plain that the 
cinema has within its grasp innumerable symbols for emotions that 
have so far failed to find expression. Terror has, besides its ordinary 
forms, the shape of a tadpole; it burgeons, bulges, quivers, 
disappears. Anger is not merely rant and rhetoric, red faces and 
clenched fists. It is perhaps a black line wriggling upon a white 
sheet.
87
 
Whilst Woolf‟s earlier writing about cinema mused on its failure to represent visual 
emotions and achieve the authentic aesthetic expression that might be achieved in 
writing, here Woolf identifies that what film can do is offer new emotions and, through 
experimenting with the technologies of visibility that film makes possible, it may 
suggest emotion and expression that is, perhaps, more real than that which is expressed 
linguistically. Woolf‟s essay registers what Trotter describes as a „fund of shared 
preoccupation‟88 in the mid 1920s for both film-makers, and writers about the cinema, 
about „the ways in which movement (and in particular casual movement) defines 
space‟89, in particular the space between the audience and film. Although Trotter does 
not explicitly articulate that what is at stake here is the affective experience of cinema, 
his discussion of filmic movement and space, and Woolf‟s interest  in the 
epistemological and ontological possibilities this offers, is discussed in affective terms 
                                                     
87Woolf, „The Cinema‟, p. 57. 
88
 Trotter, p. 14. 
89
 Ibid. 
153 
 
as the pleasures and thrill of „sheer visibility‟.90 For Woolf, this space is a matter of the 
relations between the audience and film, in so far as these record and represent the 
„common life‟, or the „real‟, which, in „The Cinema‟, is expressed in terms of the 
affective power of the cinema to offer emotion pictures. Thus cinema, according to 
Trotter, re-wrote Woolf‟s sense of literature‟s potential. 
According to Trotter, the vital difference between Woolf‟s writing about the 
cinema prior to her 1926 essay „The Cinema‟, and indeed between her writing Mrs 
Dalloway in 1925 and To the Lighthouse in 1927, was Woolf‟s „intermittent habit of 
going to the movies‟: „I want to suggest that the understanding of cinema Woolf 
evolved in very specific circumstances during the early months of 1926 made it possible 
for her to say things about the common life which she had not quite been able to say in 
Mrs Dalloway‟.91 Drawing on entries in Leonard Woolf‟s memorandum books from 
December 1925, January 1926, a letter from Woolf to Vita Sackville-West dated 13 
April 1926, and a note from Woolf in March 1926 about The Cabinet of Dr Caligari
92
, 
Trotter draws a neat correspondence between the development of her film and literary 
aesthetic and movie-going. What Woolf learned to articulate was a shift in writing 
subjectivity from a representation of presence to what Trotter describes as „constitutive 
absence‟ – the sense that the encounter „will always in some sense be missed‟93: 
„encounters between people living in the same place at the same time were there to be 
missed; though, with a view to the survival of the species, some had better not be. A 
community would thrive only if it succeeded in maintaining the appropriate level of 
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non-relationship among its members‟.94 „Constitutive absence‟ is precisely about being 
in the absence of one‟s self and the problem of how to represent this: cinema, for Woolf, 
offered a phenomenology of seeing without presence and presence without seeing that 
put into motion the „missed‟ affect of looking that is both singular and not for the self, 
the sense that „cinema allows us to behold things “as they are when we are not there”‟.95 
Constitutive absence, Trotter argues, was made visible for Woolf through cinema‟s 
„eyelessness‟, its motion without subject, its lack of encounter between eyes (or 
audience and actor) and the „queer sensations‟ this produces. 96   
Film‟s fundamental ability to show without telling began, for Woolf, to 
represent not a failure to produce authentic emotion, but the possibility of producing 
new emotions, emotions constituted through the very movingness of images. These 
might change what emotions can be pictured, what expressions might be seen, and these 
„innumerable symbols for emotion‟ would be produced by the very technological 
possibility to see outside of one-self. The „tadpole shape‟ of terror might begin to bulge, 
quiver and disappear, and anger might exceed the constraints of the subject‟s linguistic 
and somatic expression, be no longer „merely rant and rhetoric, red faces and clenched 
fists‟, but become something outside the subject, a feeling that, pictured, is tied to no 
self to produce it and no self toward whom it is produced, representing instead a new 
form or symbol, „perhaps a black line wriggling upon a white sheet‟. The openness 
Trotter traces that emerges in Woolf‟s thinking about cinema for emotion and 
subjectivity identifies a clear need to frame emotion as produced or invented rather than 
expressed by literary and cinematic technologies, and Woolf‟s essay as attended to by 
Trotter, and Laura Marcus, indexes a significant shift in what emotion is produced by 
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moving pictures. These shifts have strong resonances with „Dead Mabelle‟, and 
certainly it would be possible to see Bowen‟s story as derivative of Woolf‟s essay, 
merely miming what was published just a few months before Bowen‟s story takes place. 
But here there are two significant distinctions I would argue that demand a critical 
close-up of „Dead Mabelle‟.  
Whilst Trotter disagrees with Marcus‟ interpretation of Woolf‟s writing in the 
wake of „The Cinema‟ as experimental „cineplay‟, he does pick out that the feature of 
Woolf‟s writing that invites Marcus to read this experiment in writing subjectivity is the 
use of „visual images to express emotions and animat[e] objects into non-human life‟.97 
For Woolf, experimentalism meant doing something new with subjectivity, by putting 
emotion  pictures to work, differently. But if what allows Woolf to experiment in this 
way, and construct new forms of subjectivity with her writing (in particular to represent 
a constitutive absence that corresponded to the cinema‟s visual emotions), is going to 
the movies, this innovation is intrinsically linked to going to specific movies. Trotter‟s 
evidence makes it clear that the movies from which Woolf learns, and the cinema 
through which her writing may come to innovate, are those shown by the London Film 
Society. Woolf‟s cinematic education is determined, in advance, by aesthetic 
distinctions between art and commercial film. If cinema pictures emotions for Woolf, 
these emotion pictures already appeal to experimentalism and innovation. While Woolf 
locates emotion as part of the „common life‟ that cinema helps her understand, she 
develops her understanding (and particularly her understanding of constitutive absence) 
through a kind of film that has already distinguished itself, aesthetically, from common 
feeling.  In this way, what Woolf discovers about visual emotions tells us less, I would 
suggest, about emotion, than it does about the aestheticisation of, and discourses about, 
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emotion through which writing about the cinema in the 1920s mediated the relationship 
between literature and film.  
Trotter reminds us that the relationship between literature and cinema is, in the 
1920s, a complex one that cannot and should not be understood in terms of cause and 
effect, because „what mediates literature and film, during that silent era, is literature 
about film‟.98 Ann Friedberg recall‟s Christian Metz‟s observation that writing about 
cinema has always negotiated between producing a discourse about its object and 
producing the discourse of its object; according to Friedberg, the writers of Close Up 
(the same writers represented by the interests of the London Film Society) „reversed this 
discursive formula‟ by „advocating a cinema that mirrored the aesthetics and production 
of their own written discourse: discourse about the object‟.99 What distinguishes 
Bowen‟s „Dead Mabelle‟ from this is that it is not only overtly constructed out of the 
very films these writers distinguished their objects of writing against, but it does so in 
the form of a popular fiction that was undergoing the same kind of aesthetic distinctions 
between mere „commodity‟ and meaningful experimentations.100   
For Woolf the ability to understand the „common life‟ comes from the practice 
of watching primarily newsreels and „actualities‟, early films that „comprised the totality 
of whatever it was that took place, staged or unstaged‟101, in which movement without 
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interest was the basis of thrill or affect, the sort of film that had been largely eradicated 
from the film market by the advent of narrative cinema. By making the „commercial 
illusionism‟ of a Hollywood film the subject of „Dead Mabelle‟, Bowen offers a 
fictional theorisation of emotion pictures that takes as its material not an aestheticised 
determination of the „common life‟ and record of „real‟ reality, but instead uses the 
common or popular interest in narrative film as a way of theorising about emotion. 
„Dead Mabelle‟ is important here because it identifies that commercial film can tell us 
something about a philosophy of being and of emotion that isn‟t being set in motion 
through an emerging intellectual and aesthetic investment in experimentalism. David 
Trotter‟s discussion of Woolf‟s cinema-going highlights that American movies had, by 
1925, dominated the market and that this domination took the form of a narrative art. 
These „spectacular character-driven narratives‟102 had achieved mass production and 
consumption through the production of continuity: Hollywood cinema could reduce the 
„locomotive‟ affect of cinema, and, by smoothing over the disjunctures of the vision 
itself, direct the audience away from movement and towards narrative sensation: „The 
spectator, grasping the significance, is absorbed into the narrative process‟.103 One 
reason why Woolf prioritises and theorises constitutive absence out of newsreels and 
actualities, then, is because, unlike narrative film, this cinema does not interpret, or 
predetermine, the visual emotions: instead the thrill of sheer visibility stands on its own.  
They achieve what Woolf understands as authentic, surprising and singular emotion: 
they offer that perceptual and cognitive shock that Woolf will come, by 1926, to see as 
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material for innovation. But Friedberg‟s observation about modernist writers interested 
in the cinema leads me to suggest that what appeals to Woolf here is not quite the 
emotions these films picture, but more the way these emotion pictures allow Woolf‟s 
innovations in writing subjectivity to mirror the discourse of subjectivity that she brings 
to watching films. I say this because for Woolf, what cinema shows is something new: 
emotion is pictured differently, it is a locomotive shock, and cinema requires a 
perceptual and cognitive retraining that is eventually formulated into an aesthetic 
argument about the self. But for Bowen, the use of mainstream Hollywood film shows 
this up: emotion pictures are not only seen in experimental, or avant-garde film, or in 
the newsreels or „actualities‟.  These are at work in narrative cinema and, as „Dead 
Mabelle‟ shows, in emotion itself. While Woolf‟s experimentalism is shaped, in part, by 
a recognition of what film might teach us, I would suggest Bowen‟s stories eschew 
formal innovation because her fiction registers the inventiveness, and emotion pictures, 
in the everyday. Woolf‟s contribution to writing about cinema in the modernist period 
identifies the way cinema pictures new emotions. But Bowen‟s recognition is that the 
reason cinema can make us see emotion differently is not because it invents a new 
technology for emotion, but that it can do so because emotion is cinematic.  
The reality of subjectivity and emotion, in „Dead Mabelle‟, is from the 
beginning pictured as a problem of reading. William‟s character turns to cinema 
because he is looking for a way to read emotion, to form real attachments with others, to 
know and be known by them. William is „cinema-shy‟ (277), caught up instead with 
getting to know things, and others, as they really are. He speculates about the nature of 
reality, devoting his time to reading philosophy: but not only does an authentic reality 
elude William, he finds himself at a distance from others. William is „intelligent, 
solitary, self-educated, self-suspicious; he had read, without system, enough to trouble 
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him endlessly…On walks alone or lying awake in the dark he would speculate as to the 
nature of reality. „What am I – but am I? If I am, what else is? If I‟m not, is anything 
else? Is anything…‟ (277).   Despite having acquaintances, William is unable to relate 
to others – he can‟t „get Jim into focus but he supposed he liked him alright‟ (277), and, 
when someone reaches out to him, their „personal touch‟ is „imperceptive‟ (277).  
William pictures himself unable to feel, to move or be moved. Without really being 
moved, without emotion, he doubts his own existence, as if „he was the victim of some 
practical joke on the scale of the universe of which everybody and everything…were 
linked in furtive enjoyment‟ (278). Everyone else is joined by a kind of emotion that 
William does not have access to through an authenticity of emotion that exceeds his 
philosophising.  When William goes to the cinema and first encounters Mabelle, then, 
he is already in crisis – he is looking for authentic emotion, the very aesthetic that 
should be set off by all of his reading, that he should have been trained for.  He resists 
the cinema because its movements are too easy, narrativised, appealing to inauthenticity 
and sensation without emotion: „he resisted the cinema till a man with important-
looking initials mentioned it in a weekly review as an „art-form‟….he expected 
Mabelle‟s appeal to be erotic and went in armoured with intellectuality, but it was not 
erotic – that he could see‟ (277).   
What I suggest he finds in Mabelle, then, is not a crisis of reality, of how the 
cinema can possibly make him feel when it or she is not real, as Lassner‟s reading 
through the figure of the femme fatale might suggest. Nor does William confuse 
Mabelle‟s cinematic emotion with that of the actualitie or aesthetic film, mistaking the 
mere illusionism of commercial sensation with real and authentic emotion. Nor, in fact, 
would I argue does emotion itself undergo a philosophical transformation. Instead, it is 
William, and the reader invested in the reality of emotion, that experiences an 
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epistemological and ontological shock: not of a new emotion, but of what emotion is. In 
a close-up of a close-up of the relationship between film, emotion, and subjectivity, 
William enters the cinema for the first time when there is a close up of Mabelle‟s face – 
so close that he is „embraced in her vision‟ (278).  „Expecting to see himself reflected‟, 
William realises there is nothing personal about her eyes, yet still her „direct look‟ feels 
„as though she leaned forward and touched one‟ (278). What Mabelle offers William is, 
precisely, a re-cognition – the apprehension that he has had it wrong: in looking for 
authentic emotion, for a sense of confirmation of interiority in himself or others, he has 
failed to see what his narration has already suggested: that emotion is cinematic.  
We pause, as readers, and rewind. William, from the beginning of „Dead 
Mabelle‟ is constructed through a deployment of the filmic: he is „goggle eyed‟, he 
„can‟t get things into focus‟ (277) – and at the moments of his most intense doubt, he 
experienced „something that felt like an empty barrel rolling over the ups and downs in 
his brain…‟ (277). William exists through the cinematic, but he has not yet recognised 
that there is nothing beyond this; what he needs to relate to others, to „get them into 
focus‟ (277), is not authentic emotion, but a theory of emotion as cinema emotion, of 
interiority as virtual.  If we look again at William watching Mabelle, we see that he does 
not confuse her with reality: what he recognises, finally in the cinema, is that „[i]t had 
been all very abstract, he recognized in it some hinterland of his brain. He understood 
that passion and purity, courage, deception and lust were being depicted and sat there 
watching Mabelle‟ (278). What he is drawn to is how her „qualities overlapped 
strangely; in that black-and-white world of abstractions she alone moved in a blur. Each 
movement, in unexpected relation to movements preceding it, outraged a pre-
conception. William sat with an angry, disordered feeling as though she were a rising 
flood and his mind bulrushes‟ (278).  
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The power of Mabelle‟s affect for William is not that she transmits her feeling, 
but that the strange overlapping of her expressions – these depictions of lust, courage, 
passion –  ruptures what Bennett and Royle, speaking of the cinematic in Eva Trout, call 
the „fiction of a fluid mobility which silently dissolves one frame into the next‟.104 To 
gain the „personal touch‟, William needs to learn to participate in this fiction. Here, in 
the centre of Mabelle‟s „eye‟ and William‟s „I‟, at the heart of the kind of Hollywood 
movie that would, for Woolf, keep „cinema from standing erect‟, Mabelle herself 
becomes the technology of the cinema, her face a blur of emotion pictures. For William, 
Mabelle is already „dead‟ then, before her death,  and we might note that Mabelle is „ma 
belle‟ or „my beautiful‟. In „Dead Mabelle‟ we read the death of a kind of beauty, the 
dissolution of an aesthetic, an end to William‟s search for authentic emotion. In „Dead 
Mabelle‟, then, what dies is not a subject to be reborn through experimentalism as a 
subject in the absence of itself, for that subject – if it depended on emotion for its 
expression and confirmation, didn‟t exist: „Dead Mabelle‟ dissolves the perception that 
emotion has an origin in that subject. No longer originating in the subject, but instead in 
the motion pictures of the other, „Dead Mabelle‟ frames emotion as reel feeling.  
In „Dead Mabelle‟, Bowen kills the very thing Woolf in this period suggests 
cinema must learn from literature: an aesthetic of interior emotion. The perceptual 
shock of cinema, then, is not that it can offer motion without emotion, but that this is 
precisely how emotion works: it is a cinema of the human. Emotion, as Bowen writes of 
the movies in her 1938 essay „Why I go to the cinema‟, makes „what has never 
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happened happen‟.105 It is not that cinema invents this, but that cinema is a technology 
that makes emotions‟ event – and inventiveness – visible. Emotion is represented as 
„reel‟, and the use of glamour films in „Dead Mabelle‟ suggest not only satire or 
criticism, but register that this glamour has something to say about emotion. Like 
glamour, emotion is „a sort of sensuous gloss: I know it to be synthetic but it affects me 
strongly‟.106 Gloss and glamour are not contrary to authentic feeling, but, in „Dead 
Mabelle‟, the very technology of emotion. In the edited collection of essays on emotion 
and impersonality in the twentieth century that I discussed in Chapter One, Margot 
Reynier points to the way contemporary scholarship is attempting to understand how 
the impersonal and nonsubjective are still emotional. Embedded in this very question is 
the modernist disaggregation of motion and emotion. The question Reynier raises 
assumes that emotion should not endure without the subject. This assumption finds 
expression in the modernist urge to experiment, to break away from convention and 
mass feeling in order to produce innovative forms of aesthetic emotion. Bowen‟s 
cinema writing, however, suggests not a disjunction between authentic subjective 
emotion and mechanical movement, but instead the suggestion that this very 
differentiation – this disjunction – is itself an aesthetic. For Bowen, emotion‟s very 
realness is in its verisimilitude; but „[w]hat falls short in aesthetic experience but may 
do as human experience‟.107 What „Dead Mabelle‟ makes visible, then, is that 
subjectivity and emotion are far from actual. While Mabelle may be „dead‟, her 
subjectivity and emotion are neither dead nor alive, inauthentic nor real: instead the 
after-image of Mabelle that haunts William after he leaves her last film is pictured as 
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„burning into him with her actuality all the time. Burdening him with her realness‟ 
(284). Film does not effect subjectivity here: it stands in for it, blurring the distinction 
between Hollywood and the „actualitie‟ that mobilises modernist aesthetics. 
Earlier, I suggested that Bowen‟s short fiction invited a different 
phenomenology of the short story from Timothy Clark‟s „blindness‟, to suggest what we 
need is not a model of „seeing‟ or „not seeing‟, of „vision‟ or „blindness‟, but instead a 
theory of the short story as emotion – a space where motion, pictures, and fictional 
feeling overlap. For Clark, what blindness offers is a reading that unsettles the primacy 
of sight and undoes „insight‟.  But throughout this discussion I have been tracing how it 
is with a movement between seeing and not seeing that the phenomenology of the short 
story happens. It is at the level of emotion pictures that insight and blindness are 
discerned: if the short story revolves around a play of concealing and revealing, then it 
is through emotion that it turns.  
Here I‟d like to return to, turn over, the end of „Dead Mabelle‟. Having gained 
his cinema theory, William is no longer plagued by the attempt to find real emotion. 
Instead, he realises it is always fictional, always in movement, whether or not we see 
that motion – disjunctive or smooth, emotion pictures feel different, but their inventions 
are made possible because emotion is cinematic. William has not conflated real feeling 
for an obsession with Mabelle, but instead he has learned a theory of emotion pictures. 
Later, returning home, he looks again for proof of himself. But now his eyes slide 
around and „looking, without connection of thought, at his books and pictures‟ (284) he 
finds only „[g]reasy stains on the tablecloth where he‟d slopped his dinner over the edge 
of his plate, greasy rim round the inside of his hat where he‟d sweated. This was how 
one impressed oneself on the material‟ (285).  William‟s sense of being is not a subject 
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that can be proven, but a filmy actuality. Here Lassner‟s categorisation of „Dead 
Mabelle‟ as a comedy might finally stick, because William‟s cinematic suicide, his 
„means to the only fit gesture that he could have offered her‟ (285), does not affirm that 
he has lost everything and has no reason to go on but, instead, admits the realisation that 
this is exactly how that „business of living‟ (285) goes on. Mabelle‟s revelation, her 
cinematic insight into emotion, has made him see that he was looking at it wrong all 
along. 
It was in Mabelle‟s last film that William finally realises his problem has been 
looking for real feeling to act as proof of himself – it is in this film that William finally 
sees in Mabelle‟s absence his own: „He looked up with a wrench at his being; advancing 
enormously, grinning a little at the moment‟s intensity, Mabelle looked down. They 
encountered‟ (282). This is not, however, an encounter of feeling between  subjects or 
presence – it is instead the precise moment that William dissolves these realities – their 
„encounter‟ is not entirely blind, nor is it entirely seeing. Instead it is in this encounter 
between William, Mabelle and their emotion pictures, that the story reels, between 
focus and occlusion, insight and sensation, revelation and turning a blind eye:  
Gripping the bar tight, William leaned back to look up at the 
bright, broadening shaft from the engine-room directed forward 
above him. Along this, fluid with her personality, Mabelle (who 
was now nothing) streamed out from reel to screen, thence 
rebounded to his perception. It was all, her intense aliveness, some 
quivering motes which a hand put out with intention would be able 
to intercept. The picture changed focus, receded; Mabelle in better 
perspective, slipped from her horse and stood panting and 
listening; the horse turned its head, listened too… (282) 
Two lines later, the orchestra begins playing – but first, for a moment we have a filmic 
silence as „Dead Mabelle‟ suspends sound for a close up on these emotion pictures: 
„Their sympathy, their physical fineness, sent a quiver across the audience‟ (282). 
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Tremulous with the oscillation between the absence and presence of Mabelle, William, 
and indeed feeling, that „their‟ is dissolved and reformed to dissolve again in a 
quivering between the film and audience, mobilising a cinematic effect that contests the 
aesthetic blind-spot on which modernist writers were determining their own literary 
formations. Crucially, the film that does this is „Purblind‟. Not only blindness, purblind 
also refers to the condition of being almost blind, having imperfect perception or 
discernment.
108
 This imperfection can be the condition of both short-sightedness and 
long-sightedness. Without distinguishing between these, „Purblind‟ offers William an 
intimate proximity with Mabelle by introducing him to the impersonality of his self. 
Gathering to the eye, or „I‟, the cinematics of affect, this is what „Dead Mabelle‟ gives 
to William, and to readers of emotion pictures: the insight that emotion is not proof of 
themselves, but of the films we leave behind.  
The cinematic, in Bowen, then, is not only a matter of technique or subject, but 
instead a theorisation of the relationship between emotion, pictures and subjectivity – 
more particularly, these emotion pictures are theorised through the short story. If, as 
Friedberg argued, those writers in the 1920s who were developing film analysis and 
theory were cautious to ensure film didn‟t subsume its analysis into its own discourses, 
Bowen‟s „Dead Mabelle‟, written through a form that shares a space in literary criticism 
with cinema, interjects in the aesthetic distinctions being mobilised by this writing to 
discern art from movies, and authentic emotion from mere sensation. That the timing of 
„Dead Mabelle‟ is so precise demands we consider that Bowen‟s story had something to 
say about this speaking in the cinema. This observation might help us read back through 
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 The Oxford English Dictionary Online entry for „purblind‟ defines it as being almost blind, partially 
sighted, or having impaired vision generally. Forms of blindness indicated by purblind are: being 
completely blind, blind in one eye; myopic (short-sighted); hypermetropic (long-sighted, far-sighted). 
Through these senses it has also come to refer to having imperfect perception or discernment, lacking in 
or being incapable of understanding or foresight, being dim-witted or stupid. „Purblind‟ is also used with 
reference to Cupid, referring to the idea that love is blind. 
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Bowen‟s short story oeuvre to its initial sketches as, although imperfect, snapshots that 
begin to picture a filmy phenomenology that moves across Bowen‟s short fiction. In her 
first two stories, we see „the tight-glazed noses of the family ready to split loudly from 
their skins‟ in „Breakfast‟ (CS:15) and the way Lydia Broadbent is „at odds with herself 
again…baffled once again by the hostility of Lydia Broadbent, her derision, her 
unsparing scorn‟ in „The Return‟(CS:29). In „The Storm‟, Rupert‟s wife „had trailed 
away from him‟ (CS: 187). Indeed it is the filmy tissues of dresses in „Making 
Arrangements‟ that registers the texturalisations and contiguities that are also at work in 
this phenomenology, as I shall discuss in the next chapter. That the re-reading and re-
interpretation of Verbena‟s innocence is set in motion by a journalist holding, and 
turning over, her photograph in „Recent Photograph‟, suggests that the preoccupations 
of „Dead Mabelle‟ were, along with cinema and the short story, accelerating throughout 
the twenties. In the thirties, Billy and Daph of „Mrs Moysey‟ „ooze‟ round their 
grandmother‟s door, to be gorged on bonbons until their deterioration is registered in a 
„thin brown dribble‟ running down Daph‟s frock (CS: 345). In the late 1930s,  Mrs 
Simonez of „Flowers Will Do‟ realises she intrudes on her daughter‟s life; left alone, 
she sits till midnight, her eyes „jellies from weeping‟ (B:258).  And, in 1941, „Tears, 
Idle Tears‟ is preoccupied with films, such as Frederick‟s „gummy rush of tears‟ (CS: 
482) and the „celluloid bangle‟ (CS: 486) of the bespectacled girl. If „Dead Mabelle‟ 
made visible in the 1920s the way literary theory and analysis of cinema was occluding, 
and occluded by, its failure to acknowledge the cinema of emotion, then this feeling, I 
would suggest, spread itself across her oeuvre, revolving around emotion pictures.
  
Chapter Four 
Bowen’s Feeling for Feeling 
 
In his introduction to Pictures and Conversations, Spencer Curtis Brown, Bowen‟s 
literary executor and close friend, offers a moving account of how the book came into 
being. As a kind of autobiography, Pictures and Conversations was to offer Bowen‟s 
own intervention in Bowen scholarship. In the essay „People‟, which would have 
formed the third chapter, Bowen writes: „[w]hile appreciative of the honour done me 
and of the hard work involved, I have found some of them wildly off the mark. To the 
point of asking myself, if anybody must write a book about Elizabeth Bowen, why 
should not Elizabeth Bowen?‟1 Bowen died before finishing the book, and Curtis 
Brown, following Bowen‟s wishes, published the essays that should have been the first 
three chapters of the book, along with her notes about the book‟s structure and drafts of 
pieces she had been writing when she died. Of the fourth section, „Genesis‟, Curtis 
Brown had only Bowen‟s notes:  
IV: GENESIS (of a book, in particular of a novel or long short 
story), Remarks on the growth a book makes while being written. 
Remarks, also, on the subsequent growth a book makes when, 
having been published, and the cable having been cut between it 
and the author, it enters upon an unforeseeable life of its own.
2
 
What, precisely, the „genesis‟ of writing was, for Bowen, is not elaborated, but Curtis 
Brown was insistent that, „on the impetus which caused Elizabeth to start any one piece 
of writing, she was quite definite. It did not arise first from a conception of a character, 
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 Elizabeth Bowen, „People‟ in Pictures and Conversations (London: Allen Lane, 1975), pp.58-63, p.62.  
2
 „People‟, p. 63. 
168 
 
or of a conflict, or of a continuing plot, least of all from any urge to express an emotion 
or illustrate a theory. It was sparked off always from a memory of something seen‟.3  
That Bowen‟s work arose least of all from the urge to express an emotion 
registers not only the sense that Bowen‟s writing invites a reading of emotion, but also 
the anxieties this produces in her critics that a discussion of feeling will lead to 
speculation about the author‟s feeling and life, speculation that might occlude the 
writing itself. More importantly, it indicates in this the assumption that literary emotion 
is a matter of expression, specifically, the author‟s. Certainly this is an assumption 
Bowen herself seems to invite in „Origins‟, the first part of Pictures and Conversations, 
when she associates her interest in the short story with being Anglo-Irish. Defining the 
Irish and Anglo-Irish by a shared community of feeling conditioned by a country that 
Bowen would describe elsewhere as one „in which feeling naturally runs high‟4, she 
insists in „Origins‟ that „[b]ravado characterises much Irish, all Anglo-Irish writing: 
gloriously it is sublimated by Yeats. Nationally, we have an undertow to the showy‟.5 
Here a particular feeling is defined by the continuities and contours of Irish identity, 
culture, locality, literature, and even bodies. It is because of this feeling, Bowen writes, 
that „[w]e do not do badly with the short story, “that, in a spleen, unfolds both heaven 
and earth” – or should‟.6   
Bowen‟s definition of the short story comes, here, in a piece of writing utterly 
concerned with origins.  Rather than unfold the relationship between emotion and the 
short story, emotion and the bodies, spaces, and literatures that contain or express it, 
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 Spencer Curtis Brown, „Foreword‟ in Pictures and Conversations (London: Allen Lane, 1975), pp. vii-
xlii, p. xl.  
4
 Elizabeth Bowen, „Eire‟ in The Mulberry Tree, Ed. Hermione Lee (London: Virago Press Limited, 
1986), pp. 30-35, p. 33. 
5
 „Origins‟ in PaC, p. 23. 
6
 Ibid. 
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however, her definition challenges the logic that this would involve. That the line is a 
quotation from Shakespeare‟s A Midsummer Night‟s Dream implies an authoritative 
definition of the relationship between writing and emotion. Yet the line comes from Act 
I, Scene I, in which  Lysander, addressing „love‟, picks up on, and picks at, expectations 
that what is about to follow is a straight love story: „…for aught that I could ever 
read,/Could ever hear by tale or history,/The course of true love never did run smooth‟.7 
Rather than gloss the events that are about to unfold, Lysander‟s speech registers how 
love tangles, contorts and twists. The only thing that can be grasped about love, he goes 
on to imply, is its ungraspability. Although the senses „behold‟ love, they do not get a 
hold of it:  
Love is momentany as a sound, 
Swift as a shadow, short as any dream, 
Brief as the lightning in the collied night, 
That, in a spleen, unfolds both heaven and earth; 
And ere a man hath power to say “Behold!” 
The jaws of darkness do devour it up: 
So quick bright things come to confusion.
8
  
 
Love, then, is like lightning that, „in a spleen‟, unfolds both heaven and earth, only to 
enfold it on the brink of beholding. This unfolding and enfolding „spleen‟ is the 
intertexture of the anatomical organ and the belief that the spleen was the seat of either 
melancholy or mirth: to be „in a spleen‟ is to be in a fit of temper and passion.9 To 
conceive of love this way complicates this unfolding and enfolding even further, 
displacing it outside the body. Phenomenalised in the spleen‟s spatial uncertainty, love 
is in „a‟ spleen, the spleen that is the lover‟s love but not their spleen or anyone else‟s. 
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 Shakespeare, A Midsummer Night‟s Dream in The Riverside Shakespeare, ed. by H. Baker, A. Barton, 
F. Kermode, H. Levin, H. Smith., M. Edel (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1997), pp. 251-283, 
p. 258, lines 132-134. 
8
 Ibid, lines 143-149. „Momentany‟ is glossed by the Riverside Shakespeare as „momentary‟. 
9
 The Oxford English Dictionary Online entry for „spleen‟ observes that in the 16th century, the spleen 
was regarded as both „the seat of melancholy or morose feelings‟ (entry b) and „the seat of laughter or 
mirth‟ (entry c).  Entry 7 notes that when modified by „a‟, spleen refers to a „fit of temper; a passion‟. 
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In nobody, to be „in a spleen‟ is to be outside oneself even in the deepest feeling, out in 
space, unfolding heaven and earth.  
Bowen‟s definition of the short story puts it, and emotion, in the same place, and 
textures this with a strange and complex spatiality. Emotion is both displaced by the 
short story (the short story takes the place of „love‟) and the way the story works – it is 
how the story „unfolds both heaven and earth‟. That emotion involves a relationship 
between slippage and its actuation is, already, suggested in Lysander‟s speech that, 
addressing love in a chain of comparisons, does not lay out a logic of love but instead 
engulfs it.  It also puts love in a relation to itself, in which love is like itself: rather than 
unfold, love is folded into a spleen, which itself unfolds and is enfolded by its own 
movements. These movements, though „swift‟, are striking in their brevity: though 
„momentany‟, love locates eternity in its power to „behold‟ heaven. That love‟s 
temporality is contingent to what it discerns, and that this temporality and 
materialisation is itself a movement that implies the eternal and the fleeting is registered 
in the „quick‟ that comes to confusion – although quick emphasises the speed of this 
movement, what is „quick‟ is also what is endowed with life, what is living. „Quick‟, 
however, is also the „seat of feeling or emotion in a person, the core of a person‟s 
being‟.10 This materialises, or quickens, a contiguity of texture and time through 
emotion that not only directly addresses a logic of reading emotion and locating it, but 
confuses this. Bowen‟s intertexture with Shakespeare initiates a phenomenology of both 
emotion and the short story that, rather than express emotion, or illustrate a theory, 
challenges the logics these involve. Rather than define the short story, or emotion, 
Bowen‟s definition instead displaces these into each other, displacing a reading of 
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 Oxford English Dictionary Online, entry for „quick‟.  
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emotion from reading feeling in the text or the feeling of the text to the unsettling 
proposition that we should, instead, ask how the text feels.  
In her essay „Truth and Fiction‟, Bowen insists that in writing, time, and timing, 
is vital: „every story demands some particular sort of timing of its own…there must be 
an allotment, a proportioning of time: timing gives emphasis‟.11 In giving emphasis, 
Bowen suggests that time gives literature its intensity or force of feeling, its 
implication.
12
 Time‟s force of feeling is, itself, emphasised by her affirmation that time 
is what „pins the reader to that immense “now” which is so important if we are to have a 
feeling of concern and reality…we may move backwards and forwards but the present 
moment must grip and hold us‟.13 Those novels that „lose their hold on us‟ do so 
„because the author loses their grip on actuality…this causes the feeling of a slurring – 
the focus in which time should be has been lost, the thing is being mishandled‟.14 
Bowen‟s discussion here pins together time and feeling: the writer must handle time, 
time must grip the reader; but it also draws into this the implication of time, that time 
involves the text and reader, with time they enfold each other. The folding time 
actuates, its implication, draws out the texture of this feeling, how the feeling of time 
moves the text. This is apprehended in the intertexture Bowen initiates in „Notes on 
Writing a Novel‟, where she extends Flaubert‟s injunction that writing must interest:  
Flaubert‟s „il faut intéresser.‟ Stress on manner of telling: keep in 
mind, „I will a tale unfold‟. Interest of watching a dress that has been 
                                                     
11Elizabeth Bowen, „Truth and Fiction: Time‟ in Afterthoughts: Pieces about Writing (London: 
Longmans, 1962), pp. 135-143, p. 140. 
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 The Oxford English Dictionary Online defines „emphasis‟ as the „use of language in such a way as to 
imply more than is actually said; a meaning not inherent in the words used, but conveyed by implication‟ 
(entry 1), but also notes that „emphasis‟ is both the „[i]ntensity or force of feeling‟(entry 3) and the 
„[s]tress of voice laid on a word or phrase to indicate that it implies something more than, or different 
from, what it normally expresses‟ (entry 4). 
13
 „Truth and Fiction‟, p. 135. 
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 Ibid., p. 141. 
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well packed unpacked from a dress-box. Interest of watching silk 
handkerchief drawn from conjuror‟s watch.15 
„Interest‟, here, suggests the affect of watching: what interests is what initiates „a quality 
of mattering‟.16  
That what interests, for Bowen, is a contiguity of textures and time – silk drawn 
from a watch, a dress, well-packed, unpacked from a dress-box – corresponds with 
Renu Bora‟s observation that texture „expresses how temporality…is intrinsic to the 
meaning of materiality‟.17 In his discussion of texture, fetishism and Henry James, Bora 
observes that texture in James‟s The Ambassador emerges through distinctions between 
„rough‟ and „smooth‟, „rubbed‟ and „touched‟. These textures not only fascinate the 
character that perceives these textures, but, more importantly, this fascination registers 
the hypothesising – the interpretive event whose outcome has not yet been decided – 
that texture invites:  
Chad‟s physical beauty, his texture, makes Strether fascinated, 
curious in many ways, and also makes him ask the two 
questions: (1) How did he get that way? (2) What do I want to 
do with him? (Stare? Ponder? Or reach out to touch the exciting 
surface?) Importantly, the questions of material, textural history 
(How did he get so smooth? Rubbing? Polishing? Heating? 
Fucking? Defecating?), and the questions of the desire to act 
upon this material, are answered in overlapping, inextricable 
ways. That is, the things that one might like to do to Chad have 
a relationship with the things that one might imagine were done 
to “make” him, the things that changed him.18 
Texture collapses the temporal boundary between the activities that have made this 
texture and the actions this texture might make possible, but it also collapses 
distinctions between perceptual reception and hypothesizing. Texture complexifies the 
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 Elizabeth Bowen, „Notes on Writing a Novel‟ in MT, pp. 35 – 48, p. 36. 
16
 See OED Online, entry 8 for „interest‟. 
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 Renu Bora, „Outing Texture‟ in Novel Gazing: Queer Readings in Fiction, ed. by E. Kosofsky 
Sedgwick (London: Duke University Press, 1997), pp. 94-127, p. 96. 
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 Bora, p. 94.  
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temporal movements typically ascribed to active/reactive structures of the sensory and 
affective experience or phenomena of touching and feeling. Extending Bora‟s 
observations, Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick remarks:  
...I haven‟t perceived a texture until I‟ve instantaneously 
hypothesized whether the object I‟m perceiving was sedimented, 
extruded, laminated, granulated, polished, distressed, felted or 
fluffed up. Similarly, to perceive texture is to know or hypothesize 
whether a thing will be easy or hard, safe or dangerous to grasp, to 
stack, to fold, to shred, to climb on, to stretch, to slide, to soak…the 
sense of touch makes nonsense out of any dualistic understanding 
of agency and passivity; to touch is always already to reach out, to 
fondle, to heft, to tap, or to enfold, and always also to understand 
other people or natural forces as having effectually done so before 
oneself, if only in the making of the textured object.
19
 
Although the examples here emphasise tactility, Bora argues that „texture can be read as 
synonymous with materiality itself, inasmuch as I am arguing that a kind of inevitable 
tactility or human agency in performance or in labour, is crucial to any definition of 
what it means for something to occupy physical space‟.20  This discrimination, however, 
is one that hinges on how texture works on the borders of „touch and vision‟: as a 
problem „wrought with liminals‟, Bora observes that not only is texture „juxtaposed 
with other (spatial) topologies‟, but „textures will also leap forward from their other‟.21 
Texture, then, does not emerge only from materialities that point, reach out, or yield to 
touch, but also those that appear to preclude or repel it.   
Bora observes that „texture‟ has two senses, which he distinguishes as 
„TEXTURE‟, the „surface resonance or quality of an object or material…its qualities if 
touched, brushed, stroked or mapped, would yield certain properties and sensations that 
can usually be anticipated by looking‟, and „TEXXTURE‟, the „stuffness of material 
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 Bora, p. 101. 
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structure‟.22 Bora‟s distinction, here, does not differentiate between material‟s structure 
and surface, but instead discerns how in „texture‟, the sense of depth and surface, 
interiority and exteriority, are extended into each other and into the intertexture of 
touch; the scale of „TEXTURE/TEXXTURE‟ is, rather than wholly intrinsic to the object, 
textured by the relations and modes of perception to that object. These relations are 
determined by the intertextures of the TEXXTURES of the materials that touch. In asking 
us to „imagine how squeezing someone‟s, say, bicep, can register the various resistances 
of skin, fat, muscle, and bone‟23, we apprehend that these elasticities, affordances and 
resistances are not only felt by our touch, but are also felt, as textures, by those 
materials touched by us. The touch that enables these perceptions also feels its own 
materials, such as how the sensation of the thumb‟s phalanx against its tissue multiplies 
the surfaces and textures of the squeezing thumb.
24
 The sense of depth is, in this way, 
implied from texture: „[w]hen a surface…has certain properties, we often project these 
properties into its interior, and by this interior I mean  not just a cavity, invagination, 
fold, or centre, but the structure, consistency, or TEXXTURE of its inner matter that 
extends liminally, asymptotically, into the surface‟.25 Depth does not arrive from 
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 See Kosofsky Sedgwick‟s critique of Ann Cvetkovich‟s 1992 study Mixed Feelings: Feminism, Mass 
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texture, but is generated in the act of feeling; what we think of as depth is a sense of 
depth.
26
 
In her reading of Bora, Kosofsky Sedgwick observes that, regardless of whether 
a material „exemplifies‟ its texxture, or, by blocking or refusing information, „insists 
instead on the polarity between substance and surface‟, there is „no such thing as 
textural lack‟.27 Texture, then, does not inhere in some materials over others, nor does it 
adhere to only particular kinds of touch. Texture does not disappear with distance, or 
appear with proximity: while contiguity determines textures by encountering and 
moving between varying modes of perception, thus enabling differing theorisations, the 
spatiality of those contiguities may be as varied and mobile as the encounter permits. 
What this, finally, introduces to this discussion of texture, is another temporality. The 
temporal collapse texture registers, between what has happened and what might happen, 
also challenges a temporality of textural stasis or homogeneity – of movement: if there 
is no textural lack, then we are also, always, perceiving texture. The sensation of one 
texture sliding into, catching on or encountering being blocked by another texture 
implies feeling and time in movement, an effect that Bowen was acutely aware of when 
she noted that „[v]ariations in texture can be made to give the effect of variations in 
speed‟.28  
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These observations about texture help us to understand Bowen‟s figures of 
interest (watching the dress well-packed unpacked from a box, watching the silk drawn 
from a conjuror‟s watch) as exemplifying Bora‟s extension between TEXXTURE and 
TEXTURE. As figures, these might interest by initiating hypotheses about who has 
packed, why it is done well, how the veil came to be in the watch. These also indicate a 
juxtaposition of materials and textures between the dress and its box, or the silk being 
drawn from the watch. But the examples further figure a lack of tactility. These 
examples interest, involve and imply precisely because they do not allow touch. Not 
only are we „watching‟ these events unfold, but we are not given any information about 
the particularity of these materials: they do not invite an intimacy or closeness with 
these objects; they are utterly impersonal. The contiguity of these two examples is, 
itself, a juxtaposition of figurative materials that are closed to touch. Although the 
figure of the dress offers an openness to its own TEXXTURE by telling us it is „well-
packed‟, this openness not only reduces hypothesisation, but also normalises the 
relations of materials within it. The second example also blocks its TEXXTURE: by 
telling us only that the silk is „being drawn‟, the history of this structure is erased, it is 
magic. This is what unsettles. But that it is a conjuror‟s watch similarly normalises any 
unusual contacts here. In both examples, their contexts explain their contiguities, as if 
smoothing the texture of each figure; they are both „packed‟ with their meaning. Bora 
suggests that what is „packed‟ connects TEXXTURE and TEXTURE because „a specific‟ 
TEXTURE „is causally or structurally related to‟ a specific TEXXTURE .29 The texture, 
here, doesn‟t simply originate in its TEXXTURE, but also makes that TEXXTURE 
perceptible.  Bora notes that the „material world is saturated with labours, and there are 
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 Bora explores James‟ use of „packed‟ as being of interest because its „linkage to queer practice has 
been made obvious by the (slur?) “fudge packing” „, whereby „packed‟ functions to connect TEXTURE 
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many ways in which one can unspring or perceive this labour‟.30 The „packed‟ object 
then, is one whose texture is an interpretation of its texxture, an object whose texture 
may be unsprung.  
Bowen‟s figures of interest appear to accede to what Bora identifies as the 
„epistemological pressure that texture seems to beg‟31, recuperating, rather than 
mobilising, the kinds of uncertainty I have argued Bowen‟s stories suggest are at the 
heart of emotion. I want to suggest here, and through this chapter, however, that these 
examples complicate this promise of TEXXTURE. Rather than locate interest in the 
„packed‟ objects, as a meaning that can be then lifted out, unpacked, this promise is 
instead what has made them disinteresting. What interests is not that these textures are 
open to us, but that they are closed to each other - they materialise interest as a 
movement between textures that do not touch. Put alongside each other, these examples 
initiate a proximity that is discerned by the distance, the lack of contact, between them. 
It is this discontiguity that moves us to watch, that interests, and implicates us. The 
temporality of this intertexture with Flaubert materialises not in either image, but in the 
movement between these, the space that allows us to discern their textures, their 
differences, and affordances.
 32
 It is this spatiality, rather than the topology of these 
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textures, that initiates the „interest‟, the force of feeling that is textured by Bowen‟s 
intertexture with Flaubert. Interest works through the sensation of a promise that those 
textures, those surfaces, might offer or yield an interior, a TEXXTURE that might be lifted 
out, made accessible through epistemological pressure. It is this promise that is offered 
by the silk „being drawn‟ from the conjuror‟s watch, the dress „well-packed unpacked‟. 
Yet in these examples interest also maintains a temporal pull that corresponds across 
various interpretive possibilities that might be discerned; in this sense, what Bowen‟s 
intertextuality with Flaubert offers is a figuration of interest, and emotion, that 
phenomenalises it as a liminality between interpretations, yet that makes interpretation 
possible. Interest is registered as an interpretive event rather than the particular meaning 
yielded by that event.
33
  
The „interest‟ of Bowen‟s intertextuality with Flaubert has, throughout this 
discussion, implied emotion – that there is an „intuition that a particular intimacy seems 
to subsist between textures and emotions‟34 – is confirmed by Kosofsky Sedgwick, who 
argues that if these „seem to belong together it is not because they share a particular 
delicacy of scale, such as would necessarily call for “close reading” or “thick 
description”. What they have in common is that at whatever scale they are attended to, 
both are irreducibly phenomenological‟.35 Not only does Bowen‟s literary return to 
                                                                                                                                                           
touching that he argues is most moving:  „Why do these objects move and disturb us so much? These 
objects not only congeal time but also conceal processes of touch…these objects preserved and exhibited 
behind glass-panels, cannot be handled‟ (p. 236). For Das, this leads to the conclusion that these objects 
„are the site of actual touch, we can gain access to the intimate encounter between people, places, objects 
and the emotions such meetings generate‟ (p. 237). For this reason Das argues that what moves us is the 
feeling „unsprung‟ from these objects. My arguments here disagree with this – rather than read „touch‟ as 
residing in a particular site or object to be „unsprung‟, I am interested in how it is the „unspringing‟ 
without resolution that is affecting. 
33
 This is one of the contributions Kosofsky Sedgwick‟s Touching Feeling makes not only to the study of 
emotion but to thinking about textual practice, through her engagement with Silvan Tomkins: affect 
involves movements along a continuum of interest (p. 97). In particular Tomkins situates interest as one 
„end of the shame-interest continuum‟. See also my discussion of „disgust‟ in Chapter One. 
34
 Kosofsky Sedgwick, p. 17. 
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 Ibid., p. 21. 
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Flaubert identify „interest‟ in place of „emotion‟, but, in doing so, it exemplifies how the 
stasis that the singularity of interest might appear to identify is destabilised; interest 
works through a slippage, rather than security, of its emotion. This phenomenology of 
interest mobilises emotion as an interpretive event, rather than an epistemological 
certainty. Bowen‟s return to Flaubert may remind us to recall that „[s]tress on manner of 
telling: keep in mind, “I will a tale unfold” ‟, but while her return to Flaubert promises 
to unfold interest, her very manner of telling, of producing interest‟s texture, makes it, 
and emotion, at its most singular and identifiable, a  conjuror‟s „reveal‟.  
It is precisely this play of texture and epistemic pressure that textures and times 
the text of Bowen‟s short story, „Unwelcome Idea‟, in which two women ride a Dublin 
tram.
36
 Miss Kevin and Mrs Kearney are introduced through the similarities and 
distinctions of their textures: „They both have high, fresh, pink colouring; Mrs Kearney 
could do with a little less weight and Miss Kevin could do with a little more‟ (374). Not 
only are they textured – brought out from the background into view – by their 
colouring, but their weight speculates the density, volume, and texture of their 
materiality, how they occupy physical space. Even the quality of their friendship is 
anticipated with a sense of their materiality, their relation to each other: „…they are 
enthusiastic, not close friends but as close as they are ever likely to be‟ (574). It is the 
textures of their encounter that times, and places, the story. Miss Kevin, with a „virgin 
detachment‟, has „kept thumbing her sales parcels, and now…cannot resist undoing one. 
„Listen‟, she says, „isn‟t this a pretty delaine?‟ (575). Feeling the fabric her undoing 
releases, Miss Kevin‟s touch locates the story: „She runs the end of a fold between her 
finger and thumb. „It drapes sweetly. I‟ve enough for a dress and a bolero. It‟s French: 
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 „Unwelcome Idea‟ (CS, pp. 573-577) first appeared in New Statesman Issue 20 (10 Aug. 1940), 
pp.133–34. It was collected a year later in Look at all those Roses. 
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they say we won‟t get any more now‟ (575). In fingering the fabric, Miss Kevin not 
only fingers the context for the story – the war – but, more importantly puts a finger on 
the story‟s distance from, rather than proximity to, the war. What the war impresses on 
Miss Kevin and Mrs Kearney, after all, is that they won‟t get French delaine, nor „that 
Coty scent‟ anymore (575). That Miss Kevin and Mrs Kearney‟s preoccupations don‟t 
apprehend the feeling of war is given a final touch when Miss Kevin, getting off the 
tram, exchanges „bye-byes‟ with Mrs Kearney:  
…the tram clears the crowd and moves down Dun Laoghaire 
Street, between high flights of steps, lace curtains, gardens with 
round beds. „Bye-bye to you,‟ said Miss Kevin. „Happy days to us 
all.‟  
Mrs Kearney, near the top of the stairs, is preparing to bite on the 
magazine. „Go on!‟ she says. „I‟ll be seeing you before then.‟ (577) 
 
The readers of New Statesman, the magazine that published „Unwelcome Idea‟ in 
August of 1940, may have felt, like Mrs Kearney, a certain bite. The cheery conclusion, 
just too tender, might have probed the sore-spot of Britain‟s absent men, undermining 
rather than affirming Miss Kevin‟s stoicism, while Mrs Kearney‟s bite on the magazine 
is uncomfortably loaded. With France so recently occupied, the story registers a 
violently innocuous intersection of national sentiments that its reader may have chewed 
over that summer, such as being „bullet in mouth‟, „biting the bullet‟, „gritting one‟s 
teeth‟, and things „blowing up in your face‟.  
„Unwelcome Idea‟ suggests a national character apprehensive about how, or 
what to feel. That the story, and its readers, were not only preoccupied by threats of 
occupation and unsure how to handle it, is woven into the dialogue: „„Wasn‟t it you said 
we had to keep off the roads?‟ „That‟s in the event of invasion, Mrs Kearney. In the 
event of not it‟s correct to evacuate.‟ (576). Yet these apprehensions also form the very 
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fabric of the narrative structure.  Opening with a visual sweep, the narrator, like a search 
light, pans the landscape and villas of Dublin bay, observing that „in the distance, 
floating across the bay, buildings glitter out of the heat-haze on the neck to Howth‟ 
(573). The scale of what the story is able to comprehend is amplified by the volume of 
detail it offers, from the „the whole bay open‟ to the „low-lying villas…fitted between 
earlier terraces‟ (573). There is nothing the story can‟t apprehend, picking out even that 
„an inner door left open lets you see a flash of sea through a house‟ (573). Sharpening 
with a telescopic focus from the „point‟ at which „you see the whole bay open‟ into and 
along the tram that „slides to stops for its not many passengers‟ (573), the text searches 
out the tiniest of details: the „[h]ousewives with burnt bare arms‟ (573), the „[f]orgotten 
Protestant ladies…squeezed between the kerb and the shops‟ (573), the „file of booted 
children‟ with „a nun at the head like a needle‟ (574), and children that „by themselves 
curl their toes in their plimsoles‟ (574).  This topographical scrutiny goes on for two 
pages, and even when it focuses on the meeting of Miss Kevin and Mrs Kearney, its 
clarity of focus, the precise textures of their encounter, is maintained:  
By half-past eleven this morning one tram to Dalkey is not 
far on its way. All the time it approaches the Ballsbridge stop Mrs 
Kearney looks undecided, but when it does pull up she steps aboard 
because she has seen no bus. In a slither of rather ungirt parcels, 
including a dress-box, with a magazine held firmly between her 
teeth, she clutches her way up the stairs to the top. She settles herself 
on a velvet seat: she is hot…..Mrs Kearney has finished wedging her 
parcels between her hip and the side of the tram and is intending to 
look at her magazine when she stares hard ahead and shows interest 
in someone‟s back. She moves herself and everything three seats up, 
leans forward and gives a poke at the back. „Isn‟t that you?‟ she 
says.
 
 
Miss Kevin jumps around so wholeheartedly that the brims 
of the two hats almost clash. „Why, for goodness‟ sake!...Are you on 
the tram?‟ (574) 
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With a resolution so attuned that it not only picks up the minutiae of the moment, but 
also the very details that belie the characters‟ interiority, the story, having secured these, 
turns its focus to the movements of Dublin‟s population, their uncertainties of action 
now explained by the apprehensions with which we, as readers, have been put in touch. 
Less than a month after the story was published the Blitz would begin, and after this it 
would be impossible to read „Unwelcome Idea‟ without being seared by the relative 
stability and security of its characters, and the divisiveness about Irish neutrality it 
touches. By the time a reader might pick it up in Look at all those Roses, published by 
Gollancz in 1941, Mrs Kearney‟s ability to declare that „this war‟s getting very 
monotonous‟ (576) could, itself, be explosive.    
„Unwelcome Idea‟ registers a twinning of the visual with surveillance in an 
atmosphere where security is always doubled with suspicion. The tone of orientation 
offered by the omniscient narrator echoes that of a voice-over, lending the story the 
cinematic effect of a war effort news reel, a medium the British Film Institute notes 
„found its voice‟ during World War II, „communicating vital news mixed with 
propagandist uplift‟.37  But the war‟s presence is off-scene, materializing Bowen‟s 
observation that news reels in Ireland „gives one the feeling of an invented world – 
one may watch social functions (not connected with war effort), trotting-races in the 
sunny Dominions…No film drama featuring or hinging on the present war (or even, I 
understand, the 1914 war) may be shown‟.38 Resonating with the literary, propagandic, 
and ethnographic promises of the visual, „Unwelcome Idea‟ not only affirms Laura 
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 British Film Institute „Newsreels‟ http://www.screenonline.org.uk/film/id/476463/index.html (last 
accessed July 17th, 2010).  
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 „Eire‟ in MT, p. 33. 
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Marcus‟ argument that cinema and war are the „twin technologies of modernity‟39, but 
points forward to Bowen‟s speculation, in 1945, that „[t]he cinema, cinema-going, has 
no doubt built up in novelists a great authoritarianism‟.40 The cinematic techniques of 
„Unwelcome Idea‟ exploit the powerful effects of seeing and being seen, effects 
Bowen noted, after the war, when she wrote that narration  
must…involve very careful, considered division of the characters 
…in the seeing and the seen. Certain characters gain in importance 
and magnetism by being only seen: this makes them more romantic, 
fatal-seeming, sinister. In fact, no character in which these qualities 
are, for the plot, essential should be allowed to enter the seeing 
class.
41
  
The story „sees‟ Mrs Kearney and Miss Kevin of Dublin bay, spotlighting a population 
whose neutral status presented an uncertainty for Britain, as if locating and 
neutralising the anxieties that permeated the atmosphere of Britain in the summer of 
1940, by relocating these in Dublin‟s inhabitants.  And while a British reader might 
have recognised in themselves Miss Kevin‟s frustration that „with the instructions 
changing so quickly it‟s better to take no notice‟ (575), or Mrs Kearney‟s accusations 
that the A.R.P. „stopped the Horse Show‟ (576), this unsettling or unwelcome idea 
seems contained by the insight that these sentiments are located in, and originate from, 
the very lack of insight Mrs Kearney and Miss Kevin have about the war.  
„Unwelcome Idea‟ puts into practice Bowen‟s insistence that good writing 
should be that in which, like a good film, „movement, angle and distance have all 
worked towards one thing – the fullest possible realization of the director‟s idea, the 
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completest possible surrounding of the subject‟.42 But in doing so it realises how the 
cinematic twins documentary intimacy with invasion. In her preface to the Demon 
Lover and Other Stories, Bowen observes the filmic quality of her war-time stories: 
these have „made for the particular, spot-lighting‟.43 In „Unwelcome Idea‟ this spot-light 
is turned on an Irish neutrality that Bowen, in her essay „Eire‟, describes as 
„inflammatory‟ to a Britain with „not much idle angry feeling to spare‟.44 As an excerpt 
from Bowen‟s reports on Irish neutrality for the Ministry of Information „Eire‟ very 
likely shares its observations with those of „Unwelcome Idea‟.45 Rather than address 
only the Ministry of Information, however, „Unwelcome Idea‟ addresses Britain. As, 
perhaps, a means of defusing the home-front‟s perception of Ireland as „passively 
hostile and in some senses rather inhuman‟46, „Unwelcome Idea‟ initiates an 
illumination, both on the home-front and in Ireland, of this perception of a „national 
childishness, a lack of grasp on the general scheme of the world‟.47 Yet, in making these 
„comprehensively understood‟48, the story can‟t avoid doubling illumination with a 
feeling of speculation, and suspicion. Indeed this might be one way of understanding the 
disaffection Bowen‟s work for England‟s Ministry of Information has elicited from 
some critics when placing her, as discussed in Chapter One. That Bowen‟s war stories 
register uneasiness, however, is not merely an after-effect felt by critics contending with 
her personal and national dislocations.  The story itself mobilises, in its very 
comprehensiveness, a series of complex contiguities that suggest a propagandic case 
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study that fingers the „unwelcome idea‟ of Irish neutrality, and, through this, provides a 
way to articulate the „unwelcome ideas‟ of disillusionment and disagreement that might 
have circulated amongst the British public. The danger that such a sympathy might 
register a community of feeling, suggesting an enemy within, however, seems to be 
neutralised by the way those sentiments are aligned with a lack of proximity to the war, 
expelling sentiments that might undermine the war effort into the Dublin bay whose 
neutrality is brought home to Britain.  
„Unwelcome Idea‟ exemplifies, then, the cultural politics of feeling that Sara 
Ahmed argues work to delineate individual and collective bodies, delineations that 
involve complex „histories of articulation‟.49 In her discussion of a British National 
Front poster, Ahmed points out that the „you‟ these posters name works to 
simultaneously identify a national body, a „we‟, to which „you‟ belongs, that possesses 
certain feelings, and in doing so, discerns an „other‟ body that is „the „source‟ of our 
feelings. For Ahmed, contact with these objects, in the form of things or other bodies, 
generates feeling, and this feeling cannot be separated from emotion. The point, for 
Ahmed, is that emotions are not what emerge from an interiority, but rather are what 
„create the very effect of the surfaces and boundaries that allow us to distinguish an 
inside and an outside in the first place‟.50 The feeling of a „you‟ and „we‟ does not 
secure the location of emotions, but instead locates how emotion discerns between 
objects, how „it is through emotions that surfaces or boundaries are made; the „I‟ and 
the „we‟ are shaped by, and even take the shape of, contact with others‟.51 In her 
discussion of „hate‟, Ahmed argues that it is the relations between figures that generates  
movement, and this movement „produces a differentiation between „us‟ and „them‟, 
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whereby „they‟ are constituted as the cause of „our‟ feeling of hate‟52. Crucially, what 
mobilises the affects she reads is precisely their failure „to be located in a given object 
or figure‟.53  
Although Ahmed‟s reading is particularly interested in what she discerns as 
„hate‟ texts, her observations are helpful in apprehending the anxious effects of 
Bowen‟s textural distinctions between the seen and not seen, the touched and not 
touched, in „Unwelcome Idea‟. These distinctions thicken into the kinds of containment 
effects Ahmed describes through the texts‟ narration, which, as if seeing from above, is 
not only able to discern the topographical contexts that bring Miss Kevin and Mrs 
Kearney into contact with each other, but to ascribe to these the very order or 
orientation, the comprehension, that the characters lack. The sheer volume of detail, the 
specificity of the distinctions, the precision of „ozone smells‟ (573), even the 
pronouncement that „the modern will sag, chip, fade‟ (573), all ring with the tactics 
Ahmed observes of the propagandic, and this is materialised in the story‟s address, 
throughout, to an implicit „you‟. The implicitness of the story‟s addressee, however, is 
punctuated, twice, near the beginning of the story: it is you that can „see the whole bay 
open‟ (573) and you that is able to „see a flash of sea through a house‟ (573). These 
moments suggest a capacity to penetrate what is being observed, to open it and peer into 
or behind the figures that texture the scene. That these generate their effects through an 
ability to move into the object, or comprehend it in its entirety, without being affected 
by it renders this „you‟ with an impermeability. In this sense the „you‟ has the capacity 
to see, penetrate, examine, and comprehend without being contaminated by its 
proximity to what it touches. Texture emerges here at the level of the topographical. But 
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the agency of these textural perceptions is involuted: „you see the whole bay open‟ 
because you are, then, „at a point‟, and „you see a flash of sea through a house‟ because 
„an inner door left open lets you‟ (573). The penetration that has been achieved is not 
only permitted by the objects themselves, but invited. While appearing to secure the 
distinction between „you‟ and „Dublin bay‟ the dependence of the explicit „you‟ on the 
topologies perceived instead registers that, as Renu Bora observes, „textures leap 
forward from their other‟.54  This, for Ahmed, exemplifies the deconstructions of 
security, generating the affects through which we might locate in Bowen‟s text an 
ontology of insecurity.
55
 Textured by a language of invasion, excess and encroachment, 
such an ontology „speaks the language of “floods” and “swamps”, of being invaded by 
inappropriate others‟.56 
Certainly these are the textures at work in „Unwelcome Idea‟, where the story‟s 
divisions between the seeing and the seen, the touched and not touched by war, an „us‟ 
and „them‟, lose distinction at the story‟s moments of greatest concentration: Mrs 
Kearney is first „a slither‟ (574) and later „flutters‟ (575); an „immense glaring reflection 
floods‟ (573); the shopping centre „congests‟ (573); the tram „slides‟ (573). What 
naturalises boundaries, distinctions, and containments, strains against these, and is 
undone: dresses „stick close to their backs‟ (574), parcels are „bursting out from their 
string‟ (574), and the heels of evening slippers „protrude from a gap at the end of the 
dress box‟ (577). Even the striking observation that the tram driver, twice, „smites his 
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bell‟ (574, 577), loses distinction through its etymological echo of „smear‟.57 And, 
whether Miss Kevin and Mrs Kearney‟s exchange, at the end, is overly sentimental or 
distasteful, its inadequacy is almost overwhelmingly tacky. While this can‟t help but 
exemplify the Irish „lack of grasp‟ on the war, it also sticks, uncomfortably, in the throat 
of a Britain that might recognise these as expressions of its own, secret, sentiments. 
These slithers, flutters, and smears, the tackiness of „Unwelcome Idea‟ extends the 
filmy phenomenologies of Bowen‟s emotion pictures, discussed in the previous chapter, 
and demand an attention to the relationship between emotion and the textures of her 
short stories.  
For Bowen, the problem of British and Irish relations was a matter of feeling: 
„Eire feels as strongly, one might say as religiously, about her neutrality as Britain feels 
about her part in the war‟.58 What Bowen‟s report recommends, if these relations are to 
„stand, as they must stand, this present strain‟, is „[t]ime and tact, on which there are 
many demands already‟.59 „Tact‟ reiterates the ontology of insecurity that Ahmed 
describes. This sensitivity to touch is also a keen discrimination of feeling and 
sensitivity to the appropriate, correct, and proper: to have tact, to use tact, suggests the 
tactics that feelings require.  In this sense Bowen‟s tact extends what Ahmed observes 
of the affects of security to thinking about emotion itself. As Zoltán Kövecses‟ study of 
metaphors of emotion demonstrates, not only do our metaphors for emotion deploy 
figures of containment, but these containments fail.
60
 While discourses about emotion 
have tended to either naturalise or debate the location of emotion „inside‟ or „outside‟ 
the topologies that these containers (whether corporeal, material or object) imply, 
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Ahmed‟s discussion helps us to observe that these figurative breaches do not affirm 
these boundaries, but, rather, affirm that emotion materialises these boundaries. I will 
go on to suggest that there is an important distinction to be made between the texts 
Ahmed analyses and Bowen‟s, and that this distinction turns around what Bowen‟s texts 
do with their textures. But I want to note here that, while different emotions may 
mobilise different materialisations of these boundaries – thickening them, turning them 
into an object, thinning them to sheer proximity, dissolving, opening, and enveloping 
them even – the work of emotion is the discernment that phenomenalises these 
boundaries. „Unwelcome Idea‟, then, not only indexes the importance of textures in 
Bowen‟s work, but turns our attention to the way those textures feel.  
These observations help us to develop Phyllis Lassner‟s treatment of Bowen‟s 
short fiction as an „investigation into the boundaries between past and present and 
fiction and history pos[ing] literary, social, ideological, and epistemological questions‟61 
by attending to the way the textures of her short fiction suggests a peculiar sensitivity to 
the affects of the topographies that her stories engage with. Rather than simply provide 
a lens through which to see or comprehend answers to such questions, these textures 
complicate the very notion of insight emotion might offer. This in turn suggests we 
reconsider some of the critical interest those topographies have invited. I have observed 
the concentration of interest Bowen‟s critics have had on her novels, leaving her stories 
comparatively understudied. But of the seventy nine stories widely available to critics 
through the Collected Stories (a number recently supplemented by Allen Hepburn‟s 
2008 The Bazaar and Other Stories, an edited collection of previously uncollected and 
unpublished work, including some unfinished stories) very little attention has been paid 
to those written before the war. Of the sixteen or so grouped as the „War Years‟ in the 
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Collected Stories, those that have been spot-lit by Bowen scholarship tend to be from 
The Demon Lover and Other Stories, published by Jonathan Cape in 1945. What has 
drawn interest tends to be described by Bowen‟s critics as the sense that these stories 
attest to the peculiarities and singularities of the Second World War, capturing, as 
Bowen, in her preface to The Demon Lover collection wrote, the „strange growths‟ it 
raised.
62
 The particularity of these „strange growths‟ lies in their attention to the 
sensations of dislocation and dissolution – they exemplify the way the war affected 
boundaries of space, time, and subjectivity. In her 1977 biography of Bowen, Victoria 
Glendenning insists that although Bowen‟s novel The Heat of the Day affirms that the 
„war years were Elizabeth‟s noon, and The Heat of the Day the book that came out of 
it‟63, it was in the war stories that Bowen learned to handle this material, and develop 
her grasp of the war‟s dissolving effects. In these, Glendenning contends, Bowen‟s 
emphasis on the relationship between changes in subjectivity, space and time merged 
the topologies of things, people and places, collapsing the distinctions that had 
determined life before the war: 
Psychologically, one of the results of the war for Elizabeth was the 
breaking down of boundaries and barriers. „It seems to me that 
during the war in England the overcharged subconsciousnesses of 
everybody overflowed and merged.‟ „Life with the lid on‟ was over 
for good…It happened socially, as it did for all previously sheltered 
people, in a rather obvious way: in her neighbourhood, and in her 
work at the warden‟s post and on patrols, for example, she was 
brought into close contact with people she would not normally have 
become intimate with….But it goes further than this. She felt the 
„thinning of the membrane between the this and the that‟….The 
„wall between the living and the dead thinned‟, as did the wall 
between the living and the living…Nearly all the short stories she 
wrote during the war have this element….the barriers of time and 
reality break down.
64
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It is this susceptibility to how things „break down‟, the disintegration of barriers of time, 
space, subjectivity – the boundaries that differentiate the real from unreal – that places, 
for Shafquat Towheed, the emergence of Bowen‟s aesthetics of displacement and 
dislocation as both late modernist and anticipating postmodern spatiality.
65
 In his study, 
Towheed picks up the invitation extended by Bowen to critics interested in the unique 
affects of her writing when she wrote „Origins‟, the first chapter of her unfinished 
autobiography:  
Few People questioning me about my novels, or my short stories, 
show curiosity as to the places in them. Thesis-writers, interviewers 
or individuals I encounter at parties all, but all, stick to the same 
track, which by-passes locality. On the subject of my symbology, if 
any, or psychology (whether my own or my characters‟), I have 
occasionally been run ragged; but as to the where of my stories, its 
importance in them and for me, and the reasons for that, a negative 
apathy persists….Failing to throw a collective light on my art, my 
places tend to be thought of as its accessories, engaging enough to 
read of but not „meaningful‟. Wherefore, Bowen topography has 
been untouched by research. Should anyone give it a thought after I 
am dead, that will be too late. To it, only I hold the key.
66
 
 
Bowen suggested that critics had failed to research the „Bowen topography‟ because it, 
like she, does not locate easily:  „The Bowen terrain cannot be demarcated on any 
existing map; it is unspecific‟.67  For Shafquat Towheed, it is the „unspecific‟ that has 
gained its place in the revival of critical interest in Bowen: „Bowen‟s critics have, 
almost without exception, noted the centrality of place and its discontent, displacement, 
in her fiction‟.68 But for Towheed, this emphasis on displacement has also displaced the 
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textures and surfaces that make up Bowen‟s topographies – the complexities of how her 
fiction handles space, and, in particular, the spatialities of a London whose bombing had 
„blasted into the fabric of a city‟69:  
While academic criticism has increasingly noted the importance 
of specific physical locations and their imaginative and 
psychological implications in Bowen‟s writing, relatively little 
attention has been paid to the complexities of space – physical, 
temporal, acoustic, emotional, social, mental and creative, to 
name but a few – recursively opened up and closed down in her 
fiction, a fiction that tends at once to both claustrophobia and 
agoraphobia, to both stasis and constant flux.
70
 
 
For Towheed, it is Bowen‟s feel for the complexities of space that allows her 
stories to register the psycho-geographies formed by these intersections, and makes 
Bowen‟s war-time stories a compelling case study for how war‟s landscapes stimulated 
the „burgeoning clinical interest in the psychopathology of space and its discontents‟.71 
Citing the emergence of air-raid phobia, Towheed observes that clinicians at the time 
pathologised the phobia as an irrational condition of „overanxious superstitious 
people‟.72  Yet, argues Towheed, Tom Harrison‟s readings of the Mass-Observation 
records show that the „spatial dislocation of Londoners living through the Blitz, and the 
fear, anxiety, or even feelings of euphoria that the destruction of space produced, was 
not therefore confined…it was ubiquitous‟.73 Towheed argues that it is precisely this 
ubiquity of war-time feeling, provoked by changes in London‟s spatialities, that is 
mapped by, and can be mapped in, Bowen‟s stories.  
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As representations of the changes to the fabric of London, Bowen‟s Demon 
Lover stories also represent the emotional effects of these changes for London‟s 
inhabitants. Thus the stories, Towheed argues, locate „space[s] created (emptied or filled 
in) by an „explosion‟ (past, current or anticipated) of one sort or another‟.74  The stories 
are, like wartime London and its inhabitants, torn and blasted, and, as the inhabitable 
spaces of London diminish, so too do the boundaries between its people, accounting for 
the claustrophobic affects that surface in the wake of Bowen‟s Blitz stories: „…space – 
physical, emotional and imaginative, and not just elbow room in a crowded restaurant – 
is at a premium….[c]lose proximity in wartime London extended beyond the physical – 
the cheek-by-jowl seating in restaurants, the attempt to keep three fresh eggs unbroken – 
and into the emotional and the imaginative‟.75  
In Towheed‟s account of the spatiality of the Demon Lover stories, these acquire 
a texture that maps London‟s changing fabric. Just as Bowen‟s characters, „[c]aught 
between the conflicting terrors of claustrophobia and agoraphobia, of grinding 
proximity and desolate expansiveness…negotiate uncharted spaces‟76 so too, Towheed 
suggests, do they produce the feelings that accompany these.  The war‟s reworking of 
London‟s spaces, its alterations to the fabric of the city, effected a texture that, in turn, 
textures the bodies that inhabit it – it is this interplay between old and new spaces, 
displacements, and indeed the continued presence of absent spaces that haunts Bowen‟s 
characters:  
Nowhere is this more apparent than in her wartime stories collected 
in The Demon Lover and Other Stories, for at no time was the 
spatial experience of millions of fellow Londoners more acutely 
felt and their expectations more disruptively challenged…Bowen‟s 
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wartime fictional characters, perpetually in transit and forever 
forced to engage with material objects in the world around them, 
atavistically betray the spatial origins of both language and 
identity; but, more importantly, they also display the extent to 
which individuals have invariably defined themselves in relation to 
the constantly changing explosive spaces, filled as well as cleared, 
that they have had to negotiate, occupy, and even inhabit.
77
 
 
By tracing how the war affected the topologies of war-torn spaces and indeed subjects, 
Towheed‟s analysis places Bowen amongst those writers whose aesthetic registers the 
war‟s alterations to feeling. In altering spatialities, the war alters the very fabric and 
textures of people‟s emotional lives and indeed, of their selves. What Towheed tracks in 
Bowen‟s Demon Lover stories is the „flux in the demarcation of space, its causes, and 
consequences, and above all, its effect on human temperament‟.78  
Such an alteration might be pointed to in Bowen‟s „A Love Story: 1939‟79, in 
which the lives of three „couples‟ (Mrs Massey and her daughter Teresa; the Perry-
Duntons, and lovers Frank and Linda) become intertwined at a hotel in Ireland. As 
Phyllis Lassner remarks, the characters „struggle desperately to remain intact at the 
moment history proves the futility of their efforts‟.80 Finding themselves all, in their 
own ways, displaced from their homes to be placed in the hotel by the war, the story is 
charged with the „lack of an individuality…that forms the greatest danger to Bowen‟s 
characters‟.81  Observing that the characters become so intermingled it is difficult to tell 
their stories apart, Lassner considers the story a mourning of „individual 
psychology…[and how] in its violation of national and cultural boundaries World War 
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II threatened the loss of individual and cultural freedoms‟.82 Towheed‟s discussion of 
the spatialities of war might be understood as an extension of Lassner‟s remarks that 
suggests the story figures not only the war‟s „lack of individualisation‟ but also the 
ways it alters topographies and spatialities, fabricating subjectivity in new ways.  
This may be registered in the narrative thread supplied by Mrs Massey, who, in 
an instance of the war‟s displacements, finds herself in the company of Mr Perry-
Dunton. Perry-Dunton is in the hotel because the war has stopped him and his wife from 
returning to England from their honeymoon, while for Mrs Massey the war has taken 
her lover, and this loss has driven her out of her home and into the hotel lounge. 
Throughout the story, Mrs Massey‟s disorientation is figured as a loss of bodily and 
spatial certainty: on arriving at the hotel lounge her daughter „steered her mother round 
the screen to the fire‟ (497), Mrs Massey‟s „manner was swaggering‟ (498), and she 
doesn‟t „know myself what I‟ll do, from minute to minute‟ (498). Her sense of where 
she is becomes a matter of where her lover isn‟t, and this dislocation is textured by the 
materials that make up that space: „Mrs Massey looked angrily round the lounge and 
said: “They‟ve changed the chairs round, since.” She pointed to an empty space on the 
carpet and said: “That was where he sat…There isn‟t even his chair” (498). The war‟s 
effects on Mrs Massey‟s ability to map and navigate her topographies, its 
anesthetisation of feeling, and the boundaries of feeling, is exemplified in her 
drunkenness, which registers not only a disorientation of bodily and social relations, but 
a transgression of these:  
Mrs Massey was not equal to the walk back…There had been talk, 
before they left…of telephoning to the village for a car. Mrs Massey 
would not brook the idea. „I won‟t give trouble,‟ she said. „There‟s 
trouble enough already.‟ Magnificent with protest, she now stood 
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trembling and talking loudly and sweeping her hair back at the foot 
of the stairs. „I should never have come,‟ she said. „But how could I 
stay where I was? We‟ll go home now; we‟ll just go quietly home – 
Are you gummed there, Teresa?...‟ Mrs Massey said: „I don‟t know 
what you all think.‟…Majestic and dazed between her escort, Mrs 
Massey stumbled along in a shackled way. (505-506) 
So affected is she that, rather than get into the car belonging to the man who has offered 
to drive her and her daughter home, she „passed quietly into the open lock-up next door‟ 
and gets into Clifford Perry-Dunton‟s car. Intoxicated, Mrs Massey registers no 
violation of social manners or propriety. Informed by Clifford, who has only been in the 
car to look for his wife‟s gloves, that she is in the wrong car, she „settled herself by him 
contentedly. “There‟s my daughter to come,” she said, “and a man from the hotel. Just 
wait, now, and they‟ll show you the way” ‟(506). Returning home, however, even the 
familiarity of her own fire is disorienting: „Mrs Massey and Clifford…now sat in two 
armchairs opposite the fire. “I don‟t understand,” she said. “How did we come in your 
car?” (509) Throughout the story Mrs Massey‟s loss has been textured by a spatiality of 
disorientation. The affect of this unexpected, and war-wrought proximity, however, 
accumulates throughout the story, altering, in the wake of disorientation, not only Mrs 
Massey‟s feeling, but the very texture of her being. To answer Mrs Massey‟s question, 
Clifford draws out his wife‟s gloves from his pocket to explain: „Looking intently at the 
pussy gloves, Mrs Massey‟s eyes for the first time filled with tears. The access of some 
new feeling, a feeling without context, resculptured her face‟ (510).  
Mrs Massey‟s „new face‟ (510) figures the intersections between texture and 
spatiality that Towheed and Ahmed‟s arguments suggest. Here the displacements of 
war, its clearing out and filling of space, is registered not only in the feeling that results 
from Mrs Massey‟s proximity to Clifford – a proximity only made possible because of 
the time, and timing of the war – but in how the very topography of Mrs Massey‟s face 
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bears witness to the war‟s effects. One of the observations Towheed makes about 
Bowen‟s war-time spaces is that these represent space not only cleared by war, but 
filled by it. Mrs Massey‟s body is „filled‟ and „accessed‟: it is as if it bears the same 
fragility, the same impressions of the war, as the material of London. Throughout his 
analysis, emotion, for Towheed, is a response to the war, its altered spatialities, and the 
intersections of spatiality with materiality. Space alters the materials, fabrics and 
textures of landscape, building, object and body; these alterations fabricate subjectivity. 
Most importantly, the spatial alterations that mobilise material uncertainty about the 
subject proceed from war.  The precise relationship between emotion and space, or 
emotion and the material, however, remains unclear. On the one hand, emotions are a 
response to the war and its changing topographies. Experienced as a reaction to changes 
in space that also affect the topologies of the body, they become „commitments‟ and 
„investments‟ that characters „put into‟ London, and each other. Yet people also have 
„emotional space‟ in Towheed‟s analysis, and he argues that it is the war‟s proximities, 
peoples‟ „incursions into‟ this that drives stories such as „Careless Talk‟ or „Mysterious 
Kôr.
83
 Not only is emotion displaced and relocated throughout the argument, exerting, 
like Mrs Massey‟s „new feeling‟, pressure from both the „inside‟ and „outside‟ of the 
subject, I want to suggest it is precisely the possibility of displacing emotion – its spatial 
uncertainty – that mobilises Towheed‟s reading. For if, as Towheed insists, the 
importance of space in Bowen‟s work is „its filling with the accreted emotional 
responses of those who have occupied it, for these seeming empty spaces are in fact 
full‟84, it is also the situation of characters in this „emotionally filled space‟ that allows 
Bowen‟s wartime fictional characters to exemplify „the extent to which individuals have 
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invariably defined themselves in relation to the constantly changing explosive spaces, 
filled as well as cleared, that they have had to negotiate, occupy and even inhabit‟.85  
In locating the complexities of Bowen‟s spaces, Towheed‟s argument displaces 
emotion, and, I suggest, depends on being able to displace emotion both into and out of 
the subject in order to describe its disintegration. If Bowen‟s characters define 
themselves in relation to space, they do so in relation to space „filled‟ with emotion, 
emotion „accreted‟ from their own feeling. These spaces don‟t acquire force in 
themselves, then, but through their implied relation with emotion. Rather than 
exemplify Towheed‟s argument, I want to suggest that Mrs Massey‟s face registers the 
deconstructions that make it possible. „Resculptured‟, Mrs Massey‟s face does not gain 
its fragility, its materiality, from the war, but from emotion. While the intersections of 
space and materiality may alter the feelings of that body, they alter it because that body 
is already sculptured by feeling. Bennett and Royle observe that prosopopeia, in 
Bowen‟s novels, dissolves characters, bodies, and subjects by figuring how, „in order to 
enable the figuration and reading of a face, description unavoidably isolates and 
represents its features, makes and unmakes a face‟.86 Prosopopeia, then, „constitutes the 
rhetorical basis of characterization as such – not simply another rhetorical figure, but 
figuration itself, the figuration of figuration, the uncanny, hallucinatory ground of the 
literary‟.87  Mrs Massey‟s prosopopeia, however, supplements the uncanny forces of the 
literary with emotion itself: what makes and unmakes Mrs Massey‟s face is emotion, 
the „access of some new feeling‟ (510).  
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Mrs Massey‟s resculptured face, then, not only indexes the ontologies of 
insecurity Ahmed attributes to climates of anxiety, but also registers this as an 
insecurity about the subject, an insecurity that war‟s spatial disorientations and 
dislocations amplify, reveal even, but do not create.  It is important, here, that „A Love 
Story: 1939‟ was written in 1940 before the Demon Lover collection in which Towheed 
locates Bowen‟s dislocations and displacements of space and subjectivity. But it is also 
set before it was written, indeed, set farther back into the beginnings of the war. Before 
I turn to consider this further, however, I want to suggest that what distinguishes 
Bowen‟s texts from those that Ahmed analyses is their acuity to these ontological 
insecurities. Rather than mobilise the insecurity of particular ontologies, Bowen‟s texts 
mobilise an insecurity of emotion itself: instead of reading feeling in her stories these 
are, already, reading emotion. They are a feeling for feeling fascinated not by the 
origins of emotion, but preoccupied with its absence. 
For Ahmed, the texts she analyses are selected for their performance of 
particular emotions: crucial to this is her discernment that although these operate as case 
studies, these emotions are not „in‟ these texts, but instead are the work these texts „do‟. 
As such, „each chapter takes a different emotion as a starting point, or point of entry, 
and does not “end” with the emotion, but with the work that it does‟.88 Anticipating that 
readers might find her methodology, „for a book on emotions, which argues that 
emotions cannot be separated from bodily sensations….very oriented towards texts‟89, 
Ahmed notes that she offers close readings of texts precisely because she is interested in 
the ways figuration is vital for understanding the „emotionality of texts‟ not normally 
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understood to be figurative. In a footnote to her remarks here she makes an astute, albeit 
deceptively simple point, for scholars of emotion across the disciplines: 
It might be tempting to contrast this model of „the emotionality of 
texts‟ with sociological, anthropological or psychological research, 
which involves interviewing people about their emotional 
lives…The difference between my research and interview based 
work is not that I am reading texts. It is important to state that 
interviewing people about emotions still involves texts…The 
distinction between my research and interview based research on 
emotions is in the different nature of the texts generated; the texts I 
read are ones that already exist „out there‟ in the public, rather than 
being generated by the research itself…We need to avoid assuming 
that emotions are „in‟ the materials we assemble (which would 
transform emotion into a property) but think more about what the 
materials are „doing‟, how they work through emotion to generate 
effects‟.90 
While Ahmed‟s remarks denaturalise distinctions between which kinds of „materials‟ 
are useful for „reading emotion‟, her methodology at the same time seems to naturalise a 
distinction between emotion produced in a research environment and that at work in 
everyday practices. I am reminded, here, of Jenefer Robinson‟s distinction, which I 
explored in Chapter Two, between literary texts that are useful for the study of emotion 
and those that aren‟t. Those that aren‟t, for Robinson, are postmodern texts that manage 
emotion to such a degree that it is unrecognisable, whereas those that are useful tend to 
be drawn from nineteenth century texts. I want to suggest that the desire to locate an 
authentic emotion, one not affected by the literary or fictional, is at work in both of 
these discussions. What is helpful about Ahmed‟s point is that it reminds us that the 
materials generated for the work of emotion (interview transcripts, analysis of person-
to-person interactions, photographs or films of facial expressions) are no less „textual‟ 
and no more natural than overtly constructed texts. But it does this by implying a 
distinction between texts whose „work‟ is accomplished through emotion and texts 
                                                     
90
 Ahmed, p. 19 n22. 
201 
 
whose work is to produce emotion. Precisely why she makes this distinction is unclear, 
yet it suggests a discourse of emotion working at the level of criticism, in which 
theorising the work of these powerfully political texts also provides a way to contain 
their affect through critical analyses. Bowen‟s stories, I would suggest, push this 
problem even further.   
Unlike those „materials‟ whose textuality Ahmed reveals, Bowen‟s stories have 
an acuity to their textuality. What I want to go on to argue in the rest of this chapter is 
that Bowen‟s texts not only do not naturalise their  „emotionality‟, as Ahmed might put 
it, but suggest a preoccupation with denaturalising the possibility of reading that 
„emotionality‟, and any reading it might invite. Here I‟d like to return to Mrs Massey‟s 
„feeling without context‟. That this is contextualised by her looking at Mrs Perry-
Dunton‟s gloves suggests, paradoxically, a context for this feeling without context. 
While the gloves, on the one hand, might work through their belonging to Mrs Perry 
Dunton – thus triggering a set of associations for Mrs Massey such as young love, 
youth, innocence, a nostalgia for love untouched by war or even for pre-war feeling 
itself, the gloves also seem to intensify feeling into its own object. That the gloves 
might signify their meaning through association with Mrs Perry Dunton‟s hand is, at the 
same time, worn away in a sequence of movements that produce the gloves while 
appearing to reveal them. Tracing the gloves‟ appearance, backwards, draws out a series 
of displacements: Clifford puts the gloves in, and takes them out, of his pocket; they are 
left in the car by Mrs Perry Dunton; she doesn‟t want them; and indeed even the 
moment in which Clifford finds them refuses to give up their location: „He reached into 
the Alvis, switched the dashboard lights on and got in and sat in the car to look for 
Polly‟s gloves. Mist came curdling into the lock-up after him. He put the wrist-length, 
fluffy gloves in one pocket‟ (504-505). Whatever they may be attached to is also 
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detached from them through this play of movements. What is crucial, here, then, is not 
the feeling in the gloves, their „signification‟, but instead the work these gloves 
accomplish. In this sense the gloves exemplify Ahmed‟s arguments about the work 
emotion does: it mobilises and makes possible relations, contacts, and contiguities. Yet 
the gloves do this in the text with a kind of staging of their own work: the gloves, if they 
„do‟ emotion‟s work, do not mobilise a specific emotion but instead mobilise „a feeling 
without context‟.   
Critics have observed that Bowen‟s texts resist interpretation. As Neil Corcoran 
remarks, „acts of writing and reading are themselves constantly offered to readerly 
inspection and interpretation‟.91 Throughout this project I have explored how a 
resistance to reading emotion is vital to these textual slippages and mobilities. For 
Corcoran, it is through Bowen‟s „intense sensitivity to the semantic, acoustic, and 
etymological interconnections between words, to the autonomy of their dealings with 
one another, and to the way one might feel possessed or acted upon by them, passive 
before their suasions and invitations‟ that the textures of her writing exceed mere 
„mannerism‟.92 While Corcoran argues that „the „vibrating force‟ of Bowen‟s language 
is the force which precedes everything else‟93, I am interested in drawing out the way 
Bowen‟s stories imply emotion with this „force‟.  The deployment of „context‟ in 
describing Mrs Massey‟s feeling indexes an intertexture of temporality and contiguity 
that suggests these gloves and Mrs Massey‟s feeling register a textuality of emotion that 
exceeds Ahmed‟s arguments. While Ahmed reads texts of feeling, Bowen‟s stories are, I 
suggest, texts that feel. Context, from „to weave together, connect‟94 is „the weaving 
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together of words and sentences, literary composition…a continuous text or 
composition…the connection or coherence between the parts of a discourse‟.95 A 
context is quite literally then, to borrow Bora‟s discussion of texture, the TEXXTURE of 
a text: as such, context registers the TEXXTURE whose labour of affects might be, as 
Bora described, „unsprung‟.96 A feeling without context, however, is feeling whose 
origin can‟t be perceived, read, or unsprung: it is precisely a feeling that does not accede 
to what Bora calls the „epistemic pressures that textures seem to beg‟.97 The gloves, 
offering a texture and materiality that over-signify touch, do not provoke a reading of 
their significance for Mrs Massey, but instead a fascination with the very desire for 
significance, the kind of reading, these textures demand: „looking intently‟, the 
„intensity‟ of Mrs Massey‟s gaze is etymologically doubled with the „intent‟ her gaze 
searches out. What she feels, however, is not the glove‟s associations, but her own 
feeling for feeling. The glove‟s economy is that of emotion: it works, in the story, by 
mobilising a series of contiguities and differentiations whose relations – though enabled 
by emotion – do not give it up.  
It is this challenge to feeling‟s context that suggests a need to revisit the contexts 
that have been ascribed to emotion in Bowen‟s work. As I observed earlier, Ahmed 
argues that when texts mobilise emotions, they are mobilising histories of articulation. 
What Towheed‟s discussion identifies, I have suggested, is a criticism of Bowen‟s work 
that articulates a historicisation of the „emotionality‟ of her short fictions.  This context, 
in scholarship on Bowen‟s short fiction, has contracted around the temporal and spatial 
contexts of her Demon Lover stories within her oeuvre, and her oeuvre‟s historicity. The 
radical affects of Bowen‟s short fiction are specified in her war stories, and particularly 
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those published during and after the Blitz, attributing their feeling to the time, and 
texture, of war.  „A Love Story: 1939‟ and „Unwelcome Idea‟, however, trouble this 
contextualisation of Bowen‟s alterations to feeling and subjectivity. Written within a 
month of one another, shortly before the Blitz, and located in Ireland, these challenge 
the origination of Bowen‟s radical topography of the subject in the alterations to the 
temporal, spatial, and material fabric of London during the Blitz.  Whilst the textures of 
these stories – the slides and flutters, the gloves and resculptured face – affirm that the 
war mobilised feelings of uncertainty, they also, I have tried to show, link these 
susceptibilities not to the war, but to the work of emotion itself: war amplifies this, but 
does not inaugurate it – this is one way of thinking about how Bowen‟s texts are 
moving. While I have focused on the work of specific textures figured in her stories, 
however, I want to turn now to her stories as textures themselves. 
In their discussion of The Heat of the Day, Bennett and Royle describe the 
feeling that Bowen‟s novels „have an aesthetic density, force and range which hang, 
suspended in their own strange atmospheres: it is as if every paragraph of a Bowen text, 
even every sentence, is already overhead, in the air‟.98 This texture is, they argue, 
already registered and at work in Harrison‟s description of his context as „sheer kink‟:  
„I appeared to be up against sheer kink‟ (136), says Harrison. 
„Sheer‟: adjective, „bright‟, „thin‟, „pure‟, „mere‟, „downright‟, 
„vertical or very nearly‟. Also, a noun, „sheer‟ as „a very thin 
fabric‟ (Chambers). „Kink‟: noun, „A short twist or curl in a rope, 
thread, hair, wire, or the like, at which it is bent upon itself‟ 
(OED)….But „kink‟, too, it should be stressed, as „a mental twist: a 
crick: a whim: an imperfection‟ (Chambers). All of these senses 
cross over, fold into one another, get knit up, knotted and undone, 
snipped off, started up again elsewhere…Proliferating in all that 
links a text with weaving or knitting (Latin texere, textum, „to 
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weave‟) and in all that binds narrative to notions of unfolding and 
to the analysis of threads and lines, The Heat of the Day is sheer 
kink.
99
 
These proliferations texture the novel with the kinky figures of knitting and its needles, 
Robert‟s tie, a string around a parcel, woolwork and, most importantly, the ways 
„[r]eferences to Shakespeare‟s plays, whether in the form of narratorial allusions or in 
discussions between characters, are woven throughout Bowen‟s work‟.100 It is these 
intertextual relations that make The Heat of the Day a fabric of displacements that 
„picks up, picks at, undoes assumptions of personal identity, and thus undoes the values 
of all constructions of the individual, social, political, erotic and ethical on which they 
rest‟.101 For Bowen scholars who have responded to this reading of Bowen, the kink in 
this logic of reading is Bennett and Royle‟s proposition that „the correspondences 
between these writers entail a rereading and displacement of intertextual relations which 
would allow us to appreciate not only Bowen‟s work as Shakespearean, but also 
Shakespeare‟s work as importantly Bowenesque‟.102  The „co-implication‟ of 
Shakespeare and Bowen challenges any hermeneutics of the real that these texts may 
appear to invite and, rather than suggest that these intertextual relations proscribe the 
possibility of Bowen‟s texts being „realist‟, these instead  „relentlessly affirm that there 
is no real life, no nature, no truth and indeed no self not fundamentally haunted by 
effects of fiction‟.103 This fabrication of the real kinks „any presentation and unfolding 
of „character‟, any narrative of the self, or of love‟.104 Almost tacked on here, love 
however soon emerges as the very „sheer otherness‟, the „delirious knotting and 
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undoing, ecstatic mental twisting‟105 of textuality. The Heat of the Day, Bennett and 
Royle argue, is „a knitting and knotting of stories that leaves no notion of love standing 
free of the radically dispossessing power of the dramatic and the fictive‟.106 Picking up 
on the knitting that textures Robert and Stella‟s love life, Bennett and Royle assert that 
„[l]ove is sheer kink‟.107 
The discussion of love in „Sheer Kink‟ is brief – once the thread of Stella and 
Rodney‟s knitting is pointed out, it appears to be dropped, making space to trace the 
weave of democracy, ethics, and madness. Yet it re-emerges, a few pages later, 
affirming „the sheer kink at the origin of their love, at the very start of their love 
story‟.108  It is this affirmation that allows „Sheer Kink‟ to return to the novel‟s 
Bowenesque-Shakespearean intertexture, to how „[l]ike Shakespeare‟s, Bowen‟s writing 
operates through multiple knittings of „fiction‟, „books‟ and „acting‟, on the one hand, 
and „life‟ on the other‟.109 Love and this intertexture are thus knitted – and knitting – 
throughout the discussion. Although they are along the same lines – they are both „sheer 
otherness‟, „sheer kink‟ –  these intertextual relations and love, however, are never 
discussed together, in the same place. Instead „love‟ punctuates the discussion, joining 
the novel‟s intertextual relations with its fabrication of the real. But love itself 
disappears from the discussion. Love works here like a slip stitch, in which the knitter 
passes the stitch to the other needle without knotting it – this allows the next stitch to 
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happened‟ (p. 99). 
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pass in front, allowing the slip stitch to bind by disappearing; the magic of the slip stitch 
is that it knits multiple fabrics at once. If, as Still Lives proposes, the sheer kink of love 
in The Heat of the Day lies „in an exchange of words which are never exchanged, in the 
phantom of an exchange which can never be known or be forgotten‟110, then love‟s 
disappearance from „Sheer Kink‟ figures this phantom exchange – love gives „Sheer 
Kink‟ the slip, it fabricates it.111 Love is knit through „Sheer Kink‟; it knots the novel‟s 
intertextual relations with its suspension of „every conventional conception of fiction 
and history, of literature and criticism, of presenting a narrative, a tale or account‟.112 
But it is also knit out of it: as Bennett and Royle observe, „[a]ny critical account of the 
work of these writers, and of their intertextual relations, can only be supervised by a 
logic of sheer kink, can lead only to sheer kink‟.113 Love‟s slip not only stitches the 
emptiness of emotion to the textures of Bowen‟s novels, but also registers how the 
„aesthetic density‟ of Bowen‟s writing, its intertextures, are knitted through this moving 
space, through emotion‟s phantom exchange. That emotion textures Bowen‟s 
intertextuality with Shakespeare in The Heat of the Day remains, however, only ever 
implied.  
In his study of the „return‟ in Bowen‟s work Neil Corcoran turns to Bowen‟s 
short fiction to explore how emotion textures the intertextualities of her writing. 
Observing that „„[s]usceptible‟ is a much repeated word in Bowen‟s critical prose, and 
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„mobile‟ is a word everywhere in her work, both fictional and non-fictional‟114, 
Corcoran draws a correspondence between the feeling of Bowen‟s work, and its 
movement. For Corcoran, the stories in Bowen‟s Demon Lover collection, „her finest 
single volume of stories, is a book of many unhappy returns‟.115 Tracing the „literary 
return which is allusion or intertext‟116, Corcoran‟s inventory of the many lines, plots, 
titles, and traditions that Bowen‟s stories pick up and inflect not only affirms the 
intertextures of these stories,  but deploys these to contextualise her stories‟ powerful 
affects. These „return[s] to the already written‟ lend her Demon Lover stories the texture 
of a „re-reading [that] is also an invitation to us as readers to read the traditions 
themselves differently‟.117 As with Bennett and Royle, one such tradition is the 
distinction between fiction and reality itself: „...another reason why acts of reading and 
writing figure so prominently in Bowen‟s work: in Elizabeth Bowen life itself is deeply, 
indeed inextricably, penetrated by text, what she calls „livingness‟ by writtenness‟.118  
In „The Demon Lover‟, Corcoran observes that Bowen re-writes the plot of a 
Scottish ballad in which a lover returns from the dead: her „masterstroke‟ is that she 
„made the ballad‟s otherworldly ship, on which the lover carries off the woman, the 
London taxi from which there is no exit‟.119 With „Mysterious Kôr‟, Bowen forms a 
third in an intertextuality already mobilised by Andrew Lang‟s sonnet „She‟:  
dedicated to his friend H. Rider Haggard, and evoking the city of the 
dead which figures prominently in Haggard‟s novel She (1887). 
Lang‟s sonnet interiorizes or psychologises Kôr as the name for 
ineradicable or ineffable human longings and desires;
 
and the story‟s 
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heroine, Pepita, in a state of intense sexual frustration, moulds her 
own personal fantasy further out of the sonnet‟s invitation.120 
Corcoran notes that „Mysterious Kôr‟ stages an acuity to its own relationship to this 
intertextual literary past: the characters quote the poem „prominently, and poignantly, in 
the story, and the poem itself is discussed by the characters‟.121  Reading „Sunday 
Afternoon‟, Corcoran observes how the story „ends when the Anglo-Irishman Henry 
Russel insists, twice, on calling the young girl of the story not by her actual name, 
Maria, but by the name of the daughter of Prospero‟s island in Shakespeare‟s The 
Tempest, Miranda‟.122 Proust is quoted „in a similarly glancing but more recondite way‟ 
in „Ivy Gripped the Steps‟ when Gavin Doddington „revisits the scene of the definitive 
traumatizing events of his childhood…and thinks of his fate as „l‟horreur de mon 
néant‟‟ while the „neant‟ also resonates with „the connotations given to it by Sartréan 
existentialism‟. 123 Lastly, „The Happy Autumn Fields‟ is offered as „an allusion‟ to 
Tennyson‟s „Tears, Idle Tears‟, in which the „lyric persona‟ cries without 
understanding. The „empathetic and nostalgic desolation‟ suffered by Mary is, Corcoran 
writes, „presumably developed‟ from this persona‟s „condition‟. In this return to the 
feeling of the past, „The Happy Autumn Fields‟ points to how Tennyson‟s poem is 
“about the most potent of absences”, and so is the story: so potent, in fact, that the 
absence becomes present again to the heroine‟.124  
These moments generate what Corcoran calls Bowen‟s „literary allusiveness‟. 
Acknowledging that the intertextures these citations form is „not entirely characteristic‟ 
of Bowen‟s writing, he adds that they do, „of course, occasionally figure elsewhere in 
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her work‟.125 The significance of these quotations, allusions and literary returns is 
„„almost transparent, although still inexplicit‟126, yet Corcoran speculates that it lies in 
the stories‟ historical moment. The examples Corcoran provides are all from Bowen‟s 
The Demon Lover and Other Stories, the same texts that ground Towheed‟s analysis. 
Like Towheed, Corcoran suggests that the texture of these stories reflects the changes to 
the fabric of London and its inhabitants. But for Corcoran, there is another devastated 
topography that Bowen‟s texts inscribe: literature itself. Confronted by „the peculiar 
wartime combinations of distress and apathy‟127, the Demon Lover stories, Corcoran 
suggests, „could be read as the writer‟s attempt to draw corroborative strength from 
some fragments of a literary tradition when engaged on the representation of an 
experience which was considered by many to lie beyond the capacity of “literature”‟.128  
Corcoran argues that Bowen‟s intertextures enable these stories to represent „an 
undermining of public, official, attitudes to the war….betrayal, isolation, hallucination, 
sexual thwarting, jealousy, manipulation, profound anxiety. Their emotions are a very 
long way indeed from the official narratives of the Blitz‟.129 Not only do these 
intertextual relations signify the resistances of the feelings of the „explosive present‟ to 
representation, but they also signify that present‟s susceptibility to the feelings of the 
past. For Corcoran, Bowen‟s „[r]eferentiality is both a way of staying the present against 
hopeless confusion, and also a reminder of the besetting nightmares of the past from 
which the present, literally explosively in the Blitz, cannot break free‟.130 Corcoran‟s 
analysis reminds us that the fabrics of Bowen‟s short stories are, like The Heat of the 
Day, textured by their intertextuality. The tissue of these intertextual relations, I want to 
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argue, however, is feeling: in each of the examples Corcoran provides, what the texts 
return for is a literature of feeling, a way to represent what is unrepresentable in the 
present. The texture of this intertextual fabric is feeling.  
For Corcoran, the return to the feelings of literatures past is consolatory in a 
present whose emotions have no literature. Although Corcoran acknowledges that the 
feelings summoned may not in themselves be consoling, their representation, he 
implies, offers a literary topography that stitches these feelings of the past into the 
present, as if these intertextures may map and orient the feelings of those in the 
devastated present. This return supplies a graft, a repair to the emotional wounds of the 
present and what Bowen named „the desiccation, by war, of our day-to-day lives‟.131 
Whether or not these heal, seems beside the point – that they are grafted, graphed, is the 
act of consolation itself, supplying literary emotions to a city, people and literature that 
„have no feeling to spare‟.132 In her introduction to The Demon Lover collection, Bowen 
writes that „I see war (or should I say feel war?) more as a territory than as a page of 
history‟.133 The feeling of war touches the nerve of a „territory‟ whose origin itself is 
already unsettled by affect: although the etymology of territory is „usually taken as a 
derivative of terra earth…the original form has suggested derivation from terrēre to 
frighten‟.134 That the collection suggests a topography of fear is affirmed in her 
recognition that her reader „may say that these resistance-fantasies are in themselves 
frightening. I can only say that one counteracts fear by fear, stress by stress‟.135 Bowen 
goes on to map out the territory the collection forms where „[t]he past, in all these cases, 
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discharges its load of feeling into the anaesthetized and bewildered present‟.136 Bowen‟s 
preface to the collection thus appears to corroborate this sense that the Demon Lover 
stories might be particularised, within her oeuvre, as a site of literary allusion and 
citation that supplements the devastation of the present with the feeling of the past. 
Bowen writes that, in a London „transformed [by darkness] into a network of 
inscrutable canyons…one developed new bare alert senses, with their own savage 
warnings and notations….by day one was always making one‟s own new maps of a 
landscape always convulsed by some new change‟.137 She implies that her stories, in the 
wake of feeling these inscrutable canyons and convulsions, returns to the past because 
„life…emotionally torn and impoverished by changes, had to complete itself in some 
way‟.138  
Developing Corcoran‟s observations, Shannon Wells-Lassagne ascribes the 
feelings of Bowen‟s work to a return to sensationalism, and her aesthetic discrimination 
of sensation:  these offer „an “unreality effect” ‟ in which „sensationalist 
language…comes to take the centre stage rather than sensationalism itself‟.139 More 
particularly, for Wells-Lassagne the sensationalist textures of Bowen‟s writing extends 
their intertextuality to their discernment of those sensations. Thus, when the characters 
of „Mysterious Kôr‟ quote Lang‟s poem, their discussion of aesthetics „offers a model 
for the reader himself to follow‟ whereby „what becomes important is less the story than 
the language used, and its effect on the reader…it is a tool used to highlight how one 
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should or should not read‟.140 It is, however, precisely this acuity to reading feeling that 
I suggest requires a return to re-reading what Bowen‟s stories feel in these intertextual 
relations. That, as Corcoran argues, „Mysterious Kôr‟ „interiorizes or psychologises Kôr 
as the name for ineradicable or ineffable human longings and desires‟141 seems affirmed 
in Pepita‟s reply to Arthur‟s suggestion that „girls think about people‟: „How can 
anyone think about people if they‟ve got any heart? I don‟t know how other girls 
manage: I always think about Kôr‟ (CS: 730). But Pepita and Arthur remind us that the 
mysterious Kôr, rather than locate the heart, turns it into nowhere: 
He reflected, then said: „But the poem begins with “Not” – “not in 
the waste beyond the swamps and sand – “ And it goes on, as I 
remember, to prove Kôr‟s not really anywhere. When even a poem 
says there‟s no such place – ‟ 
„What it tries to say doesn‟t matter: I see what it makes me see. 
Anyhow, that was written some time ago, at that time when they 
thought they had got everything taped, because the whole world had 
been explored, even the middle of Africa. Every thing and place had 
been found and marked on some map; so what wasn‟t marked on 
any map couldn‟t be there at all. So they thought: that was why he 
wrote the poem.‟ (730) 
That Lang‟s poem interrogates or at the very least registers the inability of topography 
to locate and stabilise suggests that a topography of feeling can at best be only a 
topology. This is heightened by Lang‟s having written the parodic He, which Patricia 
Murphy observes „foreground[s] the novel‟s excessive interest in historiographic and 
scholarly paraphernalia…includ[ing] mock footnotes that identify absurd historical, 
textual, etymological and orthographic references‟.142 In „She‟ itself Lang appears to 
summon the dead and forsaken city from the „nay‟, „not in‟ and „not there‟ that describe 
its location. In this sense, I would suggest that Bowen‟s „model of reading‟ here, does 
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indeed emphasise feeling, but, rather than discriminate the correct way to read and 
identify this, it instead cautions against psychologising Kôr, or any other intertextual 
reference, as an emotional interiority or symbol for feeling. Rather than locate feeling in 
the literary return, I want to suggest that Bowen instead returns to the literariness of 
emotion – it isn‟t the emotions of literatures past that texture the fabric of these stories, 
but instead their „emotional crisis‟.143  
This, I want to suggest, is exemplified by the one intertexture Corcoran does not 
discuss: Bowen‟s 1936 story „Tears, Idle Tears‟. In my discussion of Frederick‟s tears 
and the literariness of emotion, I observed how in this story, the attempt to locate an 
origin for emotion turns up only its own fictionality, figured in the citation of 
Tennyson‟s poem that is not only the title of the story, but also at the heart of the 
„primal scene‟. This story mobilises the problem of reading emotions in either literary 
texts or people and reading these by linguistic or somatic signs. Any origin of emotion 
discovered by reading, Frederick‟s tears show us, is only re-covered. The story figures 
nothing less than a radical challenge to a hermeneutic model of emotion, and, indeed, to 
any theory of emotion that would suggest it offers a zone of recuperation. In particular, I 
want to suggest that the story‟s hooking together of textuality and emotion troubles the 
recent move to define emotion, following Brian Massumi, as the „personal…the 
conventional, consensual point of insertion of intensity into semantically and 
semiotically formed progressions, into narrativizable action-reaction circuits, into 
function and meaning‟.144 Bowen‟s story also mobilises what Rei Terada has located as 
emotion‟s „secrecy‟ as an absence of meaning that impels reading and interpretation. 
What „Tears, Idle Tears‟ returns to, then, is the problem of reading emotion that moves 
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Tennyson‟s poem. Emotion is not the result of interpretation, the representation of 
interpretation, but an interpretive event:   
Tears, idle tears, I know not what they mean, 
Tears from the depth of some divine despair 
Rise in the heart, and gather to the eyes, 
In looking on the happy autumn-fields, 
And thinking of the days that are no more.
145
 
„Tears, Idle Tears‟ is, most likely, omitted from Corcoran‟s discussion of the literary 
return because it is not one of the stories in The Demon Lover, and as such does not fit 
into his reading of the stories‟ emotional charge against the fabric of war-time London. 
First published in Listener in 1936, the story was later collected in the 1941 collection 
Look at all those Roses.
146
 But its omission from Corcoran‟s literary returns is 
complicated when we realise that „Tears, Idle Tears‟ is a direct engagement not only 
with the same Tennyson poem to which „The Happy Autumn Fields‟ would „allude‟, a 
few years later, but also the same moment of that poem. „Tears, Idle Tears‟, then, 
initiates an intertexture of feeling to which Bowen returns, in „The Happy Autumn 
Fields‟, to „discharge the load of the feeling past into the anaesthetized and bewildered 
present‟. Not only do both stories return to the same poem, but their intertextual 
proximity suggests that „The Happy Autumn Fields‟ returns to the problem of reading 
emotion. While Corcoran reads the intertexture of „The Happy Autumn Fields‟ as an 
allusion, a passing reference, I would argue that this intertextuality indexes the 
preoccupations with emotion that I suggest are mobilised by the textures of Bowen‟s 
short fiction. Not only does this story return both to the terrain – „the happy Autumn 
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fields‟ – that in Tennyson‟s poem appears to give rise to the problem of reading tears, 
but it also returns to the literariness her own story locates at the heart of the emotion. In 
order to graft feeling from the past into the bewildered topographies – spatial, bodily, 
textual – of the present, then, what Bowen returns to is not the location of feeling that 
might be read and thus discharged, but instead to the literariness of emotion itself. 
Corcoran argues that Mary, in „Happy Autumn Fields‟, contracts „the most potent of 
absences‟ from the past into the present.147 Yet I suggest that, rather than locate feeling, 
no matter how raw and wounding, for the present, what Mary discovers is the 
literariness of emotion, that „[a]ll we can do is imitate‟ (CS: 684).  
The intertextualities of Bowen‟s short fiction extend the interest in emotion as a 
problem of reading already indexed by her stories‟ textures of feeling. Rather than pick 
up and weave through her stories feelings from the past, from literatures past, however, 
the fabric of Bowen‟s war time stories is fabricated by intertextualities that touch on the 
literariness of emotion. Feeling into literary texts from the past, Bowen feels out those 
that are, in their own ways, feeling around for feeling. Critics have tended to read 
Bowen‟s peculiar feeling for war time London in her acuity to the affects of war, its 
uncertainties, its dislocations, and its „strange growths‟.148 Bringing the uncertainty of 
emotion from the past into the present, however, her stories don‟t represent the war‟s 
feeling but registers these as a problem of discerning emotion. Not only do Bowen‟s 
texts find a way to actuate the uncertainties and instabilities at the heart of reading 
emotion to textualise the war-rent present, but they also, importantly, demand that we 
recognise that these uncertainties are, also, in the past. 
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For Corcoran, „The Happy Autumn Fields‟ stages its own reading of the 
relationship between the past and the present figured by these returns:  
„The Happy Autumn Fields‟ includes a sudden, disconcertingly self-
reflexive sentence about its cross-temporal correspondences: „We 
surmount the skyline: the family come into our view, we into theirs‟ 
(100); and this is the way earlier literature works in these stories too: 
as these texts come newly into our view, so we come into theirs, and 
the ensuing judgements are deeply unsettling. Or, in another 
definition of intertextuality in that story, „Everything one unburies 
seems the same age‟ (103).149 
Whilst elsewhere his discussion implies that the feeling of the past is brought into the 
present, here instead what is unsettling is precisely the affect of these intertextual 
relations between the past and present. Rather than offer a compensatory gesture that 
returns emotion to the present, unearthing emotion from the past turns up the present‟s 
uncertainty of feeling in the past. It unsettles because the rupture that should appear 
when nostalgia aligns the apparently certain feeling of the past with the uncertain 
present, instead, disappears: what ruptures is precisely the temporal disjunction and the 
containment nostalgia implies. As an „acute longing for familiar surroundings‟150 
nostalgia doesn‟t signal a memory of emotion in the past, but a longing for the sense of 
familiarity attributed to the past, the sense that, at one time, emotion could be given an 
origin, it could be familiarised as at home in, and home to, objects, whether spatial, 
literary and indeed subjective.  
 What these intertextualities register, then, is not the loss of a literature, space or 
subjectivity that contains and gives access to emotion, but the loss of the illusion that 
emotion emerges from, or secures, those topographies. The war does not anaesthetise 
the ability to feel, so much as ideas about what it means to feel. Here I would suggest 
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that the war, as the twin technology of the cinema, also, like the cinema, generates its 
particular affects not because it changes emotion, but because we have, through 
emotion, the capacity to be affected. Heather Bryant Jordan remarks that the Demon 
Lover collection demonstrates Bowen‟s „mastery of the short story in its depiction of the 
sensations of wartime‟151:  I want to suggest that the sensations these stories „depict‟ are 
not those of wartime but the discernment that the fragmented, anaesthetised and 
bewildered present registers the unchartability and unspecific terrain at the heart of 
emotion. Implicit in Jordan‟s study is the question that titles it: „how will the heart 
endure?‟ Picking up on Bowen‟s preface to The Demon Lover, the stories, for Jordan, 
are „saving hallucinations‟, implying that these stories preserve a heart so that it, and 
we, may endure: the stories keep us in touch, during war‟s desiccations, with feeling. 
But if the stories, as Bowen writes, return to the past to retrieve the „I‟, what they bring 
forward is not the consolation of emotions past, but instead only the crises of emotion 
from the past to „fill the vacuum for the uncertain “I” ‟.152 Rather than index a crisis of 
subjectivity mobilised by the war‟s unreal affects, these intertextures of feeling register 
Rei Terada‟s contention that „destroying the illusion of subjectivity does not destroy 
emotion…on the contrary, emotion is the sign of the absence of that illusion‟.153 If, as 
Corcoran suggests, the literary textures of Bowen‟s short stories invite us to read the 
traditions differently, then these intertextures of time and feeling invite us to re-read our 
traditions of emotion, and return the war‟s dissolving affects to emotion, both present 
and past. This is an invitation Bowen herself seems to issue in her review of Ivy 
Compton-Burnett‟s Elders and Betters when she defines the „task the Victorians failed 
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to finish, and that the Edwardians declined to regard as theirs‟ as the „survey of emotion 
as an aggressive force‟.154 
It is precisely this dissolution of boundaries between the present and past, 
however, that Corcoran finds troubling in some Bowen scholarship:  
The more psychoanalytical-deconstructive elements of it, however, 
while valuably emphasising and illuminating her sheer 
strangeness…tend to underestimate the structural inventiveness and 
stylistic experimentation in her: difference from what has gone 
previously is sometimes – paradoxically, it may be – obscured…In 
some of this critical work too it can almost seem as though the whole 
writerly career is being read backwards through the lens of Eva Trout; 
and for me Eva Trout is, as I shall argue, a distorting mirror.
155
 
Corcoran‟s remark recalls my discussion of debates about the place of Eva Trout in 
Bowen‟s oeuvre in Chapter One. For Corcoran, what makes Eva Trout a „distorting 
mirror‟ is its „fundamental insecurity about personal identity…sometimes so 
underminingly severe as to make the novel‟s modes of characterization congruent with 
radical postmodern conceptions of the hollowing-out of subjectivity‟.156 Traversed both 
by the „co-ordinates of the earlier novels‟ (which it „throws out of alignment‟) and 
„sheer emotional weirdness‟, Eva Trout for Corcoran is not so much the culmination of 
Bowen‟s literary preoccupations, but an „utterly unpredictable end to Elizabeth Bowen‟s 
career as a novelist; and it is a novel which, in every weave of its texture, forgoes 
serenity‟.157 Corcoran‟s reading of Eva Trout hinges on the relationship between fiction 
and reality that preoccupies the novel, and he argues that the novel‟s intertextures with 
at least a dozen or more writers, including Shakespeare, makes it „by far the most 
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foregroundedly literary of Bowen‟s works‟.158 Beginning with the observation that Eva 
and Elsinore‟s final parting is another Shakespearean intertexture whose „moment also 
has an emotional authenticity which is hardly ever apparent elsewhere in a novel deeply 
preoccupied with, and plotted around modes of, the inauthentic‟159, emotional 
authenticity becomes a locus for the distinctions between, and problem of 
differentiating, fiction and real life that „disfigures‟ the novel. According to Corcoran, 
the texture of Eva Trout is that of „a kind of parable which we cannot retell in any terms 
other than those it offers us, it nevertheless insinuates, very powerfully and 
provocatively, in its sometimes extreme clashings of register, that the categories of 
living and of making fictions are confused only at our greatest peril‟.160 Corcoran‟s 
analysis culminates in the argument that ultimately what Eva Trout teaches us is the 
importance of distinguishing between „living‟ and „making fiction‟, categories whose 
distinction turns on authentic feeling. Despite insisting on the „perils‟ of confusing 
these, however, Corcoran‟s analysis ends with the problem of how „the reader is given 
by Eva Trout a new knowledge about the capacity of the empathetic imagination, the 
imagination which, in a childless writer, may recreate with such overwhelming energy 
and inwardness the experience of both mothers and children...‟.161 Here Bowen‟s very 
success, the „authenticity‟, to borrow Corcoran‟s language, with which her novel 
mobilises maternal feelings, leaves him with a problem about the kinds of emotion he 
has used to distinguish the ethical imperatives of the „real‟ that he attributes to the 
novel:  
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But what principle of empathy is at work when the mature woman 
writer of Seven Winters, published in 1942, imagines her mother 
looking at her when she is a very young child, and then tells us, in 
her own person, „I know now the feeling with which [my 
mother]…thought “That is my child!”‟? This writer is childless, she 
has never been a mother: so she cannot „know‟ this feeling by 
experience. So how can she „know now‟ what her mother, or any 
mother, ever felt? But no adequate reader of Elizabeth Bowen will 
doubt, nevertheless, the perfect truth of the claim she is making.
162
 
My interest, here, is not so much in Corcoran‟s analysis of Eva Trout, but in the 
problem of time and feeling he seems to be left with – of how the „return‟ in Bowen‟s 
work turns up feeling with no origin, emotion whose veracity appears to lie not in its 
authenticity, but its fictionality. Corcoran leaves the question unanswered: we are, no 
doubt, meant to ascribe it to the affective power of Bowen‟s writing. Yet I suggest that 
this is same problem that troubles Corcoran about Bennett and Royle‟s reading of 
Bowen‟s intertextures with Shakespeare. 
 In a footnote to one of his discussions of the Shakespearean allusions woven 
throughout Bowen‟s work, Corcoran responds to Still Lives:  „I agree, and shall refer to 
Shakespeare more than once again in this study; but I don‟t know that I follow them in 
their related view that Shakespeare‟s work is “importantly Bowenesque” ‟.163 Reading 
Shakespeare as Bowenesque doesn‟t just cross a line, then, but casts its lines too far: the 
intertexture Corcoran would corroborate shies away from this fabric of fictional 
correspondences that would cross, and cancel out, temporal boundaries. For Corcoran 
the allure of authentic emotion enables him to insist on certain logics of temporality, 
literature, and experience, but the affects of Bowen‟s violations of these logics haunt his 
reading of Eva Trout. If, for Corcoran, Still Lives makes the critical error of reading 
Bowen‟s „disfigured subjectivity‟ back throughout her oeuvre, and in so doing makes 
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the even more problematic move of catching Shakespeare out, or into, this network of 
dissolutions, his engagement with the intertextual affects of Eva Trout and the Demon 
Lover stories suggests an effort to contain these in contexts of time, oeuvre, and 
experience. Rather than distinguish between fictional and authentic feeling, however, 
Corcoran‟s distinctions are haunted by the very deconstructions emotion mobilises, that, 
as Rei Terada suggests, „we feel not to the extent that experience seems immediate, but 
to the extent that it doesn‟t; not to the extent that other people‟s experiences remind us 
of our own, but to the extent that our own seem like someone else‟s‟.164  As if 
answering Corcoran‟s question about what „principle of empathy‟ is at work when 
Bowen is able to claim her mother‟s experience as her own, Terada observes that 
„vicariousness‟ is vital to feeling: citing Adela Pinch‟s observation that for Hume, 
„feeling may always be vicarious, something we generate in attributing it to another 
figure‟, Terada adds that „…Derrida‟s implication is that I myself am one of those other 
figures‟.165   
 That Eva Trout‟s emotion becomes the remainder for which Corcoran‟s 
argument can‟t account, yet is also the discourse that mobilises his critical disagreement 
with „the more psychoanalytical-deconstructive elements‟ of Bowen criticism, 
exemplifies Terada‟s  observation that discourses and ideologies of emotion work 
through a „circular positive claim‟ that „casts emotion as proof of the human subject‟.166 
Such claims do not locate subjectivity but identify how „subjectivity is read out of the 
experience of disattachment that makes it seem as though a subject were there to be 
                                                     
164
 Terada, p. 22. 
165
 Terada, p. 163, n16. For Pinch‟s discussion of Hume see Strange Fits of Passion: Epistemologies of 
Emotion, Hume to Austen (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996), pp. 43-44.  
166
 Ibid., p. 6. 
223 
 
attached‟.167 The intertextures and returns to feeling that Corcoran observes, then, along 
with Towheed‟s location of the Demon Lover‟s emotional displacements and 
dislocations of subjectivity, figure the critical gestures that register not the subject‟s 
containment of emotion, but the pressures that conceptualising emotion exerts on ideas 
of subjectivity. Articulating this through a reading of the place of emotion in philosophy 
of mind, Terada‟s remarks extend through literary theory and aesthetics to implicate 
textual practice: 
...theories of emotion depict dilemmas in the philosophy of mind; 
emotion theory is the internal supplement to the history of that 
philosophy. Classical philosophy has not been wrong about emotion but 
rather righter – and less classical – than it has cared to be. The 
nonclassical nature of the discourse of emotion indicates that emotion 
exerts pressures on theories of subjectivity; emotion engenders what 
Ronald de Sousa calls “a kind of parallel philosophy”.168 
Thinking about „feeling‟, Terada argues, always figures an emergence of „post-
structural‟ emotion in theories of emotion in the past. The theories of emotion that 
unfold from what Terada enfolds into poststructuralist thought historicise non-
subjective emotion not in the „waning of affect‟ in the twentieth century, but in the way 
rhetoric about the emergence of a modern subject, and, more recently, a post-modern 
non-subject, works as what Terada elsewhere terms an epistemological defence to 
produce an emotional subject in the past rather than return non-subjective emotion to 
that past. For Terada „the classical picture of emotion already contraindicates the idea of 
the subject‟.169 
 Terada‟s remarks are helpful for thinking about the problems of reading emotion 
with which Bowen‟s texts confront us, offering one way of understanding the sense 
shared by most recent Bowen scholarship, regardless of critical orientation, that 
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Bowen‟s texts „interpret their interpreters‟.170 Throughout this project I have aimed to 
trace the ways this is at work in how the emotionality of Bowen‟s short fiction has been 
read, and discursively mobilised, for these critical readings. In so doing I have tried to 
suggest that Bowen‟s short fictions have been particularly vulnerable to this, not 
because they are emotional, but because they are utterly preoccupied with emotion‟s 
resistances to reading. Texturing her stories with this preoccupation, Bowen‟s 
intertextualities, rather than affirm the time, place, and history of emotion, collapse the 
temporal, spatial and historical distinctions emotion has been deployed to construct. 
Terada argues:  
The purpose and the very existence of emotion have traditionally been 
associated with persistent difficulties in the philosophy of mind. Feared 
as a hazard or prized as a mysterious gift, emotion indexes strains in 
philosophy – the same strains that poststructuralist theory argues 
fracture the classical model of subjectivity. Thus “poststructuralist” 
dissatisfaction with the subject appears in classical thought about 
emotion: theories of emotion are always poststructuralist theories.
171
 
One consequence of Terada‟s observations, here, is that thinking about feeling 
implicates the discourses, ideologies and historicity of that thought.  
 The unfolding of emotion, of an emotion, then, is enfolded by emotion: it is this 
work of emotion that Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick articulates when she describes certain 
affects – shame, disgust, contempt – as „switch points‟ for individuation, an 
„individuation that decides not necessarily an identity, but a figuration, distinction, or 
mark of punctuation‟.172 For both Sedgwick and Terada, emotion, even if it leads to 
other feeling, does not reside in what is discerned, but works at the level of discernment 
itself – it is the movements or circulations that make distinctions possible. In this way a 
causal economy for emotion, such as Brian Massumi‟s, which I raised in the 
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introduction to this project, can only exist if one attempts to isolate and extrapolate one 
feeling from another, to interrupt the chain or contiguity of relations that has initiated 
such an economy. Terada remarks that „[a]cknowledging the feeling as a feeling…leads 
at the least to more feelings‟.173 The possibility of acknowledging the feeling, however, 
is a contiguity of distinctions already in motion. The boundaries exerted by a reading of 
emotion accentuate this circularity, amplifying emotion‟s movements rather than 
interrupting or containing these. What I would take from these analyses is that the 
consequence of the relation between the singularity of a particular emotion and the 
indefinite space of emotion that discerns it is that emotion does not name a particular 
geography of relationality or dimension of contiguity, but instead is the interpretive 
event that gives rise to the possibility of phenomenalising these distinctions. Whilst 
emotion might appear to point towards particular interpretations or apprehensions, these 
are not the site, but instead the effects of emotion‟s movements.   
 By historicising the problem of reading emotion Terada draws attention to how 
the theoretical, aesthetic or practical unfolding of emotion works by enfolding the 
instabilities that emotion mobilises. Terada‟s remarks, when mapped onto the emerging 
call for theories of emotion and affect that can account for the demands that changing 
ontologies exert on the subject, act as an urgent reminder that the conception – and 
changing conceptions – of the subject and subjectivity do not challenge emotion, but 
instead challenge our discourses of emotion.
174
  Attending to emotion‟s „internal 
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supplement‟ to the history of philosophy, Terada‟s remarks move the thinking and 
rethinking of the subject‟s historical, spatial, and literary topographies  into emotion‟s 
fold.   
 Emotions, Sara Ahmed tells us, „tell us a lot about time; emotions are the very 
“flesh” of time‟.175  „Flesh‟ offers an appeal to bridge the political, methodological and 
critical bodies that might be divided by emotion, by yoking emotion‟s work to what this 
work might allow us to do:  
The time of emotion is not always about the past, and how it sticks. 
Emotions also open up futures, in the ways they involve different 
orientations to others. It takes time to know what we can do with 
emotion. Of course, we are not just talking about emotions when we talk 
about emotions. The objects of emotions slide and stick and they join 
the intimate histories of bodies, with the public domain of justice and 
injustice. Justice is not simply a feeling. And feelings are not always 
just. But justice involves feelings, which move us across the surfaces of 
the world, creating ripples in the intimate contours of our lives. Where 
we go, with these feelings, remains an open question.
176
 
By naming the capacities of emotion‟s movements Ahmed‟s figure accrues a geography 
that exceeds its own dimension, a depth that appears to  extend in either direction of the 
„flesh‟ materialised by emotion, bringing the „near‟ and „far‟ that emotion can reach into 
contact.  As both the „visible surface of the body‟ and „what is enclosed by skin‟, 
Ahmed‟s emotion-as-flesh appears here to literalise emotion as a substance at a point in 
the history of thinking the subject when its loss of depth has not only become a locus for 
anxieties about claims to ethics, politics, and agency, but more particularly when the 
loss of emotion‟s depth threatens to insubstantiate either the remaining terrain of these 
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claims, or the means by which a turn from the deconstructions of these claims might be 
executed. As if compensating for the dissolutions of borders, territories and bodies that 
accumulate over the course of Ahmed‟s study, this „flesh‟ of emotion figures a zone of 
contact where emotion‟s dissolving force is recuperated into the consolation that it 
touches us all.  Throughout, her study has denaturalised the borders that appear to 
contain emotion by showing us how emotion works to create them. By making emotion 
„flesh‟, however, Ahmed‟s figure naturalises that it is good that this should be so, that 
emotion‟s dissolutions do not diminish its potential, but materialise it. „Flesh‟ heals the 
critical and methodological ruptures of emotion‟s recent critical past, turning us to the 
future by leaving us with emotion‟s „open question‟. Bringing time, flesh and emotion 
together, Ahmed implies that it is time for emotion. 
  What Bowen‟s short stories tell us about emotion, however, is that Ahmed‟s 
figuration of emotion as the flesh of time moves us because of emotion‟s time. While 
Ahmed ends with an open question, pointing towards the future, Bowen‟s stories are 
textured by this question, enfolding emotion into its own past. Preoccupied with this 
question, repeating emotion‟s resistances to reading and closure whilst staging its 
unfolding, Bowen‟s stories not only imply the temporal breaks that might be pointed to 
as markers between modern and post-modern subjectivities, but folds the present critical 
interest in emotion back into emotion‟s past. In The Fold, Deleuze describes Leibniz‟s 
„substantial vinculum‟ that is „a strange linkage, a bracket, a yoke, a knot, a complex 
relation that comprises variable terms and one constant term‟.177 The vinculum‟s 
paradoxical introduction of „minimum exteriority‟ to the „absolute of interiority‟ is 
resolved, Deleuze explains, by its „infinite fold, that can be unwrapped…only by 
recovering the other side, not as exterior to the monad, but as the exterior or outside of 
                                                     
177
 Gilles Deleuze, The Fold (London: Continuum, 1993), p. 126. 
228 
 
its own interiority…Such is the vinculum, the unlocalizable primary link that borders 
the absolute interior‟.178 The vinculum works like a grid, „filtering‟ and „sifting‟ and it is 
these movements that substantiates bodies both as bodies, and as „my own‟.179 This 
work of the vinculum, the movement it engages is what creates the fold; it is in this fold 
that the body „becomes‟ real not in its reality but in the „realization of phenomena in the 
body‟, in the folds of the body substantiated by the vinculum.180 According to Deleuze, 
this „realization of the body‟ is the realization of the „vinculum itself‟.181  I want to 
suggest that Bowen‟s short stories not only stage this work of the vinculum through 
their „cases‟ – genric, individual, emotional, and psychoanalytical – that open out, 
offering an interior only to enfold this in the problem of reading emotion itself, but her 
intertextualities belie a fascination and interest in emotion‟s ability to do this, to be an 
„infinite fold‟, compelling folding and unfolding, without giving itself up. Working as 
an oeuvre, a body of folds that unfold a fascination with emotion‟s movements, 
Bowen‟s short fictions not only pleat the various styles and aesthetic distinctions that 
contour the literary and theoretical topographies of the twentieth century, but contract 
these back to the very emergence of emotion itself when she displaces into each other 
emotion and the short story, „that, “in a spleen unfolds heaven and earth” – or should‟.   
That Bowen turns away from her contemporaries to locate the emotion of the 
short story suggests that Shakespeare‟s „spleen‟ touches on something vital; what I want 
to suggest is that what it touches on is the absence that is at the origin and the heart of 
emotion. For Shakespeare, emotion as we know it was not yet available in his 
vernacular. Although the word was used in the late sixteenth century to refer to a 
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political or popular disturbance, and by the early seventeenth century was being used to 
refer to a movement or migration out, emotion itself didn‟t begin to migrate from „out‟ 
to „in‟ until nearly a century after Shakespeare‟s death  and, according to Alexander 
Schmidt‟s Shakespeare-Lexicon, the word „emotion‟ does not occur in Shakespeare‟s 
work.
182
 Although emotion might be rooted in „moving out‟, then, the designation of a 
subject that this movement out has been presumed to indicate is an invention of 
emotion‟s history. Emotion is, as Terada observes, the parallel philosophy that unfolds 
alongside the invention of the subject. Bowen once wrote that the writer „opens and 
shuts time like a fan…and this is important because every story demands…some 
particular sort of timing of its own‟.183 I want to suggest that her definition of the short 
story not only points forward to the present‟s preoccupation with emotion, but also 
returns us to emotion‟s past, its origin in the unlocalizable movements that may touch 
on, but do not stabilise, emotion.  Opening out, unfolding emotion, her short stories 
enfold it to its root, where emotion remains only in its moving out, its displacement of 
its own origins. It is precisely these movements, for Shakespeare, that describe emotion 
without locating it. Through Shakespeare, Bowen shows that literature‟s capacity to say 
something about emotion, to say something about it in advance of having a word for it, 
tells us something about what emotion is. Derrida remarks that if there is something 
about literature that he likes, „[t]here would be the passion…there where nevertheless 
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everything is said and where what remains is nothing – but the remainder, not even of 
literature‟.184  Displacing emotion and the short story into one another, Bowen‟s 
intertexture with Shakespeare implies emotion‟s taste for discovery with the promise the 
short story makes to encase and expose through reading what it contains. Caught in its 
own relation to emotion, however, the short story exemplifies emotion‟s secret: that it, 
as Derrida writes of passion, is „this secret that nothing could confine…no sacrifice will 
ever disclose its precise meaning. Because there is none‟.185 This is the Bowen affect, 
her short stories‟ feeling for feeling. 
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Conclusion 
‘that touch of the farouche’: The Queer Heart of Bowen’s Short Fiction 
 
In her 1951 essay „The Bend Back‟, Elizabeth Bowen considers the lure of the past for 
the inhabitants of a century that have endured „excoriations, grinding impersonality‟.1 
Literature between the wars, she writes, has run its course: it „could not either root down 
deeply into the imagination or touch the heart‟ and, at the mid century, the writer looks 
to the future by returning to the promises of the past for a literature of the heart, a heart 
that demands „to be fed, stabilised, reassured, taught‟.2 But if the heart is to be 
discovered in the past, Bowen‟s essay also reminds us that its stabilities and assurances 
are themselves what we „cull from fiction‟.3  The heart in Bowen‟s writing is, like 
Geraldine‟s in Bowen‟s 1934 story „The Little Girl‟s Room‟, anything but secure: 
„…the little girl gave herself back to the centuries, to touch, from their heart, the very 
heart of your fancy, like a little girl in an epitaph‟ (CS: 430).  
In going back to Bowen‟s writing, her scholars have been bending with her 
texts, tracing the displacements and destabilisations that, as Susan Osborn remarks, 
texture her writing with a „kind of strange and strenuous perpetuum mobile‟.4 This 
thesis has endeavoured to respond to the mobilities of Bowen‟s writing by inflecting 
emerging Bowen criticism with a feeling for how her short stories re-read emotion; in 
being sensitive to the feeling of her short fiction, I hope we might develop our tact for 
her stories‟ textual affects.  This sensitivity, in turn, may also inflect the critical return 
to emotion, affect and feeling with the acuity Bowen‟s short stories have to the 
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textuality of feeling and the deconstructions that traverse her short fictions‟ 
preoccupations with reading emotion. In so doing, the work I have undertaken here has 
only begun to touch on the feeling for feeling that moves Bowen‟s stories. 
According to Bowen, the short story has a „poetic tautness and clarity…so 
essential to it that it may be said to stand at the edge of prose‟.5 Feeling this edginess 
and undecidability, this project has tried to be sensitive to the ways Bowen‟s short 
fiction tenders and retracts emotion. In „The Disinherited‟, Matthew Harvey, a man who 
„dreaded to desiccate‟ is impassioned by his wife‟s „uncertain manner‟: what he admires 
of Marianne is „that touch of the farouche‟ (CS: 377). A manner of being both shy and 
repellent, „farouche‟ has been traced to the Latin „foras‟ for outdoors or fierce, or 
„ferocum‟ meaning cruel: but the root is untenable, and the origin of „farouche‟ is 
unclear.
6
 Rather than diminish its feeling, however, this uncertainty mobilises and 
intensifies the farouche that touches us, offends us even, invading by shrinking away. 
Maud Ellmann remarks that „farouche‟ is Bowen‟s „favourite gallicism‟; not only a 
dictional affection, „farouche‟, for Phyllis Lassner, distinguishes the affective capacity 
of Bowen‟s stories to „tear through social and literary conventions‟. 7 Shying, repelling, 
engaging with its retreat, „farouche‟ recalls the „shrewish‟ affects that initiated this 
thesis. Yet, as Matthew‟s affection for Marianne reminds us, the impressions and 
manners of the farouche touch the heart, without ever apprehending it. Registering what 
Susan Osborn calls the „queer‟ style of Bowen‟s writing, in which „many of the 
words…appear curiously more substantial than the passage as a whole and direct us to 
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their definitions, the detonation in front of the meaning‟8, this „touch of the farouche‟ 
irreducibly gathers the unsettling textures, the detonations and deconstructions of 
Bowen‟s writing with emotion. 
Hermione Lee locates in Bowen‟s writing a „convergence of sensation and 
detachment‟9 that is most affecting in her writing, and writing about, short fiction. If 
these oppositions are inclined to meet in Bowen‟s stories, however, it is because their 
differentiation depends on emotion. Writing about emotion, remarks Sara Ahmed, 
„doesn‟t make emotion the centre of everything‟.10 This, then, is my final touch – that 
emotion is not the centre of Bowen‟s writing, but it is the heart of her short fiction. The 
heart traverses Bowen‟s stories, displaced and dislocated – displacing and dislocating – 
throughout her short fiction oeuvre until it beats, with a remarkable intensity, against its 
own figuration in Bowen‟s 1939 story „A Queer Heart‟.11 Here two sisters differentiate 
themselves, set each other apart, by the differences of their hearts: the dying Rosa 
distinguishes Hilda by her „shallow heart‟ (561), her „perverse heart‟ (561), her „wicked 
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heart, a vain silly heart‟ (561). Hilda‟s daughter wonders that Hilda „finds the heart‟ 
(557) to go out and Hilda is faulted for having heart, for keeping heart, for taking the 
things Rosa had „set my heart on‟ (561). Wondering if there is anything to Rosa, besides 
„implacable disappointment‟, Hilda thinks: „you poor queer heart; you queer heart, 
eating yourself out‟ (562). Traversing the heart with counterfeiting, unsettling, 
questioning and intensifying affects, „A Queer Heart‟ queers the heart until Hilda 
touches on the secret of their distinctions: „You‟re ever so like me, Rosa, really, aren‟t 
you? Setting our hearts on things. When you‟ve got them you don‟t notice‟ (562).  
If literature is to teach the heart, Bowen‟s short stories teach us to learn, by 
heart, this lesson: that the heart‟s emotions are not the security, the origin, or the 
reassurance of the subject, but instead, as Jacques Derrida writes, „the I is only at the 
coming of this desire: to learn by heart‟.12 The heart, like emotion, is not to be touched: 
this is how we touch. This is the Bowen affect: impassioned, we are like the lover of „A 
Walk in the Woods‟ who refuses to believe the woods „had no undiscovered heart, if 
one could only come on it‟ (CS: 489).
                                                     
12
 Jacques Derrida, „ “Che cos‟è la poesia?” in A Derrida Reader: Between the Blinds, ed. by Peggy 
Kamuf (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), pp. 223-237, p. 237. 
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